October 28, 2026 · Utilities And Energy · 23,300 words · 8 speakers · 103 segments
Thank you. Thank you. Thank you Thank you. Thank you. Thank you Thank you. Thank you. Thank you Thank you. Thank you. Thank you Thank you. Thank you. Thank you Thank you. Thank you. Thank you Thank you. Thank you. Thank you Good afternoon. Good afternoon and welcome. I am calling to order today's hearing of the Assembly Committee on Utilities and Energy. Today is the second hearing in our series on California's wildfire crisis. Today we turn to the generational investments that California is poised to make over the next two decades in our electric grid and the degree to which wildfire risk is threatening our ability to finance those investments. Before we dig in, I have some brief housekeeping announcements. Public comment is welcome in person. We'll have an opportunity for that at the conclusion of today's panels. Otherwise, public comment may be submitted online via the committee website. Lastly, as is customary, we will not accept disruptive behavior and will apply assembly rules to maintain order and run a fair hearing. With that to the business at hand, California is making truly generational investments in our electric grid. Over the course of the next 20 years, California is expected to increase generation capacity by some 300 percent and transmission capacity by some 350 percent. Over the next five years, PG&E, Southern California Edison, and SDG&E have planned about $125 billion of investment. That's roughly double what they spent a decade ago. And LADWP has its own more than $30 billion plan for power and water. These investments will connect new homes and businesses, power electric cars and buildings, replace aging equipment, and make our grid less likely to wildfire risk. These investments really are the backbone of California's housing, economic, and climate goals. This is, as I said, the second in our fall series of hearings on California's wildfire crisis. Last week, we asked whether the post-2019 safety regime has made Californians safer. Today, we turn to money. We're asking a few simple questions. How do we build the grid that California needs and on what terms? As we know, customers are already stretched incredibly thin. Rates at our three large IOUs have outpaced inflation since 2021, and the CPUC says that wildfire costs are the largest reason. Those wildfire costs now run about $41 a month on the average PG&E bill, $27 at SCE, and $21 at SDG&E. On top of that, wildfire risk is raising the price of capital itself. Ratings agencies have warned that if the wildfire fund runs dry, most of California's IOU sector could fall below investment grade. And we're already seeing the consequences of that. In September, PG&E deferred about $2 billion of planned 2027 investment, impacting new customer connections and clean energy interconnections. And public power is navigating these same challenges. After the January 2025 fires LADWP power bonds were downgraded two notches and that downgrade has already cost its customers millions of dollars in higher interest So today we are digging into three questions First what is the scale of the generational investment ahead Second how much is wildfire risk adding to the cost of this investment or leading to potential delays? And three, what are the options before us to rebalance this situation? We recognize that any solution to this crisis comes with trade-offs. And as we evaluate the options before us, the test really is very simple. What does it leave customers paying and what do California customers get in return? Tomorrow, we are going to continue this conversation with a joint hearing with the Insurance Committee. But for now, I think we are ready to begin. We will welcome the CPUC Executive Director, Luwam Tesfai, who will kick us off. Thank you, Executive Director, for joining us.
Great.
We will load those slides up and the floor is yours.
Thank you. Good afternoon Chair Petrie Norris and honorable members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to join you. My name is Luam Tesfai and I serve as the Executive Director for the California Public Utilities Commission. I will present an overview of how wildfire risks are affecting the financial stability of California utilities and what that means for electricity customers So this slide is going to be a roadmap of the presentation for today, so I'll be starting with California's clean energy investments growing wildfire risks and how the costs of preventing and responding to wildfires are affecting electricity bills for customers. I'll follow that with how the wildfire fund was established under AB 1054 and Senate bill 254 and help and how that helps utilities to manage wildfire liabilities and why concerns remain about whether those protections are sufficient to protect California ratepayers. And then how wildfire risks are affecting utility credit ratings, borrowing costs, and the ability to invest in the electric grid that we need. I'll also touch on why some utilities are facing greater financial risks because they do not have access to the wildfire fund. And finally, I'll also be discussing what additional reforms are needed to protect customers and maintain utility financial stability to support the California economy. So next I wanted to do some table setting on the California clean energy goals and where we are today. And really look at the big picture. California is asking its electricity grid to do more than ever. It's asking us to power more electric cars, homes, businesses, and to serve new industries like large loads from data centers. The state projects that the electricity we need will grow by about 20 gigawatts by 2040. And looking back we already been building out and building faster every single year And I know especially you Chair Future Norris have heard me present on that topic many times but always a good opportunity to share that You know and this top chart here really shows what come online since 2020 California has added about 38 gigawatts of new resources to the grid. Over the last three years, we've added nearly 7,000 megawatts each year. And another 18 gigawatts are already under contract and in development to be coming online by 2030. So this isn't just what we hope to have online. This is what's come online and we know is under construction. And so looking ahead at the other chart, it shows what it'll take to meet our climate goals and reach 100% clean electricity by 2045 under Senate Bill 100. That's more than 130 gigawatts of new capacity plus the high voltage power lines to deliver it to California customers. These grid investments are critical for three reasons. Reliability. And by that, I mean keeping our lights on, especially on the hottest days during peak demand. Next, our clean energy goals, staying on track to replace fossil fuels with clean power for customers. And then the greater growth of our economy. So serving new demand from electric vehicles and trucks, new housing that's essential, as well as the growing California economy. Under the current model, utilities pay for these projects up front by borrowing money on the capital markets and raising that from investors. Customers then pay it back in their bills over many years. So when it costs utilities more to borrow, that cost is on customers too. Today I'll present information about how wildfire risks specifically are affecting California utility financial stability and what that means for electricity customers. So wildfires in California have changed. Hotter weather, stronger winds, more dry brush, and more homes in high-risk areas mean that fires are bigger and more destructive than ever. So on this slide, we're showing how 14 of the state's 20 most destructive wildfires have occurred just since 2017 alone. In particular, the January 2025 Los Angeles wildfires alone caused an estimated $53 billion in economic losses. Utility equipment historically has accounted for slightly under 10% of wildfire ignitions. And with the mitigation over the past years, it's now down to approximately 6% of wildfire ignition, so we are seeing progress. Most utility and non-utility ignitions are suppressed with little or no damage. But in today's conditions, a few can grow into disasters costing tens of billions of dollars. Given their many thousand miles of electricity lines, utilities are unlikely in any near term to reduce the risk of utility ignitions to zero. And given existing liability laws, that means that even with continued wildfire mitigation efforts, utility customers remain exposed to potentially enormous wildfire costs. So on this slide, we'll be talking about authorized costs and really looking at how those expenditures are reviewed and approved by the California Public Utilities Commission. IN ADDITION TO THAT, WE HAVE REVENUE REQUIREMENTS, WHICH ARE THE AMOUNTS THE UTILITIES ARE AUTHORIZED TO RECOVER FROM CUSTOMERS THROUGH THEIR RATES. SO THERE'S A SLIGHT DIFFERENCE. there, and I think it's important to highlight here. Some costs, particularly capital investments, so there I'm talking about undergrounding, electricity poles, things of that nature, are recovered over many years, or over what we call the useful life of the asset. Revenue requirements may also include the recovery of costs that are authorized in previous years, which is why the two figures do not necessarily match in a given period. Now, separate from capital costs that I said are recovered over time, we have other costs like operations and maintenance, for example, vegetation management, labor costs. Those are collected from customers every year. And so it's important to realize that distinction. So wildfire costs are already a significant part of Californians' electricity bills. And so that's important to understand where we're starting today. Customers are already paying for this. So these authorized costs are expenditures that are approved and scrutinized by the California Public Utilities Commission, as well as our many stakeholders that are involved in our process. As this table shows, from 2020 through 2026, the CPUC authorized approximately $54 billion in wildfire-related costs for the three large investor-owned utilities, Pacific Gas and Electric, Southern California Edison, and San Diego Gas and Electric, as required in state law by Senate Bill 901, which was legislation from 2019 that pushed for costly and rapid wildfire mitigation for the electric system. About $39 billion was for wildfire mitigation, and nearly $15 billion was for wildfire liabilities. These costs are associated with approximately $37 billion in authorized revenue requirements. The two figures measure two different things, as I said earlier, and shouldn't be added together. But because some costs are recovered, as I said, over many years, they'll continue affecting customer bills well into the future. As of January 2026, wildfire costs accounted for 10 to 14% of a typical residential electric bill. So next I want to dive into a bit of the credit rating landscape. Wildfire risks have already weakened California utilities credit ratings. As this slide shows, several utilities are now near or below investment grade. A credit rating works a lot like a personal credit score. The lower the score, the more it costs to borrow. Below a certain line called investment grade, as you can see on this slide, borrowing gets much more expensive, and some large investors can't get money at all. Southern California Edison is rated triple B minus by S&P. just one downgrade away from falling below investment grade. PG&E is already below investment grade under S&P's rating scale, and this translates to additional costs for customers. And that additional cost is really a cycle, as I demonstrate on this slide. Uncapped utility liability of a wildfire event or risk of one even also puts utilities at risk of credit rating downgrades Credit rating downgrades negatively impact rate payers because they increase utility borrowing costs that are legally collected on customer bills These higher financing costs also constrain access to capital and make it harder for utilities to fund important projects like the ones that I talked about at the beginning of the presentation. This also includes wildfire safety improvements, grid upgrades, and infrastructure needed to serve growing electricity demand and to support the growth in California's economy. This also increased costs for utility energy contracts. This eventually leads, as you see on this slide, to liquidity strain, all of which adds cost pressures to every aspect of utility business. And finally, investor confidence is eroded when downgrades trigger market exit by utilities, stock price decline, and stock price volatility. So, for example, with respect to higher borrowing costs, PG&E estimates that wildfire-related borrowing cost premiums on bonds issued since 2017 will result in approximately $4.1 billion in additional interest expenses over the lives of those bonds. These expenses are legally required to be paid by California ratepayers, everyday customers. So maintaining utility financial stability is important not only for paying wildfire claims, but also for keeping the electric system reliable and affordable. So following the 2017 and 2018 wildfires and the PG&E bankruptcy, the legislature acted with AB 1054, which established the Wildfire Fund. The fund is a pot of money that helps utilities pay for eligible wildfire claims from utility-caused wildfires and to avoid another bankruptcy like PG&E's in 2019. It's paid for in a 50-50 split, half from utility shareholders and half from the ratepayers. Only the three large investor-owned utilities, Pacific Gas and Electric, Southern California Edison, and San Diego Gas and Electric, contribute to it and can draw from it. And as we know, there are many more utilities in the state of California that they cannot draw on the Wildfire Fund. The Wildfire Fund was an essential piece to allow PG&E to emerge from bankruptcy. The credit rating agencies have also been clear that continued access to a Wildfire Fund with more than $10 billion available is critical for the investor-owned utilities to keep their current credit rating and avoid further downgrades. The original fund had approximately $21 billion in initial claim-paying capacity, but it only covers eligible utility-caused fires that occurred before September of 2025. Three fires, Kincaid, Dixie, and Eaton, are expected to draw on it, with Eaton alone expected to use much of what's left. Importantly, until better estimates of Eaton are known, we will not know the amount of funding available for future fires, creating more uncertainty. For later utility cost fires, Senate Bill 254 more recently set up a process to fund a new continuation account of about $18 billion, but again with a split of 50-50 between shareholders and ratepayers, and again limited to the large three investor-owned utilities only. But that money isn't sitting in the account today. The funds administrator first has to determine that the funds are needed. And so until we get a better estimate on the Eaton fire, we will not know. Then the contributions come in over time on a set schedule. Utility contributions don begin until 2029 and ratepayer contributions don begin until 2036 That means if a major utility fire happens before the account has been built up the money to pay claims would have to be borrowed against those future contributions. Borrowing adds costs and may limit how much is actually available to pay the claims of victims. Given how large wildfire damages can be, the current funding framework is not enough to cover future catastrophic utility caused wildfires. Another major utility caused fire will very likely cause more credit downgrades and possibly bankruptcy. Now I touched on this at a brief level earlier but I do want to further emphasize it with its own slide. Only the large investor owned utilities PG&E, San Diego Gas & Electric and Southern California Edison have access to the wildfire fund. The other investor-owned utilities like Liberty Utilities or Pacific Corps and the publicly-owned utilities like LADWP, Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, have no access to this fund. Instead, they rely on their own insurance, liquidity, borrowing capacity, as well as the rate-setting authority that the publicly-owned utilities have over themselves to manage wildfire-related financial exposure. These tools are likely inadequate in the event of a major wildfire. So this is my final slide. Reform is necessary and it is urgent. The options we have today may not be there after the next big fire. Absent structural reform, the status quo will see continued increased and unaffordable electric bills. Constrained electric service due to credit downgrades. And when I say electric service, I mean all of this housing we're trying to bring online or new electricity generation resources, and limited access to capital that hampers the overall California economy. Without reform, even the status quo is not sustainable. Future fires are likely to bankrupt and further downgrade electric utilities, further increasing rates and threatening the state's ability to provide safe, reliable electric service. Thank you, and I'm open to taking questions from the committee.
Wonderful. Thank you, Executive Director Tess Fai. Questions from the committee for the Executive Director, Assemblymember Papin.
Well, thank you so much for the presentation. I do appreciate it. I had a quick question. So the backgrounder notes that it is that about each percentage point added to financing is about $5 on the monthly bill of residential folks. And I just want to believe that that relationship also works in the inverse, and it is that each percentage point that's removed from a liability getting financing costs, that that is credited. And is there a way of ensuring that any savings from lower cost debt will reach consumers?
So right now, through Assembly Bill, I think it was 2666, we were able to create a team to be able to track those costs as well as those savings related to return on equity. And so the Public Utilities Commission opened a new proceeding this year called the Rate Case Plan Proceeding, where we are going to be working on implementing that in order to be able to track in both directions. right now we are gathering the data, we have it on our website, but we want to look at it in a more granular fashion. So the PUC opened that new rulemaking to be able to work with stakeholders on how to create that transparency and visibility and track it both ways Thank you Madam Executive Director for being here Appreciate the presentation and all the work that you doing as well as your board and the commission I guess my main question
goes to slide 11 where, you know, reform urgency is talked about and sort of the options that you lay out. And I don't think anyone here would disagree that we need reform. We need to fix the status quo, which isn't working. And we need to make sure that we're delivering affordable, effective energy that is also protecting people from wildfires. So I think everyone's on the same page. What is not in your list is a cap on liability. You don't list that specifically. And so I want to get, I guess, your honest opinion on what, if anything, you think we should be doing in terms of pushing for a cap on liability for shareholders of IOUs?
Yeah. So, you know, that isn't something I'm prepared to talk in in detail, but I am happy to talk about it at a higher level and the benefit of what that cap would be for utility customers. And having that cap in place, it creates more certainty in the capital markets. And so as utilities are going out there to borrow money, investors, pension funds that are considering investing, have certainty about what their return will possibly look like when it's well managed and being able to feel confident that we have our firefighter pension, our teacher pension, that these are the types of investors we want the utilities to have. Those that have the long game perspective here, because as you could see from my earlier slide about all of the build out that we're trying to do, it's a long game. And so those are the kind of investors that we want to have for our utilities. And so being able to seriously look into a cap on liability is something that I think is very urgent and being able to have that in place so that we are able to create that stability, that understanding of what the level of risk exposure is, and be able to draw the right kinds of investors to the California utilities. Great. Thank you.
Just a couple questions, and thank you for joining us. As I noted in my opening comments, we are already feeling the consequences to some extent of this. I like this slide. I think this does a good job of explaining whether we're in a virtuous cycle or a doom spiral. And I think, as I noted in my opening comments, we're already seeing the consequences of some of the fallout from this cycle with PG&E's announcement in September that they were deferring $2 billion in plan 2027 investment. And we are going to be hearing from someone from PG&E in our next panel. But from the CPUC side, how are you going to monitor whether that deferral is delaying new connections and ensure that the IOUs are continuing to meet SB410 and AB50 obligations?
So we have a couple of different ways. And so focusing, I'll talk about SB410, but I also want to talk, which has to do with customers getting energized. and then we're also doing tracking on the generation side as well. And so with Senate Bill 410, we work collaboratively with the Governor's Office of Business and Economic Development to be able to troubleshoot with customers who have challenges with getting energized and connected to the grid. I will say in response to that legislation, there has been significant investment that has been put into energization, and so some of those drawn-out timelines that we saw a few years ago that kind of spurred that legislation have been largely closed. So that's very positive, but we want to keep it closed, right? We want to keep it closed. that timeline there. And so right now the PUC in response to that legislation, we put out a decision about a year and a half ago with tracking and reporting on a quarterly basis of the energization timelines that we set out. We also had to create energization timelines. So we did that as well, but we also have reporting on that timeline so that all of the investor-owned utilities are reporting to us how they're meeting all of those milestones with customers. And we look at that on a quarterly basis, but also on an aggregated basis. And so that's a really important part to make sure that the requirements are being met and also see what the larger trajectory is. And so we've seen that largely closed. Now, with this announcement, there might be challenges to that. And we do want the utilities to think very closely about how much it costs to borrow the capital to get these customers connected, because that's going to end up on everyone's bills. Now, in addition to that, on the generation side, that announcement also affected the generation side and those customers getting connected to the grid. And so we have our tracking energy development task force, which includes the Public Utilities Commission, Governor's Office of Business and Economic Development, the California Independent System Operator, and the California Energy Commission, where we regularly meet with developers that are trying to get their projects interconnected, understanding what impacts they're seeing. And so when they received those notices, they promptly let us know that they received those notices. And so we are connected with them in order to be able to track that data and see how they're being impacted. And then in addition to that, we have an open general rate case for Pacific Gas and Electric. And we'll also be able to look into this issue there as well through the stakeholder process. And then to the, I guess, to the heart of the conversation that we want, that we're trying to have this fall is, you know, how do we move forward from here?
How do we start to tackle some of these challenges and create better balance? In the CPUC's response to the CEA in putting together the SB254 report, I'm sure you offered a number of recommendations. but I want to ask about a couple of them. So one, the CPUC recommended escalating repayment for imprudent utilities, and number two, paying for part of wildfire mitigation work with non-ratepayer funds. I guess two questions. One, do you still believe that those recommendations would be helpful? And two, can you speak a bit more to what that would look like in practice?
Yeah. Yeah. So our recommendations, we still stand by those recommendations that we had to the 254 report. And in particular, you know, looking at the impact of wildfire, it impacts everyone in the state. But right now we have a significant amount of work like vegetation management that is being paid for through just the ratepayer bills. And so that's a limited number of people in California when the impact of not doing that work and the benefit of doing that work impacts everyone in the state. And so being able to leverage non-ratepayer source of dollars so that we can more equitably pay for those types of essential, that type of essential mitigation work is something that we strongly recommend be considered by the legislature so that we can more equitably pay for that type of infrastructure. In particular, when those costs are recovered from customers, though we have a small infrastructure charge on utility bills, they're largely collected volumetrically. And so you really see customers that have high electricity bills for example paying shouldering most of those costs And so you end up with an equity concern there as well about a lot of that mitigation occurring in certain parts of the state and then customers in these other areas where maybe they're just using a lot of electricity or shouldering most of that burden. So that equity concern remains. And then at the end of our legislative session, the governor sent a letter to the CPUC asking you to report by November 1st. So this is a little
early on downgrades, borrowing costs, and access to capital. Can you share any sort of preview on what your response and your recommendations will be in that report that is coming out in a few days?
Yeah. So we are working expeditiously on the report to get it out on time. We were on a very tight timeline. It was given to us by the governor. And so you will largely see in that report a lot of the same recommendations that, as I said, we stand by from our submission to the SB25 report. And so we are also, you know, shoring up the numbers there in the report, too, just so that we can provide you with the data and analytical impacts to customers, some that I shared here, but will be in the report as well.
All right. Great. Thank you. We'll look forward to that. Thank you again, Executive Director. We appreciate you being here. And with that, we'll go ahead and welcome our second panel. We are just everyone can kind of come up and I'll read our panelists. We are going to be joined by Marie Becker, the Vice President, Internal Auditor and Treasurer at Pacific Gas and Electric, by Dan Dunmoyer, the President and Chief Executive Officer, the California Building Industry Association, by Jan Smutney-Jones, the Chief Executive Officer of the Independent Energy Producers Association, Ralph Armstrong, the Senior Assistant Business Manager at the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 1245. By Mark Toney, the Executive Director of the Utility Reform Network. And Fernando Valero, the Executive Director of Strategic Issues, the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power. And is that it? One more, sorry. And by Sam Brothwell, the Vice President of Strategic and Financial Advisory at MCR Performance Solutions. So welcome. Thank you all for being here. I know we've got a full dais, but I think that really reflects just, I think, the scale and sweep of the challenge before us and the degree to which this impacts stakeholders across the state of California. And so with that, I think we're going to go ahead and begin, Vice President Becker, with you.
Chair Petrie-Norris, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today on these important issues. My name is Mari Becker. I'm Vice President and Treasurer at PG&E, and so my role at the company includes going out to the markets to raise the capital that we use to invest in infrastructure on behalf of our customers. At PG&E, we are committed to delivering the energy to the 16 million Californians who live in our territory, Central and Northern California. And we're proud of our progress. That includes four consecutive years with no major wildfires associated with our equipment. It includes five electric rate decreases over the last two years. And we will continue to focus on that work. But the central point I'd like to convey in these remarks right now is that wildfire financial risk is making capital more expensive to do that work And that is making energy more expensive for Californians And left unaddressed those challenges are also going to make it harder for us to do the work that expected for California on the timeline that our customers would like As we heard from Executive Director Tesfai just now, since 2017, wildfire risk has been a major determinant of the credit quality of California's investor-owned utilities. And that really reflects the fact that we play two roles. One, we provide essential, are an essential infrastructure business for the state. But second, under inverse condemnation, we provide an insurance backstop role in the state. And that puts significant financial liabilities onto us. And that is unique. Faced with those challenges, legislative action has been very supportive for credit quality. That includes AB 1054 that was passed in 2019, as well as SB 254 last year. But the catastrophic wildfires in Southern California in early 2025 really changed the perspective on the durability of that framework under AB 1054. And that really is why we are here today. The final financial markets have reacted and reacted strongly to that condition. Since January 2025, Southern California Edison has been downgraded by the agencies. PG&E's progress towards investment-grade ratings has stalled. And S&P has warned that in the absence of action, as the current fund is depleted, both PG&E and Edison will be downgraded multiple notches in rating agency terminology to the single B category. And just to put that in perspective, that would make California and, excuse me, PG&E and Edison the lowest rated utilities in the United States. And so there are real consequences to our customers of that possibility. And these issues are not theoretical. Higher financing costs associated with unaddressed risk is already reflected in our rates. We just heard from Executive Director Tesfai. A PG&E's estimate is that for debt we've issued since 2017, that has committed our customers to an incremental $4 billion in interest expenses. And if we include Southern California Edison and SDG&E's estimates, that grows to $6 billion of higher costs that Californians will have to bear. The status quo is also impairing our ability to do the work that our customers want. And we did have to announce last month a $2 billion deferral of our 2027 capital plans. First, I just have to emphasize that that is not a decision we made lightly. And we respect entirely that it has real implications for our customers and their needs. But that is a decision that was also necessitated by the environment we're in. And we cannot continue to grow our capital plan without some of these issues being addressed. And so the circumstances reflect a difficult cycle. More wildfire financial uncertainty leads to weaker credit. Weaker credit leads to more expensive capital. And more expensive capital puts upward pressure on customer bills. And all of this constrains the investments that California needs. The status quo is therefore not neutral, and our customers are paying for it. So these issues raise the question of what's needed to support investment-grade utilities. and importantly, you know, past legislation through AB 1054 and SB 254 has shown what some elements of investment grade supportive solutions might look like. The rating agencies have been pretty clear in their publications about what they're looking for. That does include a disallowance limitation on potential exposure in the event of a utility caused fire particularly when the utility is prudent in its actions and meeting its commitments in how it is managing wildfire risk. Also as in previous legislation you know a disallowance limitation could exist alongside utility accountability measures and as was discussed at last week's hearings we welcome rigorous review and accountability to ensure that that we are aligned with the safety outcomes of the state. And so in closing, I'll return to my central point. The status quo is hurting affordability and threatens our ability to make investments California needs at the pace California expects. Potential solutions could consider those elements needed to support strong credit quality, and we hope you will act with urgency on these issues. Thank you.
Thank you. And members, what we're gonna do is hear from our panelists and then open it up for questions and conversation.
Mr. John Moyer, thanks for being here. Thank you, Madam Chair. Petrie Norris, members, esteemed members of the committee, Dan Dunn-Moyer, President and CEO of the California Building Industry Association. We're the business association that represents the shelter industry. Our members build all types of housing, pure charity for homeless, legally defined affordable apartments, multifamily condos, single family detached. So all components of the housing industry and all are impacted by today's conversation. We also build the most energy-efficient homes in the world. We have supported – we're the only building industry association in America that supported mandatory solar. We're the only industry that – building industry in America that supported the most strict requirements for energy efficiency. We're unparalleled anywhere in the world for energy efficiency. We are now building homes that charge multiple electric vehicles. They have all electric appliances. That's the great news. The challenge, as you'll see, is that demands, as the executive director testified, just mentioned a tremendous amount of energy. So we are very much in this discussion because we build the homes that people want, the energy efficiency that the state of California has urged us to do and we are doing. But it's also impacting how we build. Today, I want to respond to the way the agenda is framed, the impact of the recent actions that have occurred most since you've left your regular session. So we're the canary in the coal mine, for lack of a better term. And being next to my colleague from PG&E, keep in mind, we represent pretty much all components of what it takes to build a home. So that includes utilities. That includes insurance. So we pick sides. We pick sides with all of them. And we want all of them to thrive, to succeed, and to produce the most efficient price for our customers because high utility costs and high insurance costs means fewer people buy our product, which are homes. So as a result of that, we're very interested in this issue because the future of housing is the future success of this committee's actions and the legislature's actions. But where do we sit? Well, I'd like to say right now, since you adjourned in your regular session, we are in a state of great concern. And I'll use the word. It sounds kind of alarmist, but it is where our members are. So let me communicate it. The word is cataclysmic. So as my colleague to my left just said so articulately, Ms. Poppy came forward as on October 15th, she sent a letter, which I have with me here, which is sent to all of our members. And I'm sure you've seen his copies of this. But, well, we have a great relationship with PG&E. And since Ms. Poppy has been in charge of it, our relationship and our ability to build, turn power on and move our homes has improved from a 5% positive factor, which is really low, to an 85% positive. So this is no disparaging remark on our leadership. It's been fantastic. She's been a great partner with us. But as was said by the expert to my left, you're right. That letter went out, and that letter to us is truly game-changing. So what does that letter really mean? Well, effectively, what Ms. Poppy said was, I'm sorry to tell you, but we're going to go really slow next year. And your delays, her words, not mine, range from one to six months for your housing projects. We don't have one to six months in this market. Interest rates are the highest they've been. Fortunately, the Fed's didn't move on it today. But reality, the fact is we don't borrow money at the low rate of 7.5%. We borrow money at 15% to 18%. Why? Because building homes in California is very high risk. So when PG&E, and I'm just speaking on them, SCE is around the corner to having to do this if they get downgraded even more. When they step into this requirement to slow things down, which is totally understandable, you have to stick with your existing customers. You can't focus on customers you don't have yet, but those are our customers, the home buyers. So as a result of this dynamic, a one- to six-month delay for our projects, just think this through. You walk through your home. It's been approved. You look at it. Everything's the way you wanted. They fixed up the touch-up paint. And then the home builder says, hey, I'm sorry to inform you, but PG&E will be out in about four months to turn on your power. That means you're living in a hotel room for four months. The record, by the way, is nine months. This has all changed, though, in the last couple years. It's a few days. We've worked this out with PG&E and SCE. But with this announcement, that means we don't know if the power will turn on to our homes because PG&E has to go slow. And we have this great partnership, so we're going to try to work through this. But the more profound one, besides turning on the power slow, is does the project even get started? If PG&E has to come to us saying, hey, we really can't move on the infrastructure because we can't get the investments we need, we don't have the money, the cost of money is too high, we don't have the credit worthiness to do this, they rightfully have to slow things down. But what that means in English is we don't build the homes. So for us, this isn't a kind of a problem. This is a crisis. And this will start in about 60 days. So for us and the building industry, we're very interested in resolution and solutions to be here. I know I focused on PG&E, but SCE hasn't really publicly announced the fact they're going to probably get hit with a large, similar kind of cost, and they're going to have to take similar actions. So we're concerned across the board. This is about 85 percent of the buildout in California because Inland Empire, Orange County, Central Valley, Sacramento, and East Bay are our biggest buildout areas. So this is a massive part of the state's housing. I do want to say, and I just want to say the staff report on this, I did read it. I had a long flight from Atlanta this morning, so it's been up since 3.30. But the report is really well done in outlining the challenges you face as decision makers. And it's not easy because you have to keep insurers solvent. You have to keep the utilities solvent. But most importantly, you have to keep consumers happy. Those are the people who let you. So we desire to do that with you because we have the same constituent in this case, the identical constituent. So my hope, I'll just say this, I'm hopeful that what we're warring factions might come together. Those are insurers and utilities. And they might sit down and try to come forward with some sort of a path to you on a process that might work. I'll also ask, because we don't have time, that you move quicker than later. I'll go so boldly as to say this word special session, just because we have a governor who wants to do something. Not saying the next governor, he or he might not want to do something, but this governor's confronted this for seven and a half years. And all of you, and thank you for holding these hearings, have been confronting this for the last five, six, eight years yourselves. We have 20 new legislators coming in. I'm sure they're equally as bright as you are, but they're going to be somewhat confounded by the complexity of this issue. Okay, they're not, but let's say they're close to it. Sorry, Ms. Pappin. But we want to make sure we think we have the ability to get this done sooner than later especially because housing put on hold starting January 2nd So last thing I just want to say is thank you I THINK WE HAVE THE ABILITY TO GET THIS DONE SOONER THAN LATER ESPECIALLY BECAUSE HOUSING IS PUT ON HOLD STARTING JANUARY 2ND SO LAST THING I JUST WANT TO SAY IS THANK YOU THANK YOU FOR HAVING THIS HEARING THANK YOU FOR MAKING THIS A PRIORITY. AGAIN, AS I SAID BEFORE, WE HAVE ALLIES ON ALL SIDES OF THIS. AND SO WE REALLY WANT TO COME FORWARD AND BE PART OF THE SOLUTION. SO ANYTHING WE CAN DO AT CBA TO HELP IN THIS DISCUSSION, WE'RE HERE TO HELP. THANK YOU, MADAM CHAIR.
THANK YOU, MR. DUNMOYER. MR. SMETNEY-JONES.
Thank you very much, Madam Chair, members of the committee. And I, too, would like to thank you for holding this hearing. It's very important and very timely, and it was a great background paper. I thought it was one of the more informative ones I've read on a very complex issue. Kudos, as always, to our incredible consultants, Ms. Scheibat, Ms. Tatapudi. Thank you. Yeah. So I'm Janis Money-Jones. I represent the Independent Energy Producers Association. We represent a wide range of renewable solar, wind, geothermal, biomass, as well as a significant amount of the gas fleet, and we were some of the first folks in the storage business. So we've been doing this since 1982. We work in all the utilities, CCAs, our customers. We're very active in basically generating power to Californians. My bottom line is wildfire liability and the underlying utility financial instability is existential threat to California's goals of bringing reliable, affordable and sustainable electricity to ratepayers. Reducing that liability and stabilizing the financial health needs to be the top energy goal in meeting this threat. Why am I here? Well, the session ended without a mechanism to address the wildfire liability and associated credit to utilities. As you've heard, the credit agencies reacted immediately, downgrading both PG&E and Edison, increasing the cost of borrowing for interconnection and transmission. This has had a real negative real-world effect on independent energy suppliers doing business in California and supplying clean and reliable electricity to customers, whether they're PG&E, Edisons, CCAs, or POUs. As you heard, 68 clean energy projects have gotten a notice from PG&E indicating their previously scheduled interconnections for 2027 are going to be deferred, and this is seriously affecting development schedules. And it's very important to underscore, as these projects were part of the midterm reliability procurement,
needed to meet future reliability needs starting in 2030. And so these are timed in such a way that we really can't slow down. PG&E has indicated they're trading $2 billion out of the $13.2 billion that was part of their original credit plan and interconnection of residential housing, large loads, and obviously my members are affected by this decision. And you've heard the reason for the credit downgrade. They're concerned about borrowing money at high interest rates leads to long-term affordability. So just briefly to explain how all this works is the California Energy Commission, PUC, and the CalISO identify we spend lots of time on planning future needs and necessary transmission to deliver resources. The energy producers we live in a competitive market so that put out to bid and people make those bids based on creditworthy parties at very specific times and this includes obviously the ISOs And these resources depend on a timely delivery We're up against some pretty significant time constraints, one of them being the solar tax credits, which basically expire in 2030. Missed that date, game over. It's at least a 30% increase in the cost of those units. So that's a significant problem. And I'll just note, just last week it was announced to clarify that the Strategic Energy Reserve, you were briefed, I think, in May about the fact that we met this summer, we were fined reliability-wise, we had an insurance policy to Strategic Energy Reserve, which was 3,000 megawatts of some older resources. They are now being mothballed. So they're gone for next year and for probably all time to come. But the point is that they were going to be replaced with additional reliability products coming out of this midterm reliability plan. So immediate legislative action needs to be taken on this to stabilize the California market so we can basically meet our affordability needs reliably and with sustainable resources. and time is not on our side. I agree with my colleagues' interpretation of how quick it needs to be. Thank you. Next up, Mr. Armstrong.
Good afternoon, Chair Peter Norris and members of the committee. My name is Ralph Armstrong. I'm Senior Assistant Business Manager with International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 1245, where we represent about 30,000 men and women, our 30,000 belly buttons that are responsible for building, maintaining, and operating the electrical infrastructure in the state of California. I'm also a descendant appointee to the California Wildfire Safety Advisory Board, where I spend most of my time dealing with rid hardening, vegetation management, and safety. So I'm here today, though, speaking on behalf of labor. The lack of meaningful wildfire relief for the California investor-owned utilities could have serious consequences for the men and women that keep the lights on, maintain our energy infrastructure, and restore power after disasters. IBDF 1245 members are not responsible for wildfire policy decisions, yet they bear the consequences through reduced utility investments, delayed infrastructure projects, hiring freezes, layoffs, which we are in the midst of right now. We're going to see probably roughly about 1,000 people laid off right now through the holidays. Fewer opportunities for apprentices in the next generation of skilled workers. I want to emphasize something here that the electrical infrastructure that California depends on is being built, maintained, and protected by the men and women of California. These California workers are raising California families and contributing to California's economy. These are good-paying, family-supporting union jobs. The wages our members earn don't simply disappear into the economy. They are spent right here in California. They support local businesses, restaurants, grocery stores, housing, schools, and communities. Every paycheck helps circulate money throughout the state's economy. When these jobs are protected, California families benefit, local businesses benefit, and the state as a whole benefits. Our members are also on the front lines of wildfire prevention. grid maintenance emergency response and power restoration They essential to making California electric system safer and more reliable The investments made in our electrical infrastructure are investments in public safety economic growth and California future Undermining the financial stability of the utilities, the utilities responsible for work could jeopardize the investments needed to reduce wildfire risks, strengthen the grid, and protect California communities. I could also put thousands of good-paying jobs and future career opportunities at risk. We recognize the importance of supporting wildfire victims and ensuring accountability. Those who have suffered through these devastating fires deserve the support, and we must continue working towards meaningful solutions. However, California must find a balance approach to provide relief while protecting ratepayers, maintaining critical infrastructure investments, and safeguarding the skilled workforce the state depends on. We cannot lose sight of the bigger picture. California needs a strong, reliable electrical system to support its residents, businesses, and future growth. And that infrastructure will continue to be built by California workers, whose jobs and economic contributions are an important part of what keeps the state moving forward. Wildfire recovery should not come at the expense of working families, good-paying union jobs, and California's energy reliability. I urge the committee to consider the impacts of not taking action on labor at whole and the thousands of California families that depend on these jobs. We must find a solution to support the wildfire victims, protect ratepayers, preserve good-paying jobs, and ensure California continues investing in infrastructure necessary for the state's future. I look forward to any questions you might have. Thank you.
Mr. Valero.
Afternoon, members. Thanks for having me. Fernando Valero, Executive Director of Strategic Issues at LADWP, with wildfire being number one on my strategic issues list for DWP. I want to thank you for examining how wildfire risk impacts our ability to invest and keep water and power safe and reliable. First, let me say that we agree with the central finding of the California Earthquake Authority's SB254 study. Catastrophic wildfire risk is a statewide problem. It needs statewide solutions, and the losses from wildfire can be more than one utility, one city, and its customers can carry on its own. As a result of this risk, financing LEDW's operations and investments have become increasingly expensive. For context, when we replace a water main, strengthen a power line, or build a substation, we pay for this work up front, and customers pay for that investment over many years that they use it. Bonds let us spread this cost over the life of the equipment, but every dollar of interest is another dollar customers pay, as we have no shareholders to share that cost. Our five-year plan includes about $30.5 billion of investment in power and water, of which we expect to borrow about $21 billion and fund the rest from cash and revenues from the system that is generated over time. Those investments support wildfire mitigation, reliable service, clean energy, and the water network our city needs. ownership impacts how we raise money. Investor-owned utilities can borrow and raise money from shareholders, and the Public Utilities Commission sets the financing mix and the returns customers pay through rates. For LADWP, we have no shareholders, so we rely solely on customer revenues and borrowing with our rates approved locally. Now, while our bonds qualify for tax-exempt financing, which helps keeps costs down, that advantage does not protect us from wildfire risk, nor do we have access to the state wildfire fund that's available to participating investor-owned utilities, which rating agencies have noted. At the same time, we must replace aging infrastructure, prepare for more severe fire conditions, and meet our clean energy commitments. Insurance is increasingly costly and limited, and customers are already facing rising bills because rates cover the debt service and cash funding we need for this infrastructure. In the case of a wildfire, the credit consequences can arrive before responsibility for a fire is even established. So on January 14, 2025, after the Palisades fire, S&P cut both our power and water ratings by two notches, even though its own report noted our infrastructure had not been implicated as the cause. That is because of the liability paradigm in California, which was enough for the rating agencies to raise concern about our finances. When lenders see more risk, it creates two issues. They demand more interest, and two, some become unwilling to lend at all. This risk manifests itself in increased costs. For example, assuming LADWP's current five-year capital plan, a two-letter downgrade of DWP's credit rating could increase borrowing costs by over $900 million. These costs ultimately reach households because cash used for interest is cash potentially not used in other areas of need, such as reliability investments. To preserve the same investment program, we would need more revenue from rates, and that burden falls hardest on people with the least room in their budgets due to the regressive nature of our rates. Our residents also fund city services, so financial stress can reach them twice. Last session, we put proposals on the table. Clear standards of care for utilities with associated utility accountability Meaningful liability limits Subrogation reform in a state-administered wildfire insurance framework Or publicly-owned utility wildfire fund We want victims to receive timely compensation And we also need to preserve the resilience investment that prevents future harm A workable solution must do both And we look forward to working with you on that Thanks
Thank you. Mr. Tony.
Thank you very much. I think I found it. Thank you very much, Chair Petrie-Norris, members of the committee. My name is Mark Tony. I serve as Executive Director of TURN the Utility Reform Network Policymakers face a difficult choice on wildfire reform One is to treat utility executives and shareholders as a special interest group that needs protection. The other is to protect the public interest by standing with California residents and businesses that need ratepayer relief to keep the lights on, keep operating in the state, and meet climate goals. Now, PG&E is right when they say that lower utility credit ratings equals higher borrowing costs that are passed to ratepayers. But we disagree that the best way that capping shareholder liability is the best pathway to increase credit ratings, especially because that means that rate payers would be responsible for 100% of the cost over the cap. One of the themes that has come up over and over today is that credit ratings are based on risk. And so we think that reducing risk is a better way to increase credit ratings and reduce ratepayer costs. Two strategies. One, reduce the debt equity ratio in financing, which hasn't come up yet. And the other is to limit payouts from the wildfire fund. So let me start with reducing the debt equity ratio. I'm going to use PG&E as an example. Okay. The higher a company's debt equity ratio, the higher risk it is deemed by the market. The report that you received verified that the commission has authorized a 48% debt, 52% equity ratio for financing for California IOUs. But PG&E's actual debt to equity ratio is much higher than authorized due to CPUC exemptions and waivers. So it's more like 54% to 58% debt and only 42%, 46% equity. This is important because the market values risk based on actual gap ratios, not CPUC authorized ratios. So what that means is that the debt costs more to borrow. So when we were talking about the $4 billion of extra, part of that is because of this high debt-to-equity ratio. Our solutions are end exemptions and waivers for PG&E, mandating that its actual debt-to-equity ratio be in compliance with the authorized ratio would result in lower cost of financing capital projects. PG&E should be required to issue more equity. That's how you rebalance it. The management and shareholders have been trying to do everything they can to avoid that. Credit agencies have expressively state that issuing additional equity would likely strengthen PG&E's credit rating and would result in lower financing costs. I have included a memo from one of our attorneys that explains that I not going to go into it So there are things that can be done outside of wildfire liability to reduce risk and reduce the cost and increase credit rating. We need to look at that. Let's not overlook that. The second thing is to limit payments from the wildfire fund. SB 254 study provides a policy roadmap, invest in wildfire risk reduction to reduce ignition and spread of fires, protect utility rate payers from unlimited wildfire liability, and establish the state as the wildfire insurer of last resort. I'm not going to go through all of these right now. I'm open to questions. The one thing I do want to talk about, focus on, is we've got to do something to limit how many parties are collecting from the wildfire fund so that the wildfire fund can be focused on wildfire victims, can be focused on losses, and not be looked at as a double-dipping opportunity for insurance companies. for a bonanza, for attorneys, for hedge funds. The other thing we need to do is to restore the negligence standard that requires utilities to demonstrate prudence when their equipment starts a wildfire. I have some suggestions on establishing the state as the wildfire insurer of last resort. It is absolutely important that ratepayer-centered risk reduction that increases utility credit worthiness be adopted over shareholder-centered strategies that expose ratepayers to unlimited costs. My final point, please, whatever you do, release the wildfire reform bill language at least 30 days before you vote on it. The public deserves a fair chance to participate in democratic decision making process that will dig into their pockets for decades to come. Thank you.
Thank you. All right. And last, but certainly not least, we are going to be hearing from Mr. Brothwell. Thanks for being here.
Thank you, Mr. Tony, for the chair. Thank you, Madam Chair and members of the committee for the opportunity to be here today. And I would also like to commend the background report that was sent out. I thought it was comprehensive, objective, and very informative, so thank you for that. My name is Sam Brothwell, and I head the strategic and financial advisory practice at MCR Performance Solutions. We're an independent consulting firm that has worked exclusively with the utility industry for more than 27 years. I've personally spent more than 40 years in energy and utility finance. I've worked in investor relations for two utilities, in credit analysis at Moody's, equity research at Merrill Lynch and Wells Fargo, and spent 10 years at Energy Income Partners, a $7 billion energy infrastructure investment firm. So I spent most of my career looking at utilities through the eyes of investors More recently I led a study for the American Gas Association looking at why utility customer rates have been rising and just as importantly, why access to capital matters if utilities are going to continue providing safe, reliable, and affordable service. These are important issues across the country, but I think it's fair to say they're especially important here in California. So there's three key points I'd like to share with you today. First, risk matters. Risk matters a lot. It's the fulcrum under the tipping point that's referred to at the title of this hearing. Investors constantly weigh risk against return in very competitive markets. As risk goes up, as we've heard, investors expect a higher return. That means financing gets more expensive. And at some point, as we've also heard today, the risk can simply become too great. Investors have choices, and they can put their money to work somewhere else. That's an important issue for California utilities today as they face some unique risks that aren't found in other states. Unlike most other industries, utilities can't simply pack up their operations and move to another state to mitigate those risks. But investors can move their money. And we're seeing signs of that pressure today as investor capital reallocation is reflected in utility stock prices, credit ratings, and borrowing costs. Importantly, this isn't just a big electric company issue. Yesterday, I was at a water conference in Monterey where I heard a small mom-and-pop water utility worry about being sued when hydrants run dry because nobody understands that their system wasn't built to fight wildfires. My second point is that debt and equity are closely connected. We sometimes talk about bondholders and stockholders as though they operate in two separate worlds, and they really don't. Shareholders provide an important financial cushion for lenders because they're the first to absorb losses. That matters to creditors and it matters to the rating agencies. Equity is also important because the stock market represents a very large pool of potential capital, three to five times the size of corporate and municipal debt markets. So if California utilities are going to make the investments that the state needs, They need ready access to both debt and equity capital on terms competitive with utilities in other states. My third point is about the basic bargain that goes with investing in a utility. Historically, utilities have been viewed as relatively low-risk investments. They provide essential services, operate in defined service territories, and are largely protected from competition by regulation. In exchange for those protections, investors accept something else, and that is that their returns are limited by rate regulation. That bargain can work when the risks are also reasonably limited. But when you combine capped upside with potentially unlimited downside, the equation changes and becomes far riskier. Investors at that point begin to ask a pretty simple question. Why should I take that risk when I can invest somewhere else? And if enough investors come to that conclusion, the cost of capital goes up, and eventually the availability of capital can become an issue as well. That brings me back to the central challenge facing California. Every state has to balance customer affordability with the need to attract investment. California is really at the epicenter of that challenge today. Investors understand that California needs enormous investment to maintain and improve our energy infrastructure. But those same investors have choices. They decide every day where to put their capital, whether that be in another state or another industry. Today, the balance between risk and reward for California's investor-owned utilities is increasingly tilted toward risk. If that continues, capital will become more expensive and go elsewhere and very possibly not return. And that's happening at exactly the same time that California needs investment to maintain safe, reliable, and affordable energy service. So if there's one thought I would like to leave you with, it's this. utilities can't leave California, but investor capital can. Thank you very much for the opportunity to be here, and I'd be happy to answer any questions.
Thank you. Thank you again to all of our panelists. I think you did a tremendous job of just, I think, setting out exactly what's at stake, whether you are a California worker, someone who's building houses or wanting to buy a home, clean energy producer, a utility consumer. And I think just one thing I want to make super explicit to committee members that are here and folks that may be listening, one of the reasons that we're spending an entire hearing really talking about the money and talking about financing is because as we're thinking about, as we said, these generational investments, it turns out that the most important part of these projects, it's not the steel in the ground. It's the money. it's the money and the more that we can set a policy foundation that lowers the cost of that money that translates into massive savings for california customers and on the flip side and you know i really appreciate mr brothel your comments if we don't reset that balance and the cost of the money spirals out of control that is ultimately going to hit the bottom line for all of the constituents that we represent. Okay, so with that, any questions for panelists? Ms. Papin.
Well, thank you, Madam Chair. And that was one of the reasons why I wanted to come today, because one thing I learned early on is nothing happens in public policy without the God-almighty dollar working. And so if there's a hearing that's important to 40 million Californians, It's this one. So I appreciate the effort that's gone into it and your attempts to get different perspectives on how this works. So I've got a couple questions. And PG&E, you're here, so lucky you. And I happen to be in your jurisdiction. Or you, mine. So I want to talk a little bit about the $2 billion reduction. And the first question that I have for you is, is that going to happen no matter what? So we've talked about, and Mr. Dunn-Meyer used the evil word special session, but I would like to know, is there something that's going to change the letter that came out and this potential reduction of $2 billion?
Yeah thank you for that question ON BEHALF OF MY COLLEAGUES WE WOULD LOVE to do this work and it hard to hear on this panel the implications of what the deferral means for our customers Given the issues we're talking about today, we don't see a path to doing – we'll need to defer in 2027. But as I said in my opening remarks, our hope is that the state will act with urgency and implement solutions that can support a durable wildfire framework, which could support our credit quality and enable us to do more work for the state. The specifics of operationally, when that happens, and how quickly we can ramp back up the work, and I think there's a lot of nuances that relate to timing, but we will be eager and ready to try to do that if the opportunity arises. Okay.
Okay. Assuming it doesn't rise, how do you intend to allocate the pain?
In other words, what is the plan as to where these cuts might occur? Yeah. Another very important question. And maybe first just to put the $2 billion into context. So after taking those deferrals into account, in 2027, we will spend $11.4 billion. So we're still investing a significant amount and doing a lot of work. We've been very clear that we will not compromise safety or compliance in thinking about what work needs to be deferred. And so we won't touch those core responsibilities. But unfortunately, that does mean that other areas that don't touch safety, compliance, such as we're hearing from some of my co-panelists here, are the areas that could be impacted.
And you expect that to start in 27?
Correct.
Okay. So just so you know, I have three particular instances in my district that have come to light in the last week where PG&E is holding them up. One is an affordable housing complex that has already been completed. They have had their scheduling for a hookup set and reset three different times. That's not okay. The second one is a project that just involves a demolition so that the new project can start, which means a lot of economic vitality to my own city. They can't even get an appointment. And then the third one is a public works project that is already underway and will impact the ability to the financing related to that and tax credits that are related to that. And by the way, the tax credits on the unaffordable housing project may also be in jeopardy. So you're talking about 27, but that's not happening in my district. And I drove up here today partly because I got folks screaming at me saying, what is PG&E doing? So you're telling me 27, and that's why I asked how is the pain going to be allocated, but it's happening now. and unfortunately you may be the sacrificial lamb personally who's here, but we're going to need to get some action before 27. I can't have these things happening in my district for what it's worth. You don't necessarily need to answer that question. If you'd like to, please go ahead, but it's not really a question, but if you want to address the concerns, I'm all ears.
Well, thank you for sharing it. I am treasurer, and so my sort of scope of role, I don't know the details of what would be impacting work in your district. You know, as Mr. Dunmoyer here shared, our focus has been on improving our connection timelines. And so I don't know the details, but I think we can certainly follow up. And I appreciate you raising your concern.
Sure sure I mean the concern is already scheduled and then taken off the schedule not once not twice but thrice Okay and then the final question that I have was you have some comments to make about the TURN folks and their suggestions and how that might work or not work Because I'd love to hear, you know, an IOU's response to it.
Sure. I'll start with saying that we agree with Executive Director Tony that reducing risk is one of the best ways to address some of these challenges. And so I could not agree more in that opportunity, both operational risk and financial risk. But his points about the technicalities of how we structure our balance sheet is a topic that's not new. It was covered in last year's cost of capital proceeding. I frankly find his comments very concerning. I think the suggestions he was laying out would actually undermine our credit quality, not support it. And just a couple data points I guess I can share around that. First, I think he used the word require the utilities to issue equity to increase their equity ratio. Today, given where our stock price trades, we likely don't have access to equity at reasonable cost. We are working very hard not to have to go to the market because that is a very financially imprudent situation, and it's one the rating agencies would not want us doing. And so the premise alone, I think, has concerns. But maybe more importantly, if you look at the publications that the rating agencies have put out over the last month, They're very clear when they assess an issuer like PG&E to say, here are the things we'd like to see that could trigger improvement in your ratings. Here are things that could result in reductions. They are not focused on our credit metrics right now. And they will say, if you talk to them, PG&E's credit metrics are consistent with other investment-grade utilities. They are narrowly focused on the wildfire risks we are talking about today and the potential for unlimited financial exposure. And so even if one were to find a way to maybe try to implement that concept, it would not address the core problem that the rating agencies are focused on. And so I think I would like to bring it back, I guess. I think that the core element of the conversation we have here is where is their focus and how can that be supported of credit quality?
I'm assuming, and I don't want to assume, the second part of that presentation as it related to payments out of the wildfire fund, you might have some interest in that and changing how that equation works.
I just want to understand the question. Which presentation?
From turn. Their second point was restricting and limiting how people can recover from the wildfire fund.
Whether it's, did you not say, yeah, who can recover? I think we had, we referred to hedge funds, hedge funds, attorney's fees, et cetera. Sure. What I would say, and again, sort of trying to represent the rating agency perspective, is their primary focus is on the unlimited exposure, that they found the disallowance limitation that was implemented with AB 1054, which is based on 20% of our electric equity T&D rate base, that was a critical element of credit quality for them I think if you asked them would actions to reduce the magnitude of financial exposure be helpful they would say yes Generally speaking less exposure is better financially but it's not on the same level of their list in terms of what they feel like must be true
for investment grade utilities here. Thank you.
And Ms. Becker, I have a follow-up question related to this announcement of the $2 billion in deferred spending. And I actually think maybe I want to sort of rewind a little bit and ask you, if you can explain to all of us, why would you make that decision? Because I think that there's been a lot of speculation as to why you would do that. I'm, you know, with some people suggesting that it's almost like a hostile act. So if you could help us understand, you know, why would you make the decision to scale back your $2 billion of spending and what went into that decision?
Yeah, thank you for that question, Chair. As I said in my opening remarks, it is absolutely not a decision that we took lightly, but it is really necessitated by what we see as an unsustainable status quo. both the cost of this financing and the compounding of those costs in our customer rates, as well as just the overall ability for us to access capital to do the core work we need to do to meet our obligation to serve. Just to emphasize our reluctance to take that step, we have been talking about these issues for almost two years now. And so PG&E has waited a very long time not changing our plan. The state took action proactively last year with the passage of SB 254. That included a commitment to follow it with a second phase in the 2026 legislative session. And so we continued down the path to do the work in hopes that there would be a sort of more durable framework that came out of that process. But when the legislative session ended at the end of August with no action and complete uncertainty when or if any durable framework might emerge, we felt like we couldn't wait any longer.
Then you withdrew your 2028 to 2030 capital forecast pending a strategic review.
Can you help us understand what that is going to look like?
And I would imagine your strategic review is probably similar to what our other IOUs are conducting. Then I'd love to understand, Fernando, if you're doing anything similar on the – sorry, Mr. – anyway, on the POU side.
So just you described it well, but just to restate it, in early September after the legislative session ended without wildfire reform, we did come out. We announced the $2 billion deferral and then also announced a strategic review, which is really a specific term of phrase to financial markets, which is a company making up. They're not very common, but a statement that something structural needs to change in our business. We need to rethink how we finance or structure the work so that we can meet the needs of our customers. And so we announced that process in early September. It's very typical that a strategic review doesn't have a lot of detail, at least initially. This opens up the possibility for us to talk broadly about what structural solutions could look like and how our business may need to change. And so we're just really early days in starting that process. We want to, where possible, work or have input from other stakeholders, and also monitor to see if there's a possibility that wildfire reform could emerge.
Mr. Valera, are you undertaking a similar strategic review on your side, given the increased cost of capital that you've seen?
I guess I would say that we consistently look at our five-year capital plan and account for the potential affordability challenges that DWP may face. I don't know if you saw the public hearing we experienced yesterday. Obviously, customers are concerned about their affordability, as we should be, as are we, right? And so we continually kind of look at what our current capital plan is in light of the cost to borrow. You know, there are no easy solutions here, just hard choices. That goes for you. That goes for us as well. And so we're trying to manage aging infrastructure, doing our wildfire mitigation, onboard clean resources. So that requires us to consistently look at our current five-year plan. We have not pivoted, but I will say post-Polisades, right? Our bond yield pre-Polisades was around 4%. Post-Polisades were around 5.2, 5.3. And that's significant. And we weren't implicated in policy. It's right. And so that's an ongoing. Thing we will have to manage in the future. And it is challenging. So I hope that answers your question.
Understood. Mr. Brothwell. I think your your point three that you made for us was related to your you described kind of what you see as a basic bargain. bargain, that utilities are essentially supposed to be boring and safe investments. And in California today, they're kind of anything but. You said that the balance is tilted too far to risk. And in your view, we've got to do something to recalibrate that. I guess, how would you explain that to everyday Californians who read headlines about record profits and the shareholders are living large while normal folks are struggling. How do you reconcile that?
I agree. That is not an easy thing to convey in layman's terms. Clearly, as I think I indicated, the infrastructure that's needed rests on a capital system that is comprised of debt and equity. The equity returns for a utility are determined by regulation. They are determined by the California Public Utilities Commission. And I'll speak broadly about trends across the country, and that is that my firm did a report about two years ago looking at the factors that were getting ready to drive utility rates up. And it was labor. It was steel. It was all of these things. We had 2% inflation, 2% interest rates, and $2 shale gas, and all of those were getting ready to change, and they did change.
One thing that has not trended up nationally is the allowed ROE that utilities are granted by their regulators. That has not taken a nosedive, but it has been trending downward. Some of that is a function of having been in a low interest rate environment. We're not in a low interest rate environment anymore. If anything, the debt component of the capital structure has become much more costly as we heard from Ms Becker and Mr Valero So in my view you not looking at record profits You're looking at a cost of financing those assets in a challenging environment. Optics be what they are, But it is a level of profit that's set by a regulatory process. It's not like a normal business that can earn whatever it can earn in the market.
So let me play back what I think you said, which is that in some respects the accelerating risk is creating a need for accelerating profits and sort of feeding this kind of vicious cycle that we're seeing unfold. It's creating a need for capital, whether you're talking about just a baseline of keeping up with aging infrastructure, as we heard, but adding on the layer of needing to make investments to protect the system against wildfire risk. Tremendous amount of capital, as we've heard in this room today, is needed to do all those things. And that capital is ultimately priced in markets that operate at a national and indeed a global level. So as I indicated, investors make choices, and when they see elevated levels of risk, and I think the one factor here that differentiates California, as I mentioned in my prepared remarks, is you have capped returns matched with unlimited potential liability. And that is a very unbalanced risk and return profile. And I'm not sure if you yourself have written about this. So I hate to make you speak for all of the analysts and all of the ratings agencies, but we appreciate you being here. So I think all of the ratings agencies have been very clear that in their view, in order to level the playing field, as it were, with California's investor-owned utilities and their market peers, that some kind of a cap on that catastrophic downside risk is needed. Do you concur with that assessment?
I do. I think there are two things. the cap, which we've talked about, and also interim funding, because there's an administrative process around this that can leave that burden on the utility balance sheet for some period of time. And we're talking large amounts of money. So, you know, the other thing that I've read and heard is something to address that interim funding need. And you spoke about kind of the basic bargain for utility investors.
I think, and I'll paraphrase, Mr. Tony, your remarks, but I think what I heard you say is that there's kind of a basic bargain for utility customers that feels like it's getting a little skewed if we are both paying the bills and responsible for all of the risk. And that's kind of the point you were making. The framework that we created in 2015 for the Wildfire Insurance Fund was 50% ratepayer, 50% shareholders. And that is a principle that got a lot of support, okay, just that concept. And dollar for dollar. And that something that we believe is important to figure out how to retain So if we going to have a cap on shareholder liability I understand that I have had investment firms tell me the same thing I talk to them all the time also, okay, because they are part of the mix here. But I also want to see a cap on ratepayer liability, okay? I don't want to shift. Right. And so then the question, of course, and the hard question is, well, who pays over the cap? Let's let's be honest. We will all agree, including me. That is the hard question. Who will pay over the cap? And that's where I think we need to look long and hard at setting up. I have a proposal for a rainy day fund, a state rainy day fund that starts getting funded by things like, you know, a fee on second homes. I don't know, something where we look at things where maybe there are reasonable places to ask for a little bit more here and there. And I'm not going to go into the details now, but conceptually, how you yourself, Chair Pichinor, had brought up the question about are there non-rightpayer funds that can be brought into this mix? And I think that that is where the true solution is going to be. Yes, a cap on shareholder liability needs to be matched by a cap on ratepayer liability too. And that would be a solution, if we could work together on it, that would make all the difference in the world. All right. And Mr. Brothwell, your thoughts on how do you design kind of a basic bargain that works for both the shareholders whose money we need to build these projects? and for repairs?
I'd make two observations. One specific to the wildfire issue, and I think Mr. Tony alluded to some ways that those monies are being diverted away, siphoned away, however you want to look at it. I think that is an issue that needs to be addressed. Yes, there's a balancing, there's a sharing that is involved here, but it needs to be, those funds need to be directed at doing good where they're needed. The other point that I would make is there's a number of states around the country right now that are examining the basic utility business model, and that is often done in the context of looking at how can we lower return on equity. I think that is On its own would simply do what I was talking about And that is drive investor capital away Because investors don't have to invest in the utility industry either They have a lot of choices And most of them offer much higher upside potential However, I think one thing that could be looked at In a symmetrical and constructive manner is providing incentives for desired outcomes. The background report, I thought, did a very good job of addressing this issue. It is a tricky one because, yes, the inherent moral hazard, and my former firm, Energy Income Partners, we testified a little bit on this matter before the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee back in 2018, if my memory is correct. And we raised that point that a symmetrical scheme of incentives, and yes they have to be symmetrical So if there poor performance that is penalized But I think as putting my investor hat back on I think our job was to look for companies that are well run that deliver for their customers. And those companies should be rewarded. And the part of the bargain is that if those companies over earn that kind of baseline, then I think the regulators and interveners need to understand that there's a reason and that that's okay. I think one of the pushbacks you'd hear from the utility industry is that when performance incentives have been applied in rate making, they've often been mostly stick and very little carrot. Thank you.
Sort of related question, Mr. Valero, for you. I believe that, if I'm correct, I believe that LADWP is on the record as supporting both a liability cap and access to a state fund for our POUs. Is that correct?
Yeah. I mean, I guess the way I think about it is there is the size of the liability pie and how you finance the liability pie. And we don't have either. And that's a problem.
Do you care to comment on what terms, under which terms you might consider joining a fund or you and your POU brethren might consider joining a fund?
I'll say a couple of things. I think post-Palisades, DWP can see what can happen to its service territory. I'm not sure all POUs are similarly situated in that regard. So I would suggest that any sort of state-sponsored liability insurance or fund for POUs would be voluntary, which I think that accounts for perhaps some other POUs seeing it differently than we do. But DWP would certainly want to participate in either of those, most definitely. And then in terms of the DWP accountability, right, you know, I think currently our wildfire mitigation plan is approved by our local board and then wildfire safety advisory board reviews it. But if there were the ability to have that wildfire mitigation approved, say, by CalOEIS, but it came with these other benefits, I think that's something DWP would consider. And more broadly, you know, there are certainly advantages and disadvantages to an IOU model versus a POU model.
The risk of putting you and Ms. Becker on the spot. Just top line, what are the pros and cons of each model? Not for you, not for your shareholders, for Californians, for California ratepayers and taxpayers. I prefaced it by saying at the risk of putting you on the spot
No, fair enough I mean, I think, you know, one could argue that the IOUs have to feed the shareholder component But the irony is if you have a 401k or in CalPERS, you're probably a shareholder of an IOU, right? I think from a POU perspective, there's local control, local board, and our... The way we raise money is via bonds, and we're transparent, very transparent. Everything we do is in the record, right? And so I think there's an accountability perspective that POUs would argue that is very visible for its customers.
Ms. Becker, any thoughts?
Well, I guess first I would compliment the committee report yesterday. I thought it, I'm not an expert in these issues, but I thought it did a good job of highlighting some of the key distinctions. And there are a number of considerations between the IOU and the POU model. So I won't rehash those here, but we do believe the IOU model has a number of tremendous benefits, not least of which is scale and scope and the ability, when it works, to bring large amount of low-cost investor capital to do work and to do it quickly. But maybe just to bring it back to this forum and something I thought in reading that report yesterday was just the discussion of an optimal model is not a fast one in terms of determining, deciding that debate or what a specific area might need. And I just feeling the urgency of the issue that we have in front of us today also felt like it felt a little out of place in terms of needing something now to address what's in front of California versus those real considerations and tradeoffs that are part of the public discourse. I guess, you know, I think we can probably walk and chew gum at the same time. So I think it's really important for us in this conversation to contemplate both what action is urgently needed now to stave off a crisis that is potentially going to devastate not just California's utility sector, but the entire economy. and what are the right conversations and the right questions that we need to be asking as the state of California in a medium and long-term frame. So I think we can and need to do both of those things together.
Anyone else have thoughts on my IOU POU? I saw you nodding over there, Mr. Brothwell.
I would agree with Ms. Becker. The background report addressed this, I thought, in a very fair and balanced way. I would just reiterate that two points. The equity market, as I mentioned, is very large, and it's a pool of capital that is available to the IOU. I'm not suggesting that one's better than this. It's just a differentiating factor. And the other point is that if the state or state entities or municipal entities start taking on additional debt to fund acquisitions, for instance, and I think that was also mentioned in the background report, that's going to affect the view that the credit rating agencies have on their debt as well as that of the state. Thank you.
So, Ms. Javo, do you have some questions?
Thank you. Thank you. Thank you, everyone. You know, I think your comment about no easy solutions, just hard choices is a good summary of the conversation today. And, you know, in the middle of this are ratepayers who are also taxpayers and could be paying twice for some of this stuff, right? And, you know, and people are struggling right now. And I know the hearing really you know that happened at LADWP really demonstrated that in the call to not shut people off right before the end of the year You guys are having to make these choices now because of people struggling so much I certainly have people in my community, you know, who have been raising concerns about increased rates for a very long time. And because of the many, many, many hot days, very hot days that we had in the Los Angeles area, people have made the decisions to just not turn on the AC at all, which is dangerous, you know, dangerous to their health. And if you live around Chiquita Canyon landfill, it's dangerous to open the windows too, which is in my district, the burning landfill. So it's, you know, it creates impossible choices for people who cannot afford their rates. Um, and I think it's a really difficult pill to swallow that your rates are tied to the credit rating of your provider, your utility provider, right? that you have to really care about that and that things that might be really good for you, like things that lower costs for you, can at the same time work to be a disadvantage because it might increase, you know, or it might lower your credit rating and then increase costs in another way, right? So, you know, so it's just, it's a very obviously complicated issue that we have to figure out solutions to. And I think what we want to prevent, and I, you know, appreciate the chair's leadership and the hard work of the staff on this, in the series of hearings, is, you know, we don't want to be in a situation like we have found ourselves in the insurance industry, where you know, where people are really at a loss for providers, right? And so so that's just like feels like the backdrop of what we are facing right now, trying to figure this out and serve our community who is struggling to pay their rates. And it's And what I think also makes it difficult is that we, for so many years, I feel like we've been talking about, oh, we're going to see this abundance, right, in the energy market where we're going to have all this solar and wind and we're going to have to do these initial investments and then it's going to bring the cost down over time. And I don't feel like we're seeing that, right? Are we seeing this? It does not feel like we're seeing this. We are seeing this?
Yes.
Okay, explain it to me.
I will give you an example. The price per kilowatt hour for large-scale solar is less than $0.03 per kilowatt hour. That's cheaper than coal, cheaper than natural gas. That's one example where at least in one important sector, it has come down. Not in all of them, but that is one important one, which we're very happy about.
And so how is that translating to it being cheaper for customers?
Customers pay for the generation costs So the generation costs are passed right along It not like there no profit in the generation costs So customers would be paying a lot more Customers, for instance, do pay a lot more for the solar that's from whose origin is a rooftop is higher than that. I'm speaking specifically of the large-scale solar just because it is one of the bright lights in clean energy investment.
But overall, ratepayers are seeing their bills go up, right? And up faster than inflation, right?
Higher than inflation.
Absolutely. Absolutely. So the so I appreciate that solar is less, but the overall cost that people are paying is not less. It's much, much more. And I think that's, you know, that's where it feels like there's this disconnect of of the promise that that we've been hearing about. And how is this, you know, so what's the other, you know, the other big pieces that are costing us so much more? And I know part of it has to do with the cost of borrowing and part of it has to do with all of the infrastructure that goes into it. I wanted to ask PG&E if you can explain a little bit more about this $2 billion and how it was decided upon what would be both what you would be deferring and also how is that? whose two billion dollars is that is that all is that two billion dollars in projects that somebody else built that PG&E didn't pay for or is this two billion dollars of PG&E only work that you are not
doing or can you explain a little bit more about that sure um yeah I think I shared a little bit earlier but if we think of sort of the major buckets of what makes up that two billion dollars if we think of it in terms of types of work that is areas like we are hearing about here new customer connections, electric generation interconnections work requested by others which can be relocation work
in different areas. And did they pay for that? I know for example building housing they'll pay for the cost of connection correct?
Is that correct? Yes. In general, I guess I can say that our investments, particularly approved capital expenditures that go into our rate base, is work that we are funding ourselves. I don't know all the specifics on maybe some of the nuanced rate making. So I think maybe the general answer is the best way to respond to it, which is our business is we are raising the money and investing that. And that's the bulk of what we're talking about here.
So what you're saying is it's $2 billion that PG&E will not be paying. It's PG&E dollars.
It's work we won't do, and because we're not doing the work, we don't have to go raise the money to fund it. That's correct.
Okay.
If I could just weigh in on that. I'm just going to give you the history here. So when Patty Poppy came in, we sat down with her and our builders and tried to explain to her, like, why is this so slow? Why is you know when you go to turn the power in a home it goes it takes months And so people sit in a hotel room until you can come in So the on ratio when we first started working with her was 5 A month ago it was 85 85 on time So we have seen tremendous progress. When we got the letter from Ms. Poppy again, we saw a deja vu because to her credit, she went into, she went and pulled money out through investment or however she did it. probably my colleague on the left didn't, but they found an additional $410 million to come forward and make sure that the projects, the new projects, would actually be turned on in time. They developed a whole structure with it. We have multiple technical companies. We've had, I don't know, probably 50 or 60 meetings over the last four years to create a whole new system. We saw this letter. We're obviously disappointed. For us, we're the top priority. Housing is everything. But when somebody says, well, we have to deal with compliance and risks, all those are investment issues. if you don't deal with compliance and you don't deal with safety, if things start to burn down, then their credit rating is gone. So it's like we obviously want to be number one, but we also understand you have to deal with what you have to deal with first. So when we've got this letter, the notes I got back from our members was Hellfire and Brimstone. It's like you have to tell PG they're crazy, this is wrong. When you look at it as a guy who used to work for a governor who had to oversee the entire utility system after Mr. Davis left, that was my job. You realize that there are decisions that have to be made by utilities because of compliance and other components. Our goal is to find a way for money to come back in the system so that what Ms. Pappin raised is not uncommon. As this starts to slow down, we will get more and more of those complaints from our members. We'll go to PG&E. We'll try to work it out. But generally speaking, they'll try to turn on the power of things that are completed, but they'll come back to us and say, just don't start those projects. Just wait until we get this in order. Well, for us, that can be bankruptcy, especially for our smaller members. So that is a give and take in this process and why we're so concerned about it. And so until this issue of capping exposure, dealing with the issues of making sure insurance is still affordable while you go through these decisions as legislators, I mean, this is kind of the deja vu we don't want to see happen. And even though we think we're the most important thing, building housing is very important, but also these other requirements are statutory, required by the PC, required by the legislature, required by well if you don't protect your if we have more fires because PG doesn't protect their lines we're back on that issue too so for us it has to be holistic it's not two-thirds of the solution has to be a holistic solution otherwise the new construction new projects the affordable housing will fall out but last thing I would say is like what Miss Papin said about our affordable builders the tax credits are about an 18-month cycle if you don't hit it you lose it but it's the same thing for the individual consumer you go to Wells Fargo or U.S. Bank, one of our members as well, and you get a 60, 90-day window. If PG&E says, hey, I can't come in for six months, you lose your home. So, I mean, it's the same issue for the individual consumers as for the broader society or big, large, affordable project, maybe 80 or 90 units. But that's why time delays crush us. And so for us, the hope is that the legislature does create a framework upon which more investment can come in so that PG&E, SCE, and San Diego Gas and Electric can invest more in the new projects as well as maintain compliance and safety. Because to us, all those things are essential because if they don't maintain safety, they have more fires, we're back to square one all over again. So it is a holistic solution that's needed. We've seen it work when investments are made and our improvement times are turning on our powers much quicker. And we also know that what we're so fearful is it's going to go back to the bad days where we have to wait so long. And that is just bad for everybody.
yeah it is bad for everybody and go ahead
do it yeah I I Just to let my kids be cool, too. We have a high priority to get interconnected as well. There are deposits that are put in by member companies. I don't know that it covers everything that's out there. PG&E has to do the work. They have their teams to do the work, whatever else. It's all dependent on that. But actually, there may be differences as well, and there's 68 different projects. So I don't want to go any further than that. So there are costs that will be paid by the generator or the battery, but the point is they have to do the work. There is money up front that they need to spend probably on the rest of the distribution network or whatever that my member companies may be developing. So it's not just that plant, but the lines that feed into it. And so, I mean, you mentioned, Mr. Dunmire, a number of things, right? Affordable housing.
We, as a legislature, have done a lot of work to make housing streamlined and more affordable and remove red tape and all of these things to address our housing crisis, right? So not hooking up housing developments, affordable housing developments in my colleague's district, for example, or any of our districts is incredibly problematic. Not hooking up, you know, there's a huge priority around energization and being able to meet the demand around electric vehicles. Not hooking up those is incredibly problematic. Things that we have as a state invested in creating that infrastructure and then they cannot be, you know, connected. And correct me if I'm wrong, but it doesn't make sense to me that you would not connect housing when that's new rate payers for you. That's new customers, right? So that's money that's going to keep flowing into the PG&E bank account. And so how does that math work when you're deciding not to connect new customers? And how are the decisions made about what is not funded or what projects are not connected up? Because it seems like it's new customers, renewable energy projects, large capacity projects, and then other projects are moving forward around capital investment projects where you're going to make a big rate of return, right? And so how did you decide what was going to go forward and what was not?
Thank you for that question. And I just will start by saying again, we would really like to do all the work. And we didn't wish I could convey it more, but we really would love to do it all. And we know these are really hard decisions and have real impacts on real people. But I appreciate Mr. Dunmoyer's comments. When we are looking at a portfolio of work, we absolutely cannot compromise on safety. we are going to meet our safety commitments and do the work that needs to do to keep things safe and we're also going to focus on compliance and what is required from a compliance level and so if you work down sort of the must-dos and then think about other work that in the portfolio and what while it may be hard what are things that can be deferred without compromising safety they hard conversations internally but that is the work we doing to make sure we don compromise the first two goals. And hopefully, the deferrals can turn into action and work over time, and we can get back to some of these metrics that we've been talking about in terms of timely connections and
meeting the needs of all of our customers. And you're not able to do this because, You're saying because borrowing costs have increased because you can't finance the work?
And is there any way – are you having to demonstrate that to the CPUC, or is there any way you're being transparent in that? So first, yes. The impetus for having to do this is the costs are just too high to do this quantity of work for customers at this level. and there are also, we have concerns just given the risk profile right now and uncertainty on whether some of these fundamental issues will be addressed in the just continuing to rely on the capital markets at this level. We've heard from some of the other panelists that at some point actually even accessing capital can be a constraint and so those are the sort of reasons we've sort of come here. In terms of visibility to the CPUC, we do have a number of existing reporting mechanisms where we will be showing our regulator the implications of our work in 27 generally, including implications of this deferral. I can just mention a few of them here. First is that we have an annual risk spending accountability report where we go to the commission and show what authorized GRC work it was in the prior year and then what we actually spent. And so our 27 work will be shared with the commission in 2028 under that existing RSAR process. And then we have a number of other reporting mechanisms we use, especially on the safety side, both around our wildfire mitigation plan compliance and then our safety and operational metrics or SOMS reporting, which is done at the end of March and end of September every year. And so we will continue to be transparent about how those metrics are performing and keep safety as our guiding light in approaching some of these difficult decisions.
And can you talk a little bit about your obligation to serve and how that's impacted by making the decisions not to serve some people?
I'm not a lawyer. But at its core, obligation to serve is about making sure that we are there to safely provide reliable power for our customers in the state. There's a lot of work we do that doesn't fall in that sort of somewhat narrow obligation of the utility's existence. And that can include enabling the state's decarbonization goals, which we are so delighted to do. but that is an area where, while painful, if it needs to stretch out over a longer period of time, that's not going to compromise the obligation to serve and core delivery to make sure that our customers are safe and that their lights are on and the gas is flowing. And again, I think it comes back to just these difficult decisions, but trying to ensure that guiding light of making sure our core operations are continuing, but then we are thinking with things like affordability in mind, what is the right way to approach this work
given the status quo in California today It I mean it still does not square with me if you know I know you know battery storage, EV chargers, housing developments, like they are all paying you to hook them up. And so if they're paying you for the cost of doing it, but you're saying you can't afford to do it.
Maybe I'll try to describe, I think, Executive Director Tess Fi and her materials had some illustrations. But to take next year as an example, so we are going to do $11.4 billion of capital investments in our service territory. Customers won't pay $11.4 billion next year. So they will get the benefit of those assets, but they will get to pay for them over the decades that they're in service. It's a great customer benefit to be able to get the investment but not pay for it up front. The challenge is actually for someone like me as the corporate treasurer because $11.4 billion is leaving our bank accounts next year. We are going to buy the equipment that's needed. We are going to pay the people who are doing the work. And so there is a big gap in $11.4 billion going out and what we're actually going to collect in rates. The financial term for that is free cash flow negative. It just means as a starting point, you're going to end the year with less money than you started. The way we solve that and sort of square that circle is through the capital markets, that we go out and we raise billions of dollars from investors to say, please come invest in California, come invest in these assets. And we are competing constantly with other states to say, come here, give us your capital, help solve this investment hole. And that's, I think, the core of some of the issues we're talking about here today is if investors don't want to come because they don't view it as an attractive profile relative to the risk they would be taking on, that's going to impede our ability to have enough money to do what's needed to be done.
Yeah. And I guess my final comment is just the challenge with that, right? The challenge with this scenario is that what is good for investors is not necessarily good for customers in some instances, right? Or, you know, or for Californians, because obviously, you know, leaving aside all the things that are not being hooked up, the housing and energization and, you know, all the projects, but there's this conflict that the utilities, you know, have a huge incentive to make as much of the profit that they can, opportunities for profit that they can. And it helps with your energy rating or your, your, your bond rating or your, what's it called? Credit rating. Credit rating. Thank you. My God. The whole point of today's conversation and all the ratings and, But at the same time, that means that it's costing people more. That means that the bills go up higher. That means that the rate payers are paying more. So while we talking about solar going down to three cents but their bills are still going up faster than inflation right And so there a real conflict here that our chair is going to lead us to solve very eloquently as she always does But it just is this ongoing conflict that is really difficult to figure out the right balance to make sure that people who are struggling to pay their bills have the support that they need as all of these other elements get solved as well. Thank you.
And I actually have a follow-up question, Ms. Becker. So as we are, as we said, on the cusp of these truly generational investments, particularly in transmission infrastructure, I think you said in Ms. Poppy's response to my letter asking about some of the details of the $2 billion deferral, I think you said it's about 65% of it is actually transmission projects.
Correct.
Given this challenge with investability and financing of these enormous projects and the billions of dollars that's required, do you think that that creates a real opportunity for more public financing of transmission infrastructure? As you may know, we passed as part of this SB 250. It was included in SB 254. We created the transmission accelerator, which currently applies just to the competitive transmission projects at CAISO. To a little slice of them, I think there's an opportunity for us to do more. It strikes me that perhaps that is part of the way that we square this circle. I'd love your reactions to that.
I don't know all the details of sort of that proposal, but as a starting point, what I would say is we view the biggest lever on being able to reduce costs and do this tremendous amount of work is through wildfire reform. And a lot of the challenges we're talking about today are the absence of wildfire reform. I do question a little if there isn't a durable framework around wildfire whether a public entity would want to be taking that risk either and so it feels a little adjacent I guess to the crux of the issue which is how are we addressing the unlimited exposure in the state
but more generally I guess what I would say is we really believe we are here to do the right work and to do it on time and to do it at lowest cost if we can be investment grade. And so we would love that opportunity if we're able. Thank you. Anyone else have comments on that? Mr. Valero? Yeah, I guess I would just say one thing because we publicly finance transmission. In some ways, it almost doesn't matter what business model you have if we don't get wildfire risk and the liabilities associated with it under control because we already publicly financed transmission. And so it almost doesn't matter the business model, IOU, POU, with this existential crisis. Yes, understood. And I think I would not proffer that as an alternative, more of a yes and, because, again, given that our core goal is both to ensure the investability of both our POUs and our IOUs, as well as ensure that we can deliver service to Californians at the lowest possible cost. But yes, we'll continue to dig into that in separate hearings. All right. Yes, Mr. Tony. One thing I like to ask policymakers to think about is how are costs allocated? So right now we have a ratepayer system. When the welfare costs are on the ratepayer bills, it's very regressive because it's a consumption tax. And the thing about consumption tax, there's a reason why groceries have no sales tax. It is a recognition by the state that groceries and food are a necessity, okay, necessity of life. I would suggest that electricity is a necessity of life. And that one thing I know about electricity bills is that the lower your household income, the higher percent of your income you pay for your monthly electricity bill. Okay? That's just how it is. if you look at the California income tax system, the lower your income, the less you're in a lower tax bracket. And in fact, the higher your income, the higher your bracket is. And in fact, if you're a low-income household with children, you may qualify for the earned income tax credit. you may pay a negative income tax, in fact. Okay. And I just would like you to think about what is most equitable. And I'd suggest that we start thinking about part of equity is ability to pay. And that's why I would encourage you to look harder at the income tax system, which is having the state be the insurer of last resort. And if it means that maybe there's a certain portion of high income earners that can put in just a little bit more, that that's something for the public good to provide some rate pay relief, particularly for the lower income households, that's something I'd like you to consider. Thank you. Thank you. All right. All right. Looks like Mr. Smutty Jones has an additional. Yeah. Thank you. And just for a little bit of quick clarity, Ms. Becker talked about the sort of long term clean energy plan that we have here. And I'm not really talking about that, what is happening in 2045. I'm talking about what's happening right now. And we have primarily storage, which is a lot of things coming online to meet our reliability needs in the short term. And so for us, this is like immediate. We have got the same problem that the builders have with the standpoint that we bought equipment, people are moving earth, whatever else. We don't know if 2027 doesn't go into 2028, 2029, whatever. Nobody knows what's going on. The point is there's a great deal of uncertainty here that's going to really undermine the ability of people to invest money in all of those types of technologies. And I think the one thing that everybody has agreed to, and I don't want to be macabre on this, but we've – no one's mentioned the word bankruptcy before. We're like one bad wildfire away from that. I mean, that's the reality. No one ever planned for them. We've lived through two of them. We avoided one in Southern California in 2001 But that at the heart of it So we need to fix this problem and nobody planned on those events occurring but they did, and we need to fix this issue now. So I apologize for going on too long, but I thought that needed to be said. Thank you. Did you want to say something, Mr. Rothwell? No. Okay, no. I would just echo what Mr. Rothwell is. Yes, indeed. Well, seeing no additional questions or comments from members, I would say that's an excellent. We'll let that be the last word, Mr. Smutty-Jones. I think that certainly one thing that has been very clear from today's discussion is that the stakes for California could not be higher and that the crisis is not. in six months, the crisis is unfolding right now before our eyes, which is indeed why we are here on a Wednesday and Thursday in November. So with that, I really do want to genuinely thank all of you all for being here and being part of today's conversation. I really, really appreciated the discussion and appreciate your insights and perspectives and look forward to continuing to work with you as we look to address a challenge that is both enormous and enormously important for the state of California. So thank you so much. And we're going to go, you're welcome to stay, but you're also welcome to clear out. We're going to go ahead and open it up for public comment. All right. If you want to provide public comment, you can approach the microphone at this time. And we're going to give each witness two minutes to speak. And if you can go ahead and Just first state your name and organization before you offer us your perspective. Welcome. Good afternoon, Madam Chair. Alex Jackson with the American Clean Power Association. We're a trade group representing large-scale renewable energy developers, many of whom received one of the recent deferral notices that PG&E sent out. So I just want to be heard very clearly that we are fully supportive of liability reform. This is a clean energy issue. I agree it's larger than that. This is an economy-wide issue, but this is absolutely essential. We cannot continue to pile these costs on utility shareholders and their ratepayers for factors, many of which are beyond the utility's control, in terms of what's actually driving the cost of these fires. And remember that California is an outlier here. I know that there are hard choices, but really the burden should be on those trying to defend what is an indefensible status quo. But to your point, Madam Chair, we do have to think about how to walk and chew gum at the same time, because we may be in a land of Plan Bs. And I think it is concerning that right now we're seeing one of our major IOUs, who are the developers and financiers of our transmission system, kind of scattershot sending out these notices with very little notice, understanding of what criteria are behind them, because we have real stakes and money on the line. As my colleague noted, we have to hit a 2030 timeline for clean energy projects to be placed in service to qualify for federal tax credits, some of which, depending on the location, could offset half of the cost of the project. It is essential we don't lose the ball on those. So I would ask this committee to really be firm in its oversight role, provide direction to the Public Utilities Commission, maximize opportunities for other entities to do the work through mechanisms like a bill transfer agreement so that we have a contingency plan. But to be clear, plan A, let's get liability done. Thanks. Thank you. Good afternoon, Madam Chair and members. THANK YOU, PARTICULARLY TO MADAM CHAIR FOR YOUR DILIGENCE ON THIS SUBJECT AND TO THE COMMITTEE STAFF'S YET AGAIN, ANOTHER WELL REPORT I HERE ON BEHALF OF ANNER DC ACTION FUND AND WE ARE CONCERNED THAT THE STRICT LIABILITY FRAMEWORK MAKES IT MORE EXPENSIVE FOR well report I here on behalf of NRDC Action Fund and we are concerned that the strict liability framework makes it more expensive for utilities to access the money necessary to build infrastructure, and it also makes it more expensive to transition our economy into clean energy and delays construction for the distribution and transition that we need to power EVs, buildings and industrial equipment. The status quo incentivizes overspend on wildfire prevention to protect shareholders, even if the spend is less cost effective, which comes at the expense of the utility's core function. These incentives must be rebalanced to protect electricity customers and to keeping the grid safe. Thank you for your time. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair and members. Will Daly on behalf of Aurora Tech, a wildfire satellite company that detects and monitors fires from space. We partner with fire departments such as LA County and across IOUs and IOUs across the United States, including through ongoing pilots in California. For today's financing discussion, our point is simple. Better information can help utilities make better use of the resources they already have. Our satellites help locate fires, track their development, and forecast where they're heading, giving utilities and responders a clearer picture of which communities and infrastructure are threatened. The California pilots offer an opportunity to measure detection speed, tracking accuracy, and whether that information improves response and decisions about shutting off or restoring power. We're welcome to share what we learn. Sorry, we welcome sharing what we're learning so future investments are grounded and demonstrate a performance and value for customers. Thank you. Thank you. Chair and members, Alex Torres here on behalf of Perimeter Solutions. We are Cal Fire's aerial firefighting retardant partner. I think Mr. Dunmore did a great job talking about the need to have comprehensive conversations around this. And so much of the affordability conversation is grounded in our ability to reduce wildfire risk. So I want to share a little bit about a few quick regional case studies that we think offer practical examples around this discussion around protecting utility infrastructure. The red retardant is the same stuff that comes out of the Cal Fire Flames. saw made here in California, but the same basic formulation can be applied on the ground to reduce ignition. San Diego County has been piloting this up to 200 miles of high-risk roadway, including evacuations. Mr. Herbidion was here earlier. We've been working with the Rose Bowl. There were brush fire ignitions, and since we've been working with them, there have been no ignitions around the Rose Bowl. Another example that we think is not quite on the prevention side, but has to do with quick response and suppression, is the Southern California Quick Reaction Force, which you're well aware of, Madam Chair, and your leadership on AB 275 explored how we can take that to a statewide model. That bundled utility funding with county fire departments, mobile retardant bases to put together a framework that could respond to fires extremely quickly when they do arise, as in many cases they will inevitably arise, but we do need to figure out how we turn small brush fires. We put those out with resources to scale so they don't become catastrophic wildfires. And so as you weigh these financing options and these questions, we hope these regional examples can help inform the conversation about mitigation around utility infrastructure, grid improvements, vegetation management, prescribed burns, what tools help us get the most return on investment for the taxpayer to where we're not having to have as many tough conversations on how that trickles down to ratepayers. But look forward to being a partner for those conversations to come. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair. ANTHONY TAMAHL WITH CALIFORNIA SPECIAL DISTRICTS ASSOCIATION I REALLY GRATEFUL FOR ALL THE WORK THE COMMITTEES PUT in and to the presenters today I just want to speak to as we move forward trying to find solutions that those solutions don't shift the burden or the liability onto other public agencies that are also important for homes to be built, to be finished, so that people can recover and move back in. This can take the shape of diminution of value or lost property taxes when that community is still needing to rebuild. There's talk about subrogation, which I know you'll be revisiting tomorrow, or the costs of these smaller public agencies just responding to the event in real time and the recovery afterwards. So I'm grateful for your time and the opportunity to share that with you and that we keep those essential services and infrastructure also in mind as we move forward. Thank you very much. Thank you. Good afternoon, Chair and members. Thank you very much. Kim Stone of Stone Advocacy on behalf of Consumer Watchdog. Jamie Cord, the president of Consumer Watchdog, has a statement. A cap on shareholders' liability for fires the utilities cause through negligence is what the utilities want, And that cap on shareholder liability means a bigger bill for ratepayers and fewer benefits for wildfire survivors. When the utilities cause fires through their own negligence, they need to pay for the damage, not only because it's fair, but also because it creates moral hazard if they don't. On the issue of interconnections and hookups, PG&E has a duty to serve, and that duty includes making timely construction interconnections that the construction customers largely pay for themselves. if PG&E makes customers wait six additional months, as it said they could, it could potentially be violating its duty to serve. That would mean under PUC precedent that they would not then be allowed to upstream dividends back to the holding company, and the holding company would have to finance the services. If there's a four-month delay now and an additional one-to-six-month delay, that would go beyond what the PUC has said as an acceptable delay, and they would be at risk of not being able to issue dividends. This is pure bailout blackmail, and Californians in the legislature shouldn't fall for it. Thank you. Thank you. Good afternoon, Chair members. Sarah Brennan with the Weidemann Group on behalf of extreme weather survivors. At last week's oversight hearing on utility wildfire safety, many voices seemed to agree on the root of the problem. The Office of Energy Infrastructure Safety said that weather-driven risk is rising because of climate change and that we're in a race to keep up. The PAO pointed out that the same equipment has been on our grid for decades, yet catastrophic fires are largely a phenomenon of the last 20 years. Truckee's public utility said plainly that it is paying the societal cost of climate change and its crushing rates. This problem is going to get worse. Today, you're examining the financial strain of the climate crisis is putting on utilities and Californians at every level. Yet we have not examined the knowing role that oil and gas industry played in driving climate change or the fiscal responsibility that it should bear in this equation. The SB254 study found that the Wildfire Fund needs about $36 billion to stay solvent for the next 20 years. Rate payers and policyholders cannot fill that gap. Another contributor is needed to come to the table in a meaningful way. We are just committed to make that part of the conversation. Thank you. Thank you. Good afternoon, Madam Chair and members. Adam Hattafi on behalf of the California Coalition of Large Energy Users. I wasn't really planning on speaking today, but this came up on the delays for energization. And a lot of times the delays in energization are due to just grid capacity not being sufficient in a given area to serve the load that is trying to interconnect their constraints upstream in transmission or local constraints can lead to this kind of issue. it would be really helpful to allow customers to just put some batteries and solar on site and reduce their peak, reduce their overall need, and commit to never taking more than, I don't know, like 70% of their load so that they can be interconnected faster. And that's something that the legislature can explore and that we would love to have a conversation with you over the next year. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair and members. My name is Dan Jacobson, Senior Advisor to Environment California. We sponsored SB106, and you, Madam Chair, were the author of AB2779. So I want to talk about a piece of the problem that we can start fixing right now. And your background paper, which was great, makes the math really easy to understand. If we need a billion dollars to build a project, it costs $2.9 billion to pay that back, which a billion dollars is going to the shareholders. So the projects that we don't have to build are the projects that really make the most amount of sense for us. And what we saw in the advanced transmission technologies, or the GETs as they're often referred to, are some of the things that we can start to implement right now. The SB1006 report that came out earlier this year, we saw that the IOUs wanted to invest money in both grid-enhancing technologies and advanced conductors. Unfortunately, at one of the rate hearings in front of the PUC, they were encouraged to do a pilot program. Now, a pilot program for technology that has been around for 10 years really makes no sense. So how does this fit in with what we're talking about today? One is that the less money that we need to borrow is the less money that we need to raise that we need to put onto the ratepayers. Two is that these technologies help us move electricity around faster. And three is that they can help us reduce the risk of wildfire. Now, I want to be clear, they don't solve that problem, and the issues that you guys are talking about here are much greater. But this is a simple solution that we can take and we can implement right now. And so a couple things I'd ask the committee to look at. First is that we require the utilities to take some of these projects all the way to scale. And two is to ask the PUC and the CAISO to say, wait, instead of just approving these new transmission projects and these new distribution projects, Can we do a side-by-side analysis of the money that we would save if we use these new technologies? Thank you very much. Thank you. Good afternoon, Chair Petrie-Norrison member. Really excellent hearing today. Obviously, this is a very important issue. Would like to add to the chorus of kudos on the background paper. You guys did an excellent job there. I think what today highlights is that we're asking our electric system to do a lot, right? It needs to support new housing. economic growth, advance electrification, strengthen wildfire safety and keep service affordable safe and reliable Those goals can create competing demands and achieving them requires substantial investments and greater consistency between what state policy requires how we finance it, and what we expect customers to pay. A backgrounder describes roughly $125 billion in planned utility investment over the next five years. For businesses, that's infrastructure that can determine whether an expansion moves forward or a new facility can open for customers, it represents costs that they will pay over decades. The accumulation of state policy costs on ratepayer bills has contributed significantly to California's affordability challenge. Blue Sky Consulting Group has analyzed ratepayer bills and found that nearly 30% of a typical residential IOU bill is attributable to state policy-related costs, including wildfire spend. We appreciated today's hearing because we should be regularly examining whether these requirements remain cost-effective, how they interact, and whether costs serving broader statewide priorities should be funded entirely through rates. We also cannot evaluate the affordability of an investment requirement separately from the conditions under which utilities must finance it. Policy uncertainty and higher financing costs increase customer bills and delay the infrastructure our other goals depend on. We urge the legislature to align California's policy ambitions, investment requirements, and affordability commitments so businesses and families can succeed in California. Thank you. Thank you. Hi there. I'm Tina, and I'm with the Utility Wildfire Survivors Coalition. I was here a few months ago for an informational hearing on SB254, and back then it was mentioned that PG&E pays billions in litigation. So why do we continue to accept a system where utility corporations can spend enormous amounts of money fighting their responsibilities, yet we're still discussing how to protect their financial interests? AB 2700 matters because it's much bigger than survivor compensation. It's about all of us getting our power back. Legislation has this great chance to restore accountability and change a system in which powerful utility corporations have enormous influence over decisions that affect us all. My ask is that if there is a special session, that you consider this. How much is PG&E willing to spend on lawyers to avoid compensating their victims? Because this is always all about the money. Thank you so much. Thank you. Good afternoon, Chair and Member. My name is Brooke Rose, and I represent the Wildfire Solutions Coalition, a multi-sector alliance of over 95 organizations all across California, working to scale funding for wildfire mitigation from state, local, federal, and private sources. As the legislature considers wildfire risk and liability, we urge you to remember that the most effective way to reduce the overall cost of wildfire disasters is to reduce risk in our landscapes and communities. As the lovely committee background document notes, shifting liability does not eliminate risk or its costs. We echo comments from CPUC PG and the other panelists that the status quo of wildfire risk is unsustainable for California There are proven wildfire solutions to reduce the risk rather than merely shifting it Mitigating wildfire risk through the solutions in the Governor's Wildfire and Landscape Resilience Action Plan is necessary to manage costs for California's ratepayers. We urge the legislature to fund these solutions. Thank you. Thank you. Madam Chair and Member, Leanne Tratton, Tratton Price, representing Consumer Attorneys. It's been really enlightening listening to the two panels so far, looking forward to tomorrow. We appreciate that your first panel did talk about mitigation, how to avoid the risk, because as the prior comment was just made, when we're hearing from this panel the risk of liability is what's driving this urgency, it does feel like we're kind of putting the cart before the horse because we really need to be investing in two things. We need a good independent fiscal audit so we understand how their monies are being invested, what they are doing to mitigate against future fires, and secondly, an independent safety audit so that we can understand where they are making investments. Are they the right investments? We've heard from a number of people here in public comment about different strategies that aren't necessarily those that lead to an increased bottom line, but really could help avoid fires. And I think that that's probably the greatest interest we all have is to avoid having these fires in the first place. And so I hope this is just the first step in trying to peel back the curtain and understanding what's happening actually at these utilities and how their money is being spent. Thank you. Thank you so much. And that concludes our public comment. I want to thank once again all of our panelists for joining us today. And once again, just to put today's hearing in the context of the hearings that we have been conducting this fall, our hearing last week was all about mitigation and fire prevention and safety. Today's hearing was really about the money and how we are paying for this as Californians. Tomorrow's hearing will be a joint hearing with our colleagues in the Insurance Committee. So look forward to seeing you for the second part of this week's Doubleheader. With that, this hearing is adjourned. Thank you Thank you Thank you. Thank you.