May 13, 2026 · Jt Emerg Mgmt Nat Resources · 31,055 words · 22 speakers · 144 segments
Thank you. This joint hearing of the Senate Committee on National Resources and Water and the Senate Committee of Emergency Management will come to order. We're here in the O Street building in room 2100. I'll have some opening remarks. We'll turn it over to some other, my distinguished colleagues up here to give some opening remarks. And I'm really looking forward to the discussion we're going to get into today. Catastrophic wildfires over the last decade have resulted in destruction of thousands of homes, burned millions of acres, cost billions of dollars to fight, and resulted in tens of billions of dollars of property and economic losses, thousands of canceled homeowner insurance policies, and contributed to the housing and affordability crises in the state. Wildfire is a natural and necessary feature of the state's landscape. Unfortunately, the impacts of climate change, such as rising temperatures, increasing drought, and some of our historic fire suppression practices, among other factors, have contributed to the increasing risk of catastrophic wildfires. The state has taken numerous steps in the last decade to reduce the risk of catastrophic wildfire and improve the state's resilience to wildfire. And I was proud to chair the Budget Subcommittee on resources here, as we know, have the current chair here with us today and others who have served on that committee. We've taken numerous steps, including wildfire mitigation and home hardening, increasing Cal Fire's resources, requiring the state's utilities to reduce their wildfire risk, and creating the California Wildfire Fund. And numerous studies show that the cost of prevention and preparedness are much, much less than the cost of suppression and recovery. I authored SB 254 last year to further strengthen the state's response to natural catastrophes, including wildfire. and as part of that, called for the CEA to prepare a study assessing policy options to provide safe, catastrophe-resilient communities, a robust property insurance market, and affordable, safe, reliable, clean energy and stable utilities. The Earthquake Authority untook extensive effort with public workshops to develop the policy recommendations in their SB 254 report released in April. This hearing is to assess the 254 report policy recommendations related to wildfire mitigation, resilience financing, and recovery. This is the third of three Senate committee hearings exploring the SB 254 report, and the Assembly is also holding hearings. This highlights how important these issues are. The cost of inaction is high, as we heard yesterday from Mark Toney of Tern. He was issuing a red alert for crisis for ratepayers, for insurance policyholders. So the cause of an action is high. This hearing has two panels. The first will present information on the efforts the state is making to reduce wildfire risk to communities and the landscape and state funding. The second panel will focus on highlighting methods to improve recovery and financing to reduce risks. And I want to thank in advance all the panelists for their participation.
At this point let me turn it over to my colleague the Chair of Emergency Management Senator Stern Thank you Ms Chair Be brief and just say thanks in advance for everyone engaging showing up across so many jurisdictional lines These issues are complicated, so I'm really proud of the Senate, not just today, but over the last few days. I want to appreciate the work of our Vice Chair here also, Mr. Sayardo, as well as our Budget Sub-2 Chair joining us here today. honored to have you, Ms. Reyes. Yeah, we'll be looking at the money side of the equation somewhat today, and especially when it comes to how we've been spending and what the future of finance in this sector can look like. And those of you who had to sit through these hearings with me over the last few years will find it yeah, maybe repetitive, but hopefully not for everybody. I do think we still suffer from a disparity in how we've approached wildfire resilience over the past few years, and that's really what I want to try to interrogate today is, you know, we learned yesterday about $40 billion of wildfire mitigation funding has been spent by utilities on minimizing their risk given their very unique liability framework. We understand why so much is being spent there, and we have authorized and helped subsidize much of that. And over here, we will learn today that we've spent not just, yeah, about 1% of that on community hardening. So we have a paradigm where we're chasing not just utility risk, but also forest management in a way that doesn't actually recognize risk to property and risk to communities. And that's the paradigm I think we have to start to change here. So that's where I'll be focused on today and look forward to all the commentary. I'll turn it over to – where should we go, the vice chair? Yeah.
Yeah, Mr. Sarato, please. Thank you very much, and thank you all for being here today. This is an important topic. It's been something that's been brewing in California for the better part of 30 years now and maybe even longer. And I'm glad that we are finally to a point where we are going to have the conversations, and some of them difficult conversations that need to be had so that we can figure out what the heck we're going to do about this in the future. This is all about prevention, response, and recovery. And also associated with that is affordability and insurability. And we have a regulatory climate that we have to examine. as in one of the answers I hope to hear today is what are the hurdles that we are having, the barriers to the prevention aspect of this, because I know that there are communities out there that have already got their grant money. It's sitting in a bank, and they've described what they're going through as CEQA hell trying to get the project done. So we have to address that, and we have to figure out when we're doing more harm than good with some of our regulatory process. And unfortunately, I have to step out right at 10 o'clock. I'm hoping to make an hour-and-a-half meeting only last 15 minutes because this is really, really important to me. I have a unique perspective of this, and I would like to use that unique perspective in examining what we're going to be examining today, but also some of the things that I think were examined in another hearing yesterday. Those things are important to me I hope we can arrive at some way of better protecting Californians at an affordable rate and making some progress in this Thank you Thank you
Chair Reyes. Thank you so much, Mr. Chair. As we know, the devastating impacts of wildfires have affected Californians across the state, whether it's through horrendous air quality due to the wildfire smoke or wildfires destroying communities overnight. As a result, the legislature has prioritized wildfire prevention and resilience activities in the budget in the last several years. CAL FIRE's funding, for instance, to perform wildfire resilience activities have grown over the past 10 years from about $100 million in 2015-2016 to almost $700 million in the budget 2015-2016. In addition, the legislature successfully put on the ballot and the voters approved Prop 4, which provided $1.5 billion for wildfire and forest resilience activities. However, the state cannot do it alone. Much of the funding that we have relied on for wildfire prevention and resilience, such as Prop 4 and GGRF are either one time in nature or at significant risk. Now, many of us have already reviewed the 107-page report on enhancing California's resiliency to natural catastrophes, which was in response to SB 254 authored by our Chair Becker. It's very informative. But given the current challenging budget outlook, we all need to think outside the box, just as my colleague has mentioned. We need to find more ongoing, sustainable solutions for communities to truly rebuild and adapt to the new realities of wildfires in California. vegetation management, community and home hardening, prescribed fires. These are all activities that are not just one and done, but require careful planning, coordination and sustained efforts. State funds are just one piece of the puzzle. This will require partnerships at the local, regional and federal levels as well as utilities to truly address these issues. I appreciate the informational hearings on this issue, including the one today. It's important that we talk about these issues.
It is such an important issue, and I know that together we will make informed recommendations.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you very much. Senator Grace, what's it going to say?
Thank you, Mr. Chair. An ounce of prevention is better than a pound of cure. To be rephrased, the millions in prevention is far better than the billions in recovery. With that, I'm very interested in hearing what the panelists have to say.
Amen. Okay, let's welcome our first panel up. Okay. I think we're going to ask the LAO to start off here, and then we'll turn to Daniel.
Good morning chairs Becker and Stern and other members of the committee is Brian Metzger from the Legislative Analyst Office Our office was asked to provide a brief overview of state wildfire resilience funding and in preparation for this hearing, we prepared a handout that we will use to guide our remarks today. On page one of the handout, we provide a figure that shows the increase in state funding for wildfire resilience activities over the past several years. From 2018-19 to 2025-26, the state has appropriated about $4.7 billion across a variety of activities, which we break down in more detail over the next couple of pages. Funding peaked in 21-22 at $1.1 billion, with subsequent years of funding ranging from $450 to $750 million. It is important to note that the funding sources for state wildfire resilience activities have changed over time. In 2018-19 and 19-20, it was exclusively from the Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund at $200 million. In 2020-2021 to 2023-24, a majority of that funding came from the General Fund due to surpluses that the state experienced at that time. And in 2024-25 and 25-26, an increasing amount came from Proposition 4, the climate bond passed by voters in November of 2024. On page 2 of the handout, we provide our first detailed breakdown of the state wildfire resilience funding that is focused primarily on general fund and GGRF-funded activities. This figure does not include Prop 4 funding, which we'll cover on the next page. There are a lot of programs on this table, so I'm not going to go through all of them. We aggregate the GGRF funding into two main programs for forest health and wildfire prevention, as well as fuels, crews, research and monitoring. And that's about $1.5, $1.6 billion. And up until 2025-26, this funding was continuously appropriated for use on a variety of activities with a specific percentage split established in statute. As we will mention later in the handout, the new cap and invest structure under SB 840 changed how this appropriation would be calculated. Proposed trailer billing, which also would, if adopted, remove the current percentage split in statute. You also will note that compared to other programs on this list, notably less funding, about $65 million, has been appropriated for community hardening programs, such as defensible space inspections and home hardening. On page three of the handout, we provide our second detailed breakdown of state wildfire resilience funding, this time focused on the wildfire and forest resilience chapter of Prop 4. Again, there are a lot of programs in this table, but I would highlight that about $600 million of the $1.5 billion available in this chapter has been appropriated. An additional $314 million is proposed in the governor's budget to be allocated across many of the programs with funding remaining. Taken together, $4.1 billion in general fund and GGRF and $600 million in Prop 4 gets you to the $4.7 billion we mentioned at the top. On the last page of the handout, we explain that one-time state funding for wildfire resilience activities will decrease in the coming years. Absent Prop 4, there are few sources of ongoing state funding for this work. The primary source is though with the adoption of the new cap and invest structure, the amount of projected revenues in a given fiscal year will determine if and how much funding may be available for wildfire resilience activities. Up to $200 million may be available, but only after higher priority programs and projects are funded. In 26-27, for example, the governor's budget projects GGRF revenues will only be able to fund about $142 million in wildfire resilience. activities. Also recently proposed amendments to the cap and invest programs regulations would if adopted reduce GGRF revenues by roughly half and likely leave no funding for wildfire resilience activities. The other source of state funding is CAL FIRE operations funding for resource management and fire prevention which supports activities like defensible space inspections. State funding however is not the only source of wildfire resilience funding as you mentioned utilities have collected billions of dollars for fire prevention activities that are largely related to electricity transmission and federal programs have also historically provided funding after a major disaster declaration and that concludes my remarks and happy to take questions
thank you I think we're gonna do a few questions up front if you if you all want to dig in for a quick second and we'll roll through the rest of the panel that's okay so if there were any initial questions for the LAO here about confines of this report. I know you're about to leave Mr. Vice Chair. I don't know if I want to give you first priority there before you go or we can jump in. Yeah. Do we have an idea of what, you know, when we're talking about like GGRF funding and Prop 4 funding and you read through the list of what these projects are, these are projects that they're not one-and-done projects. The grass grows back, the forest grows back, the intrusion into the, into you know the the WUI areas, they regrow. And if we're going to use one-time funding to do a project, then we're not going to be able to – we won't have the funds when the project needs done again. So do we have a figure that we need from the legislature's point of view on the budget of what our yearly maintenance of those activities fund needs to be? because that's not a should we be funding this or not question. That's a priority of your budget question, and that's what I want to make sure that we understand that just because we take care of some of this stuff in one year, it's going to be there going into the future, and when we have billions and billions of dollars in a budget, we better use some of that billions of dollars to make sure that people's houses aren't burning down.
Thank you for the question. That is a very important point about the maintenance after the projects are completed. And our understanding is that there have been efforts in the administration to think about funding for maintenance as a part of grant programs. So thinking about how if we're giving out grants, there could be a certain portion of those grants maintained for maintenance efforts. But in terms of the overall magnitude of kind of how much funding would be needed for maintenance over the long term, We've seen, you know, academic articles and other sources that put it, you know, in the hundreds of millions, if not billions of dollars. But I don't have a specific figure for you right now.
And when we're reliant on a lot of funding from the IOUs because they have the deep pockets. But then when you consider that, what is it, 12 percent of the fires actually involve utility type infrastructure. And because of their strict liability clauses, that's where their liability is happening. And that's part of the affordability crisis on our part is we're funding something. Fires are going to happen, and there are a variety of ways they happen, not only through utility uses, but I'm sure everybody is aware of what those other ways are. So that you know for me we need to look beyond trying to find somebody to blame with the deep pockets to make them pay because we paying We the ones that are paying We need a more sustainable approach to funding to make sure that as this problem goes forward no matter what causing the problem, that we are prepared to be able to deal with it. Thank you, Mr. Vice Chair. Are there other comments or questions from members here? Chair Reyes?
One of the comments made, thank you, Mr. Chair. One of the comments made in the prior hearing was what about having fossil fuels pay their fair share? We know that there was a bill introduced because of climate change and the impact of fossil fuels on climate change and knowing that climate change has a lot to do with these wildfires. Having fossil fuel industry also pay their fair share. Any thoughts on that?
I don't have any specific thoughts on that. I think from a policy perspective, understanding kind of what is meant specifically by, you know, a polluter pays kind of, you know, approach to potentially funding some of the wildfire efforts is something that has been introduced and certainly that we've looked at. But I don't have any specific thoughts on, you know, particular pieces of legislation or particular approaches to that.
Thank you. I also want to commend you on a very good report. It helps us to look at the numbers and to see what the numbers have been over the years and to see where we are today. Thank you.
Thank you for that.
I'll just try to tee up the rest of the panel because I know you all hear from Cal OES, from Office of State Fire Marshal, and then we have Patrick Wright waiting on the line with the task force. I guess just to tee that piece up from the LA, I want to make sure I'm reading this right. So if you do it by percentage at least, since 2018, I'm seeing about 1.5% of funds have gone to community hardening and 98.5% have gone to other stuff. Forest sector, economic stimulus, science, fuel breaks, resilient forests and landscapes. Am I reading that right? So about like less than 2% of the state funding has been so far used on community-based things that are sort of property and structure-based.
Yes, you are reading that correctly. There's about $65 million, as we said, that is very specifically tied to community hardening. Now, there may be other pieces of funding here and there for things like, you know, fire prevention grants or some of these other buckets of funding where there may have been some community hardening included. but specifically very targeted funding towards community hardening is about $65 million.
And do you have any data on the results of the overall funding? I know we do have some data around how the pilot's gone around the community hardening piece specifically, but do you have a sense, like for all these other programs, is there a metric that we use to sort of evaluate performance based on property loss avoided or structural risk reduction versus, my understanding is these are mostly either acreage-driven goals, carbon-driven goals, things other than sort of public safety. Is that a fair assessment?
That is a fair assessment. I think there's been work done by CAL FIRE recently to take a look at, you know, for example, when we've done fuel breaks or other kind of fire mitigation efforts, how effective are they when we see a fire come through a community or come through, you know, a certain landscape? But typically yes these programs are focused on you know greenhouse gas reduction you know acres treated those sorts of metrics that are specific to the grant program itself
Yeah, my understanding is that the performance, and this might not be a fire marshal question for the remainder of the panel, maybe it's a bigger CAL FIRE question or a natural resources agency question, but that the performance is judged based on the success, at least for some of the major forest and landscape pots, as well as the fuel breaks piece, that they're basically judging success on suppressing 95 percent of all ignitions at 10 acres or less. So it's not based on how many houses burned down, but it's based on sort of acreage and ignition goals. And I guess that's the question is if there's enough flexibility in statute or in the funding sources to allow for a different kind of metric to drive it. Do you believe that there's discretion to, say, have some of those more community-based metrics even in, say, a fuel break program or a fire prevention grant program or even in Forest Health to say, you know, that is there anything in statute preventing that from being more flexible?
Not that comes to mind, no. I think to the extent that the legislature would like to be more specific about what it would like to track, what metrics it would like to track for specific programs, it can certainly do that in statute or even through budget bill language if there's funding associated with it. I think my understanding is that the task force is working on an update to its action plan that will focus on community hardening and will include some new metrics, you know, aside from just acres treated. And so to the extent that those could be, you know, more formalized, that would certainly be something the legislature could do.
Okay. Jump in. Yeah. Let's turn to Senator Kilbolland first.
Thanks, Mr. Messer, if you don't mind. I have a freshman question because I'm sure you might understand what I don't understand about this. So in your analysis, you point out that the sources of one-time funding are not growing and they may be substantially lower. But I'm curious because we do this a lot in state government. We create a funding source for something, and then we declare to ourselves that that funding source is the only way we can pay for that thing. So if we if we'd never created GGRF, we'd never passed cap and trade and then climate change happens, happened and is happening as it did and wildfires both in terms of their direct consequences like like like my colleague mentioned, but also impacts on insurance and everything else were to happen. It seems foreseeable that we were maybe not foreseeable because in the past we would have responded in some other way. Given fires and everything else, we would have said, okay, this is important that we deal with resilience, hardening, all these other elements, and therefore we're making a general fund appropriation like we do for some large percentage of the rest of the budget. Is there some legal reason or is it purely cultural that we're thinking about these issues, at least in this analysis, as wildfire lives entirely within the GGRF space and that the fact that, you know, our general fund revenues are up one to three billion dollars a month is of no, is a completely unrelated fact. It seems like they're like that, but that, but I'm, but I'm brand new here, you know, I've only been here for a year, so maybe you can help. Like, is there, is there, is there a reason why we don't, this doesn't show up on your list of there's one-time general fund, but legislature, you know, should also worry about that because they're competing needs, but that, which is typically in an LAO, like last page.
Why is the general fund not on the table here Thank you for the question Senator Cabaldon I don want to preclude the option of potentially using one general fund for this purpose Our analysis was specifically focused on, based on current law and policy, and also based on the current budget condition that we have, you know, established under the governor's budget, and not necessarily on, you know, tomorrow's May revision or what's to come, that, you know, the availability of general fund is quite limited for particular expenditures at this time. That's not to say that this should live solely within the realm of GGRF, for example. It's just the decision that's been made within the current cap and invest structure as well as within kind of current legislative and administration priorities to kind of look at wildfire resilience spending that way. But certainly there could be different decisions made. And again, we've also got funding coming from Prop 4 that's also providing some additional support. But I wouldn't want to say that general fund is off the table or that there's not a potential for using it for this purpose. It's just based on the current budget condition. That's not something that we've contemplated.
Well, on that note, just briefly before we wrap this little point up, as you mentioned at the outset, we are backfilling general fund with GGRF for the operational budget of CAL FIRE right now. And that's the governor's current proposal as well. So that's over a billion that was previously generally funded. And so that's one option for us to consider is if you actually freed up, if you took care of the operational side of CAL FIRE with the general fund, you free yourself up a billion dollars to just do potentially or some piece of that heavy on the mitigation side.
So previously, yeah, prior to last year, the Cal Fire operational budget, or at least that piece of it, was not GGRF funded. Is that right? That's correct. So there was budget bill language that was adopted in 2526 that was contingent on whether the general fund was projected to experience a deficit. There would be a certain amount of GGRF that would be used for Cal Fire's budget. And so in 26-27, $1.25 billion of GGRF is being used for CAL FIRE's operational budget, $750 million of which is coming from the legislative discretionary piece of the cap and invest structure, and $500 million of which is coming from the interest earnings on the cap and invest fund. Yeah.
Yeah, good. Well, I do think it's an interesting point, right, as we just discussed. So it's, you know, not only are we not funding mitigation out of the general fund, but even the Cal Fire operational budget is actually not a general fund, technically not actually coming out of GGRF. Yeah, before we move on, I'll just cite, you know, the report, to come back to the report itself, let's tee up some of our other panels as well. The report talks about up to approximately 2 million existing residential structures in the very high fire hazard severity zones requires some level of home hardening defensible space. According to CAL FIRE, you know, costs vary, but the comprehensive mitigations average approximately 45,000 per structure. Most homes in the high risk areas were built before the modern fire resistant construction standards took effect. I've seen there's I think there's data on that elsewhere in the report but it does say in 25 to 26 state budget California directed approximately 250 million towards wildfire prevention and mitigation against an estimated statewide prevention need of four to seven billion. Do those those numbers kind of read?
with you as well. We've seen the study that's referenced in the report and do acknowledge those numbers. Yeah, okay, good. Well, I think that sets the table a little bit for all of us. So,
thank you. If you can stick around for questions, that'd be great. We'll now run through our next three panelists and then have questions on all community. We'll start with you, Daniel,
please go ahead. All right. Well, good morning, Chair Becker, Chair Starr, members of the committee, Daniel Berlant, California State Fire Marshal, and on behalf of CAL FIRE Director Joe Tyler, thank you very much for having us today and a very important conversation, not just on the cusp of the report being released, but as we continue to develop the future of the Wildfire and Forest Resilience Action Plan and how we take and are taking many of the recommendations and many of the points you are making today under consideration and inclusion into the future of that action plan. The report pursuant to your bill, Senate Bill 254, presents an important and timely message for California. As you have already all mentioned, the state's wildfire crisis is no longer solely a fire suppression challenge. It's an economic challenge. It's an insurance challenge. It's a housing challenge. It's a public safety challenge, and ultimately it is a resilience challenge that requires a whole-of-society response. We believe the report correctly recognizes that California cannot respond to a catastrophic wildfire after disaster strikes. We must reduce risk before the next fire is ignited. And this is exactly the direction that Cal Fire Office of the State Fire Marshal's Community Wildfire Preparedness Strategy has been moving towards for years. California is, as you all know, facing a wildfire environment unlike anything in our history. Climate-driven extremes, prolonged drought, historic tree mortality, and decades of fuel accumulation have fundamentally changed the scale and the intensity of the wildfires that we are responding to across the state. Fifteen out of the twenty most destructive wildfires in just the past decade have occurred with just in the past decade. Entire communities, as you know and as many of you represent, have been devastated in a matter of hours. So at the same time, more Californians than ever are living in wildland urban interface areas, and that is where the homes and development meet wildland or open vegetation. And Chair Becker, to your point and to the notes there, we believe that today there are roughly 4 million homes located in California's wildland urban interface. And here's the most important part of this fact. 90% of those homes were built before today's modern adoption of building standards. So that gives us somewhat of a benchmark of the challenge in the community that we face. The consequence of this growing risk extend far beyond, though, the fire itself. Families face increasing insurance costs, loss of coverage altogether. Local governments struggle with evacuation planning and infrastructure needs. Utilities, as was mentioned, face extraordinary pressures to harden their systems while maintaining affordable and reliable energy. And vulnerable communities often bear the greatest burden because they have the fewest resources to prepare and recover. And I very much acknowledge that those of you who have had recent wildfires in your districts understand this firsthand. Now, this SB 254 report captures the reality very clearly. It concludes that California long resilience depends on sustained investments in risk reduction and Chair Stern to your point investments in stronger community preparedness improved coordination across agencies and stakeholders and policies that reduce catastrophic losses before they occur the report identifies several overarching policy pathways and I'm focused really in to the risk reduction into the community space here among those significantly include a commitment to community wildfire risk reduction, expanded mitigation investments and incentives, greater alignment between the insurance market and resilience actions, improved local capacity and technical support, better use of shared data and science, as well as long-term strategies that prioritize resilience over recovery alone. Now, these are not abstract concepts. They are practical recommendations that really mirror the direction that California has been advancing through the state's wildfire and forest resilience action plan. Now, in the next action plan that you see, we have been developing a very focused area in what we're calling the community wildfire preparedness strategy. And this strategy is built around a simple principle. Wildfire preparedness must happen at multiple scales simultaneously. Wildfire, excuse me, that strategy rests really on three interconnected components. First, home hardening. Research continues to show that embers are responsible for a majority of the home ignitions during wildfires. These embers can often travel miles ahead of the fire flame itself, igniting vulnerable components of the structures and again leading to complete destruction in those communities. Now, I will say, though, a moment of pride here. California has been a national leader in addressing that threat. For nearly 20 years, we have had state adopted some of the nation's first wildfire building standards for new construction in wildfire-prone areas. And research and data has continued to show that those homes have a significantly higher chance of surviving wildfires. And so, basically put, our code works. Studies continue to show, though, that demonstrate that even homes built to those modern wildfire resilient standards, while they, again, significantly survive, it's those that were not built to the standard that are remaining to be susceptible. And some of the higher standards include things like ember-resistant vents, Class A roofs, non-combustible siding like stucco or fiber cement, tempered glass windows, enclosed eaves, ignition-resistant construction material, all of which help us improve the survivability. But we have to recognize that the challenge before us, as I mentioned, is most homes that are at risk were built before that standard. And that is why retrofitting existing homes has become such an important priority. Now, the second piece of our strategy is defensible space. This remains one of the most effective and immediate tools available to homeowners and communities, creating and maintaining buffers around structures reduces overgrown and hazardous vegetation right up around them. It interrupts pathways for fire spread. That is something we saw in the LA fires, a much more urban conflagration, but it was those flammable pathways that allowed the fire to travel from home to home to home like dominoes. Defensible space cuts that pathway. And more importantly for us, for our firefighters, it provides a safe operational space during fires to take a stand and protect a community Now at CAL FIRE we have continued Thank you to your support and investments to expand our defensible space inspections public education and local resources statewide We have also increased the emphasis on the ember resistance zone a five safety zone immediately around the building, because science continues to show that combustible materials closest to the home often determine whether or not that structure is going to survive the wildfire. The third piece of our strategy is neighborhood level mitigation. Wildfire preparedness does not stop at the property line. Communities survive together, or they don't survive at all. Programs such as FireWise USA, FireSafe Councils, community fuel reduction projects, evacuation route improvements, shaded fuel breaks, and neighborhood scale home hardening all recognize that wildfire resiliency must occur collectively. Now, Governor Newsom has made streamlining wildfire regulations one of the hallmarks of his administration while maintaining California's nation-leading environmental protections. And Senator Ciarto, to some of your comments about some of the CEQA challenges your community has faced, in 2025, the governor issued an executive proclamation to expedite critical fuels reduction projects while protecting public health and the environment. And through this streamlining process, which just expired on May 1st, projects that are being improved are being approved in little as 30 days, reducing timelines that, yes, often have taken well over a year or more. So far, 383 projects have been approved through this streamlining process and have now been fast-tracked, and we still have more that are under review. The SB254 report specifically emphasizes that community-scale mitigation has to occur across sector coordination. It's essential to reducing our losses. And while CAL FIRE strategy has already reflected that philosophy, we cannot rely on a single solution, and we certainly can't respond our way out of this crisis. True resiliency requires a layered protection across parcels, across neighborhoods, across landscapes. Now, the Office of the State Fire Marshal within CAL FIRE is uniquely positioned to lead California's community wildfire preparedness and risk reduction strategy. Because we're not only able to leverage our statewide fire prevention authorities, our building standards expertise, our wildfire science, our local fire service coordination, but as well our public education, all under one mission-driven organization. And so while CAL FIRE is obviously very focused on wildfires and response, within the department, our office, 365 days a year, is solely focused on fire prevention and community resilience preparedness. The Office of State Fire Marshal already serves as the state's lead agency for defensible space regulations, for enforcement, for education, for wildfire building codes, as I've mentioned, fire hazard severity zone mapping, fire prevention policy, as well as community risk reduction projects. We work directly with local governments, with fire-safe councils, with the building industry, with the insurance industry, with fire-safe councils, and with residents across the state, all giving us that operational reach necessary to translate policy into on-the-ground action. Importantly, the SB254 report calls for an integrated approach that aligns mitigation, resiliency, insurance incentives, technical assistance, and long-term risk reduction. And that's precisely the work that our team at CAL FIRE is doing every day. Through our Wildfire Mitigation Advisory Committee that meets every single month we have established a formal structure to coordinate across the stakeholders and across the sectors We bring together experts from the fire service at the local level, insurance, utilities, local governments, academia, and community organizations, all to help us align our policy and to share best practices and advance statewide mitigation strategies. Wildfire preparedness and resiliency can't exist in silos. It requires connection between state policy into local implementation, combining science with enforcement, scaling preparedness from the individual homes all the way to the entire community. And the Office of State Fire Marshal has both the statutory authority and, again, that operational experience to serve as the statewide backbone for community wildfire preparedness. Now, the scale of the challenge before us is enormous. Again, I don't need to tell you that. You all understand that firsthand. But California is not starting from zero, and I think that's important to understand and recognize. And the recommendations outlined in the report validate much of the work already underway and validate that we must continue that focus to expand the effort. Back to the community wildfire preparedness strategy that I've referenced, we're already working to operationalize it. We're already working to implement many of the recommendations through science-based mitigation, cross-sector coordination, neighborhood scale, resiliency and targeted financial assistance and incentives driven by risk reduction. And Senator Stern, I heard you loud and clear and look forward to talking more about how we do that. But as I've mentioned, and the piece that I think is really exciting from my perspective and from the team, we are updating the California Wildfire and Forest Resilience Action Plan. You'll hear from the director of the task force momentarily, but we are actively incorporating key recommendations from the report into our strategy and into our work. Now, initiatives that you will likely see in that action plan range from emphasizing regional planning at the county level, wildfire mitigation validation to actually validate that the work is occurring, establishing new community wildfire data standards and metrics. And the report reinforces that, again, resiliency, as I mentioned at the beginning, requires us to do more than emergency response. We have to have a coordinated mitigation. We have to have better risk information, stronger building practices, and investments into those communities to truly reduce the vulnerabilities before the disaster occurs. And that is exactly the direction California is taking. And again, I thank you all for your investments because we are expanding on financial assistance. We are improving risk assessment tools, strengthening model local ordinances, and increasing technical assistance. But as our partners at the LAO have very well identified, much of it has been on one-time funding, funding we are grateful for, funding that continues to matter. But we are charged with having to have a conversation of how do we sustain this. And I'm just going to answer Senator Ciardo's question here. In the latest wildfire prevention grant funds that we made available last week, $70 million through the climate bond, we are prioritizing in our fuel reduction category maintenance over new projects, making sure that the investments you have made over the last several years, that we are maintaining those, not just putting new work on the ground that's critical, not just chasing acres, but maintaining the work and the investment you have made. But most importantly, the report underscores that preparedness must occur at the community scale, and we are working to move beyond just reporting on acres, and that's an important metric. It's been an important metric in the last decade for us to change our philosophy, our emergency response philosophy. Our firefighters focused on responding from one emergency to the next, uh, using, The metric of acres treated helped us really track that work metric of the work that our firefighters were doing. But it also, you know, we have to continue to look at moving away from what I like to call random acts of mitigation. It's great that we're investing in these projects. Don't get me wrong. But when they're not to scale and when they're not interconnected, they are random. We have to focus on using wildfire risk reduction modeling to identify the right mitigations in the right place. And we are piloting tools to do just that, analyzing risk, providing a decision-making planning platform that best reduces the risk while providing the highest return on investment. This platform combines AI, geospatial data, wildfire science, all to prioritize which mitigations and which treatments optimize the resources and measures the outcome across communities and forests and fire-prone landscapes all at the same time. But here's what's really important to note, that even with modern tools, sustaining and expanding this work will require continued partnerships and investment. Wildfire resiliency cannot be achieved through one-time funding or through isolated projects. It requires long-term commitment, sustained collaboration, and shared responsibility across every level of government, the private sector, and the public. It is not just on the state to do it all, but I do view that it is our role to provide the tools and the guidance to support the private sector and communities to bring funds and continue to do this work. Now, California has an opportunity to lead the nation in demonstrating what true wildfire resiliency looks like. Not just simply responding and reacting to disasters after they occur, but actively reducing risk before catastrophic fires strike. Not just rebuilding with the same vulnerabilities, but building stronger, safer, and more resilient communities. And not just treating wildfire preparedness solely as a firefighting issue, but as a comprehensive resiliency strategy that protects lives, homes, economies, and the future of the state. So in closing, again, I want to emphasize the SB254 report. It provides an important roadmap for California's future. Our community wildfire preparedness strategy, and I say ours, but it's really important to note back to the Wildfire Mitigation Advisory Committee, Our strategy is with our local, our other state entities, our federal, our tribal, our private sector partners. But that work and that strategy is working and it's helping many, many in putting the recommendations into practice through home harding, defensible space, neighborhood level mitigation, technical assistance, financial assistance, incentives. We are moving California from a model of response to a model of resiliency. And just last week was our wildfire preparedness week. And it was a perfect time to ensure that we showcase that we are ready for fire season and for the peak of the fire year, but more importantly, to talk about these steps that homeowners need to take so that California is prepared, not just for this year, but so that we're building a safer California for generations to come. So I thank you for the time, and I very much look forward to your questions after my colleagues.
Excellent. Good. We'll use a lot of words we like to hear on comprehensive, coordinated, sort of bang for the buck, a lot of good stuff. We'll move over now to you, Robin.
Thank you. Good morning, Chair Stern, Chair Becker, committee members. Thank you very much for having me here today. My name is Robin Fenegg and I'm the deputy director for recovery at Cal OES. I also our state hazard mitigation officer tasked with overseeing FEMA hazard mitigation assistance program and how we implement that in California First I want to provide a brief context on the AB38 pilot structure that informed our early home hardening efforts Through AB38, which was passed in 2019, the legislature tasked the California Wildfire Mitigation Program, or CWMP, Joint Powers Authority, with funding pilot projects that provide neighborhood or community-wide benefits against wildfire. Chief Berlantz and my respective teams work together to support these communities, tackle challenges, and capture best practices. The CWMP JPA is not the subrecipient for the FEMA or AB38 grants. Naming the local entities as the subrecipients allows us to understand those barriers, assessing and managing grants, while also allowing the program to adapt to the unique needs of their communities. Moreover, the legislature mandated specific criteria to evaluate risk and prioritize by need. with social vulnerability criteria built into the bill language. The JPA ranked counties using those criteria and worked with local experts to identify the communities that best met those criteria within the communities in the counties, as well as the groups to specifically manage those programs. Additionally, the intent of this funding was to match with FEMA grants. At the time, it made sense for us to leverage federal funds. We didn't have any reason not to, and up until then,
most of our FEMA grants for wildfire were largely for education, outreach, and warning systems. And we also had zero home hardening grants to point to. So this was really important work for us to undertake, really understand what those challenges were, and then try to figure out how to scale. Obviously, we are where we are today, and we have a big task in front of us. A few years later, we have learned a lot, and we are consistently incorporating those lessons learned across our entire FEMA grant portfolio, not just the CWMP or even home hardening alone. It may be helpful to clarify that the CWMP is one important component of our broader approach to community wildfire risk reduction, but not the strategy in its entirety, as Chief Berlant had mentioned. Framing it as the whole strategy could unintentionally overlook the significant work being done by teams across both CAL FIRE and CAL OES. For awareness, in our FEMA hazard mitigation grants portfolio, we have over 116 active projects for wildfire resilience alone, with over $460 million federal dollars being used right now. We also have another 95 projects under review of FEMA for $577 million in federal funds. When you include the non-federal match that our local partners and tribal partners are bringing to the table, this investment totals over $1.2 billion in wildfire risk reduction in the FEMA grants alone. This includes $480 million in community hardening across the state, and that's over $360 million outside of the CWMP. So the work that we're doing through CWMP is funneling outside and helping other communities stand up their programs. CWMP has helped us tremendously understand FEMA's EHP process, and it's allowed us to build tools that support appropriate scoping, collection of property information, and helping us shift staffing at Cal OES to align with the subject matter expertise that we need to get these grants moving more quickly. Prior to these shifts, it has taken on average 680 days, or as many as 1,300 days, to receive FEMA approval to start a grant in the wildfire space specifically. We cannot begin until FEMA approves the grant within our hazard mitigation programs, otherwise we jeopardize all of the funding. Furthermore, FEMA is no longer extending periods of performance on grants Our pilot communities have a year or less left to access their FEMA funds We worked with the communities to right their approach and try to maximize the federal funds to then turn to state projects until the end of the state liquidation period ends How could the effectiveness be improved The simplest answer is to get the federal grant flowing and to get it flowing more quickly. This new kind of landscape of hazard mitigation that we're operating under means that we honestly haven't had a FEMA hazard mitigation approval of a new HMA grant since July of 2025 due to the DHS Secretary $100,000 review and approval policy. It's recently changed with the appropriations bill that was passed to reopen FEMA, if you will, where Congress also now has a role to play in grants with $100,000 more or more in federal funds across all Stafford Act programs. We've also weathered multiple DHS and federal shutdowns, which means the EHP process has slowed down even more. And we also have seen litigation involving our grant programs. I know as Charister and I have had some other conversations about BRIC about. Last week in the Assembly Budget Subcommittee 4, we had a similar discussion to the one we're having today and heard from several local entities working to tackle wildfire risk and increase insurability in their respective communities. There has largely been success with some local groups funding that work, and we're also trying to capture those things and share those with our CWMP communities as well. Thus far in the CWMP, we've hardened 155 properties. We have 19 properties in active construction and 370 properties with assessments completed waiting for their turn to start. Our average costs are pretty reasonable. Establishing defensible space costs on average just over $12,000, and the structural retrofit components are just over $49,000. The JPA has been successful in helping pilot programs build their capacity and identify best practices to scale other mitigation programs across the wildfire and home hardening portfolio. Some of the highlights that we're able to share are one, completion of a home hardening framework that helps an entity start up a program by walking through all of the considerations and recommendations based on the pilot program experiences and also other communities who are starting to engage in that work. We have used this to properly scope other programs outside of CWMP and right-size existing programs under FEMA review. We also have a standardized homeowner application portal built with the collection of environmental and historic preservation information in mind. And we've also trained FEMA to actually use it to manage our EHP processes moving forward. We've also leveraged our understanding of the overall EHP process to advise federally funded projects on which areas to prioritize, to access those that have reduced barriers, and prioritizing that work first to kind of scale and build the momentum within communities. The JPA has also trained 53 assessors in our pilot communities to address unique property-specific risk. That property owner education is a really vital component to what we do with the JPA. We've also established minimum quality standards, or what we call the MQS, which are program guidelines for material selection and performance quality. It's a blueprint for how each retrofit should be completed, providing the subrecipient, property owners, and contractors an easy way to identify what work is being performed and why, and how the retrofits increase protection. And there are also references to relevant building codes and external program standards to thoughtfully align with other state initiatives and partners like IBHS. It's also got pictures so people understand this is what this retrofit means, this is what it looks like, and how it kind of accomplishes the task. Moving forward we also taking lessons learned and trying to streamline the delivery of the Prop 4 grant program We don have federal dollars available to match and if we did we would still recommend delivering the Prop 4 program with only state funding The Prop 4 wildfire hardening program has legislative mandates, including prioritization of low-income communities on the fire risk reduction list and in high fire severity zones. Through CWMP, we have learned about specific roles that have impacted program success and used those to help kind of the next generation of home-hardening communities to model after to facilitate program delivery. In our selection process, we will factor in proximity to contractors, as well as selecting sites near the existing CAL FIRE-funded defensible space or fuels treatment areas to help maximize state investment. Thank you for your time today, and I stand by to answer any questions after the other panelists complete their presentations. Okay, thank you, Deputy Director. We'll turn lastly to Patrick Wright. I think he's going to be able to remotely testify here, Wildfire and Forest Resilience Task Force.
Mr. Wright. Can you see me?
You are with us.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. Delighted to be here. I apologize. I could not be there in person with you. It turns out I'm actually in Nebraska with all of the Western states and the Forest Service leadership trying to discuss how to deal with some of these same issues to better align our efforts and to deal with the many changes that are underway at the federal level. I'm now going to share my screen and walk you through just a short set of slides to give you a sense of where the task force is going, where the state is going, and then end with some specific thoughts in response to committee questions on how we're trying to work with regions to better prioritize and report on the benefits of projects. As many of you know, the task force is not able to advance.
Yeah, we're with you. Yeah, we got you on the screen, your task force, your PowerPoint.
I see that, but it's not advancing. Oh, it doesn't matter.
Edith, can you help out here?
I cannot.
I'm going to have to – I'll stop my sharing, and maybe you can try yours.
There we go.
Next slide. I'll try to run through these quickly. As many of you know, the task force was created, the most recent version, about five years ago in response to the development of the nation's first wildfire and forest resilient action plan where we're able to put together in one place for the first time all of the related activities of state, federal, local agencies in dealing with our wildfire crisis. Very much a science-based program that's designed to align the agencies and to grow regional partnerships throughout the state. Next slide. We get a lot of our work done through regional meetings up and down the state where regional leaders have been able to hear firsthand from Secretary Crowfoot, Chief Tyler, and the federal agencies on where they're going, and for us in turn to hear about the key issues and priorities in each part of the state. These have been tremendously successful, and we certainly hope to build on them in the future. Next slide. We've accomplished a lot, as Chief Berlant has said, in the last several years, coordinated over $6 billion of state and federal institutions, We've ramped up treatments to over 700,000 acres annually, including more than a doubling of prescribed fire. We also have considerably streamlining processes, as Chief Berlan also mentioned. Projects that typically took a year or two to get approved are now being approved in 30 days. And we're now working on potential solutions to that effort to make sure that it extends beyond the period that just ended in May. We spend a lot of time building regional capacity. The State Department of Conservation has a program known as the Regional Forest and Fire Capacity Program, where millions of dollars are flowing to partnerships throughout the state to give them the capacity they need to address their priority areas. We've also developed a series of interagency strategies for things like prescribed fire, reforestation, landowner assistance. These are programs that previously, candidly, were operated in silos. You have a state park program, you have a Cal Fire program, you have a Forest Service program, you have an NRCS program. Over and over again, we've brought these agencies together to integrate and align those programs to better leverage funding and make a difference on the ground. And then finally, we spend a lot of time, I'll come back to this at the end, of developing new tools and data to much more effectively design our projects to make sure we're hitting the highest priorities and to report on the results of those projects as well. Next slide, I think, gives you just the framework for how our action plan update is heading. We will have a comprehensive landscape resilience strategy that we'll be outlining in the near future, together with a community strategy led by CAL FIRE that includes many of the elements that Chief Berland talked about, together with a framework for trying to get the regions to go where they need. At the county level for community work and at the regional level for landscape work, we're doing everything we can to give local and regional agencies the tools they need to scale up, go bigger, and go faster. The next couple of slides give you, again, just a short flavor of each of these strategies. The landscape resilience strategy is really focusing on prioritizing the high and very high hazard areas. Our scientists are telling us if we can be laser focused on those areas, we get a much bigger bang for the buck than if we scatter our projects across the landscape, as Chief Berlant was mentioning. So we're going to be spending a lot of time with various decision support tools that help regional entities better plan and prioritize those projects so they can hit these high priority areas. We also need to work to build our fuel break network. We've got a federal network, we've got a private network, and we've got a non-federal network that's being built by CAL FIRE. We're in the process of integrating all of those networks so that we have a comprehensive fuel break system throughout the state to better protect communities and help firefighters as fires do occur. And then finally, spending a lot more time recently on restoring recently burned areas. We face a real risk in this state that up to half of our store forests could be lost if we don't get in there aggressively and start replanting areas that have been burned at high intensity and simply can't recover on our own. So those are just some of the brief highlights of our landscape resilience strategy. The next slide walks through just the broad strokes of the community preparedness strategy that Chief Berlant summarized everything from home hardening defensible space community programs particularly at the county level which we think is a real sweet spot to get integration of work in our communities around the state, a big effort with both utilities and Caltrans to reduce unwanted ignitions, and then again to continue building out that fuel break network to protect communities and critical infrastructure throughout the state. The next slides speak to the big differences we're facing in Northern California and in Southern California. As you know, Northern California is really faced with forests that are way too dense. So our highest priority there is getting more thinning done, more beneficial fire done, more reforestation where that's needed, and to expand our wood utilization program so that we can save money and make productive use of the material that's coming off of all of our forests. All of that, of course, has to be coordinated with community and home resilience efforts if we're going to get our biggest bang for the buck. In Southern California, the situation is a little bit different. You see from the next slide, certainly we need to continue our emphasis there on community and home hardening efforts. But, sorry, if you can go back a slide, but we're also have a different situation on the landscape where reducing ignitions from roadways and utility corridors is really the highest priority in Southern California. So we've developed this unique partnership. This is one of the benefits that the task force brings, where we have CAL FIRE, the Forest Service, and Caltrans working very aggressively to take care of all the high-priority roadways in Southern California to reduce that ignition risk in ways that help each community in the state prevent the kinds of fires that we've seen recently there. The next slide goes into a little bit more detail on how we're beginning to track and report on all this work. We do have an interagency treatment dashboard that allows you and others to track every one of the 2,000-plus projects that we funded on the state side and another 1,000 or more on the federal side. We track them both by activity. Is it thinning? Is it prescribed fire? Is it reforestation? And also by ownership. Is it on federal land? Is it on state land? Is it on private land? We've got a comprehensive setup. The next phase of this is going to be to start to put in planned projects so that we can get a better sense of where all the different projects of the different agencies are across the landscape. The next slide zeroes in a little bit more on Southern California to give you a sense of some of the issues that we've had with this approach. As Chief Berlant has said, it's wonderful that we've funded hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of projects in Southern California. But those are each isolated projects that require a grant application, requires a review, requires a report, requires crews to be hired, requires permits to be had. We simply aren't going to solve our wildfire crisis on a project-by-project basis. So we're beginning to shift both how we do projects, how we fund them, and how we report on them. The next slide is a really good example of how CAL FIRE is moving in this direction. Whereas previously it would have funded those isolated projects, CAL FIRE and other agencies are now moving to block grants. In this case where they took million of forest health money million of wildfire prevention money and gave the Southern California groups a million block grant to fund 23 projects at one time So those will be increasingly block grants to these individual subregions or block grants to the region as a whole We think this approach is vital if we're going to be able to scale up in the way that we need to to attack this crisis more cost-effectively. This approach also allows us to better measure results. It's very challenging to report on the benefits of individual projects. But when you group those projects, it allows you to measure how they can work together. This next slide from Southern California tells you where we are on this process. We're right on the cutting edge of this, but this is a great example where the fuel break network that the Forest Service in CAL FIRE or building together with the ignition reduction work that's underway is going to significantly reduce the burn probability throughout Southern California. Again, this is just one metric, but it gives you an example of how we're trying to move rapidly beyond acres treated to give you and others a better sense of how these projects are working collectively to reduce risk across the state. The next slide, which is from a different part of the state, from the Placerville region gives you a similar story. The map to the upper left shows the areas that the consultant team, the modeling, the data, the community have arrived at as priority treatment areas. And the map on the bottom right gives you a prediction of how the burn probability in that area will change if we actually implement those projects. Again, this is all cutting-edge work, but you're going to see more and more of this from us and from CAL FIRE at both the community level and the landscape level. The final slide takes it even one step further where we can take some of the same information. In this case, it's a project near Sonora on the Stanislaus National Forest where they've used these same tools to implement these projects and are reporting on significant risk reductions to homes, to power lines, to communication sites, to watersheds, carbon, et cetera. So again, as every day goes by, we're getting better and better about getting beyond acres treated and using a sophisticated new set of tools to both better plan and prioritize projects and to better report on the results. The bottom line for us, it's all about going faster, smarter, and bigger to link work at the community level with work at the landscape level and to be able to better report to the legislature, to the administration and others, the effectiveness of this work and the benefits we're getting from the dollars we do have. Thank you again. Happy to answer any questions you have as we go along.
Great. Thank you. Well, we really appreciate all of those presentations, and we'd like to dive in now. Any questions? Can I start with bringing you back up, Mr. Wright? And just to kind of dive back into the previous point, you know, I don't know if you want to – there's a couple slides I guess I want to focus on.
maybe you gave us the Stanislaus example just now, but then you sort of, you outlined your NorCal and SoCal strategies. Do you actually have a number of how many homes or communities will be,
will have risk reduced from this whole range of projects No we don have information quite down to that level The biggest challenge we have right now is at the landscape level we have tremendously good data on the condition of vegetation throughout the state down to the three-meter level. And we also have sophisticated fire models that track fire as it moves through vegetation. So our predictive capacity at the landscape level is very high. The challenge that we have at the community level, and certainly Chief Berlant can talk about this, is we're now getting there. But the challenge to date has been to get that parcel-level information. Who actually is doing home hardening? Who is doing defensible space? And how do you track fires as they progress through the community? Not vegetation fires, but structure-to-structure fires. Great advances are being made in each of those areas every day, which is why you heard from Chief Berlant that Cal Fire is committed to working on a new set of metrics and models for the community level that will be able to match what we've done at the landscape level.
But I guess what I'm getting at is your central goal here is not to avoid property loss from fire.
Is that correct?
Well, I think we have multiple goals.
Obviously, we want to reduce fire risk to everyone, both communities and landscapes.
I get that there are multiple goals, but what I'm saying is I saw acreage on every single chart of how you track your progress. And I also saw forest growth as a metric with actual concrete data, but that there is no concrete data driving your hardening strategy. And in fact, as I saw it, your NorCal strategy is about landscape resilience, and it assumes that the whole north is a bunch of forests from what I can tell. And the last time I checked, like in the hills of Orinda or throughout the East Bay or in all the very high fire severity zones or high fire zones that are experiencing massive insurance crisis, that impacting that market is not the central driving thesis of your spending strategy. Is that a fair assessment?
No, I don't think so. I think our goal is to try to align community work with landscape work. And as you've heard from Daniel and Cal Fire, they're about with us to launch a comprehensive strategy that is focused on community preparedness, particularly at the county level. We're going to be aligning that with a landscape strategy that focuses more on the regional and subregional level. They both go together.
Sure. I get they go together, but it's like when you have 1.5 percent of the funds for one piece of it, you can say it goes together. But what does that actually mean in terms of impact? I think the concern here, you know, we can look at both the GGRF piece or the Prop 4 piece, where the bulk of the Prop 4 funds are also, at least as of right now, programmed in a way that chase acreage or, say, watershed health or other goals aside from avoiding property loss and preserving public safety.
And so the question is whether you can start to reform your administration of these other programs to make community safety the driving metric and what restrictions you have on doing so.
So, for example, if we wanted forest health, for example, to prioritize community safety, is that possible?
under current law. I think that's very much what's happening now. As I tried to show in some of our brief graphics, we're prioritizing high hazard zones, as you see from the...
Can we pull that one back up? I'd be good to go through it. Pull that landscape resilience strategy up. I was looking at high hazard zones, and I saw huge stretches of the eastern Sierra in there, which is great. There's a lot out there to do. I just didn't think that many people lived there. That seems like the bulk of the
landscape. Well, no, actually, I think the highest risk area from the landscape perspective, if you can go back to the previous slide that shows the high hazard zone is the Sierra Foothills area that is extremely vulnerable to fire. And so at the landscape level.
Take it back just real quick. Take it back to that landscape resilience strategy slide. Can we go there for one second?
I don't know who's in charge of them. I think you need to go back a little more.
Yeah, go back a little more if you don't mind. A little bit more. A little more. One more.
keep going there we go that other one the one you just passed there we go so I see
the red areas are where you have what you're calling high risk right so but that
wildfire hazard potential doesn't actually weight potential property loss correct
uh i no right it's it's it's this is dealing with hazard rather than risk uh but we have
increasingly sophisticated tools of course that do both of those things as we're planning and prioritizing projects yeah no i appreciate it and some of it may be that the statutory direction is
so multi-pronged that you sort of you're chasing everything and you're not actually you know we've set it up in a way that sort of leaves the community safety or the measurability of outcomes from an insurance risk reduction or insurable loss reduction. So I'm wondering how much you can do to adjust that now, or if we actually need to work that out through the budget or some statutory changes around all this.
Because it seems like the lack of weighting of home and community safety,
And it's just it's it's getting in your way of delivering outcomes, because so far I haven't heard a number of homes. I know from the community wildfire mitigation program that you are administering through your JPA. You're shooting for 2000 homes, I think, was the goal. 2000. I know we're not even close to that at this point. But if you say, OK, we've got 100 million dollars to get to 2000 homes. Chief Perlant, you said we have four million homes.
Okay, so we're a little short, right?
We've sized it based on, okay, we're going to try to hit 2,000. Well, we got now 3.98 million more to go. And yet that's the full scope of the funds that we're looking at. So I just – I don't see how our state's strategy is right-sized towards the scope of the insurance risk and the overall economic risk the 254 report articulated. I know that's sort of a more of a rhetorical point maybe, and maybe you all can't quite answer it today, but I do think it, yeah, it's a, I don't know what we're aiming for here. And we're a little concerned about the scale.
Senator if I could I know it was rhetorical but I absolutely agree that that is the number one challenge and really has to be the first step for us of implementing the community strategy It has to be figuring out our common set of data to really understand because I use the number of 4 million homes That's what we know physically is in the wildland-urban interface. What we don't know, though, is how many of those homes on their own have been retrofitted, how many of those homes have had work done on them. And so really the first thing that has to be done here is ensuring that we have a common set of data and then being able to pull it together to truly understand where is the greatest risk. Your points are all valid about the maps that show hazard. Don't necessarily incorporate where are the communities that have the greatest impact, and that is what you will see when the action plan is released. has got to be step number one for us, making sure we're aligned on the data and then crunching it all together.
Do we have – are the folks from Aon here who are with us – you've got to go now? Jump in. Go, go, go. Jump.
Can I jump in?
Yeah, please go.
Because some will answer a little bit of a question. What's the fastest way to reduce risk to the homes?
The fastest way?
Yeah, that's a great question. Defensible space reduces the ember collection right around the edge of it. Fuel modification. Correct.
Correct.
So to me, that's, you know, I hear some great plans, but plans aren't what's going to reduce the risk. The risk is done at the ground level where we actually get the projects done. And so that is where I think my colleague is also concerned about is, hey, this other stuff is great,
But right now, our biggest risk is those homes that are in the WUI areas and how to get that fuel modification done and that defensible space. Over the years, that defensible space model has changed, correct?
Yeah, correct. With the recent especially ember resistance zone, we all adopted. Right, because now we're looking at ember cast as opposed to what we had before, which means the fuel modification area, the defensible space area, is different. And we've expanded, as more homes are in high-hazard areas, requirements to maintain defensible space in communities that maybe traditionally did not maintain or have local defensible space ordinances. Correct.
And so, you know, for me, it's really important for us to be able to put – because it sounds like we've been doing a lot of great work and starting to use all the tools that we have to identify where the problems are the worst and how we've got to get there. But we've got to get the people on the ground, and that's the other part of that, is there's a workforce for now and a workforce for going forward that we're going to have to deal with from the budget perspective. Because otherwise, we're not going to be able to get the work done. And as I had stated before, tell me really quickly about the governor's orders in relation to being able to – our CEQA exemptions. Where is that? Because I got cities out there that are stuck in CEQA hell. We need to fix that.
In late 2025 through May 1st of this year, we accepted applications through the California Natural Resource Agency to streamline projects. So far, 383 as of today projects have been fast-tracked in less than 30 days. We are still, the team is reviewing several hundred more. But it is important to note that that was through an emergency proclamation that has concluded. And so as Patrick alluded to as well and probably policy conversations for you all as well of how do we take the lessons learned from that streamlining and determine whether they should be implemented as ongoing fixes Because here what I don want to see happen I don want to see the mitigation money
They got the grant money. It's sitting in the bank. They're going through this process. And because it fell outside the window of this mitigation or the CEQA exemptions, that they burn down neighborhoods while their mitigation money sits in a bank because we have an environmental thing that says, oh, you know, this modification, you're going to have to get this permit and that permit, because the worst of the scenarios is that the entire hillside burns down, and there is no plant life, and there is no animal life. And so that's what we're trying to prevent, and that's what I hope our efforts are going to be on this next step. Identifying what we need to do is one thing. Getting it on the ground is, to me, that's the most important part, And that's the part we need, information from you, what we need to give you to do the tools to do the job. Now I'm going to go fight in appropriations. I'll be back in a little bit.
I appreciate that. For the other committee members, I'll just mention, though, we even accepted applications from projects that were not funded. So we encouraged applicants to apply for the streamlining, even if they didn't have the money in the bank, to make sure that the streamlining CEQA was approved. And now as we release fire prevention dollars or soon-to-be available dollars they're awarded, they'd have the CEQA documents all ready to go. And so your points are valid. I just want to stress that even projects not funded. In the bank, they should have been streamlined already.
So that's my point.
I look forward to working with our vice chair on extending the governor's executive order and finding a way to codify some of those elements from the VTP.
I think it's a point well taken. And I watched a goat project get turned down by my local county, and that exact hillside would burn down all of Big Rock just now and kill my next-door neighbor. So I'm – yeah, Betty's not here. She stayed behind. She ran our local movie theater. She was blind in her 90s. And I told my wife every single day about that hillside. I remember having a baby, and she thought I was just a crazy paranoid person. And so the neighbors raised a fuss with the county under the previous supervisor, and then we walked away from a few million dollars, and then that entire hillside just burned us all down. So I am not trying to advocate here that you don't focus on landscapes at all. And Mr. Wright, please don't take my criticism as any sort of, yeah, turning on that. It's just to put community safety at the heart of it all, and I think it will really help tighten things up. I wanted to see if Aon, I know you guys had done some modeling in the 254 report on this front. We talked about it briefly in the hearing yesterday. Do you mind just coming up briefly and jumping in on this panel? I wanted to get your perspective because if you did put, say, I don't know what the metric is, avoided insured losses or fair plan removal. So I'm not sure quite what it is, but when you look at the sort of state of mitigation funds that we've been evaluating today, is there a way to get more bang for our buck from a community safety perspective? Yes.
Thank you very much for the opportunity to join the panel here. When we did our modeling, we performed the mitigation modeling kind of in two different ways. One where we did a kind of randomized approach to just selecting structures and mitigating this one mitigating that one and as expected you kind of get this slow decrease throughout California if you just kind of applying the Random acts of mitigation Random acts of mitigation Quote the chief. Yes. Exactly. Yes. So then we prioritized based on communities and based on areas where we were able to segment and say, here's one area, here's another area. Actually, just as you called me up, I texted my lead modeler to say exactly what is the definition of that area so we can get that back to you. But we prioritized areas and we said if we actually were to mitigate these in order, which is admittedly a little bit of an extreme example because you don't mitigate just one community and then move on to the next. But we said if you were to carry this out, how does that change the overall effect of the mitigation? And the reality is if you're able to really hyper-prioritize your highest risk areas, then you can significantly reduce the overall exposure of California much more quickly than with those random acts of mitigation. Now –
Sorry, when you say risk, you don't mean hazard as they're defining it.
Right.
We're actually looking at structures, and we use the average annualized loss of a structure and of a community.
So we accumulated this not just by the number of structures exposed, but the modeled average annualized loss within a community using a suite of wildfire models. Understood.
Mr. Wright, do you have a comment, either a reaction to AON's modeling or there was a presentation from Milliman yesterday on the same kind of concept? We'll get into a little more with the upcoming panel with Professor Wera.
But, yeah. Yeah, I would say we at Cal Fire are very much aware of those modeling efforts, as you saw from some of the examples I showed you from Stanislaus and Placerville. That's exactly what they're doing. They're modeling different treatments around those communities to try to figure out which exact locations give you the biggest bang for the buck. And it turns out that there's a mix. In some cases, you need to treat right adjacent to the community. In other cases, you need to supplement that with treatments further away from the community because you've got really dense forests that are going to provide a wick for fire to come right into the community. So it's really an all-of-the-above strategy, but there's no question that it's a community-first strategy in both our landscape resilience strategy and our community strategy.
Because I saw on the Stanislaus side, I've got to remember the number, was it a 16% sort of projected risk reduction? Something in that ballpark. I think that's what you hit. I know you had a couple acreage numbers in there too. But is that based on average annualized loss or is that – what's that 16% get at?
What that's getting at the what economists calculate as an avoided cost, which is looking at the value of those properties and the reduced risk of those properties being consumed by fire. But I don't have all the detailed economics on that, but there are standard ways of calculating those things now that we and others are using. OK. But it's not necessarily your statutory directive to do so.
You're using it, but we haven't told you to.
partnerships to scale up and do that work themselves. So while you might argue we don't have a specific mandate to do that, that's exactly what we're doing. That's the key focus of our strategy across the state at the community level and the landscape level to give local and regional agencies the tools to do exactly that. Look, I appreciate that there's a sort of regional focus,
but I think there are even random regional acts of mitigation that are possible. And so when I when I look, for example, at what the JPA has done, that it's focused on, what is it, six counties, seven counties, skipping over the most populous parts of the entire state for the initial funding tranche. That doesn't say to me that you're putting avoided average annualized loss or avoided cost at the front. You're trying to come up, because of us often, we say, oh, what about my county and my county?
So right now we're the sole state funder of, say, Tuolumne or Shasta.
But meanwhile, Santa Barbara, Ventura, Orange, L.A., not on your list. Now that's for the community wildfire mitigation program. I'm not talking about your work, Patrick, but talking to our friends in the JPA here. So, you know, I just worry we're talking past each other a little bit with this, and I'm not sure quite how to reconcile, But I think it'll be important work for this for our working group and our process going forward. Great. A few things on my end. So I guess one thing I'll say for Daniel, for the CUNY wildfire mitigation program, when funding became available, was the local capacity or material and contractor availability the larger barrier in terms of getting the program up and running? For the Joint Powers Authority? Yeah. Yeah, you know, not part of the initial barriers. You know, the first several years, the main focus was really, and now we have these tools, building the prioritization tool to know which retrofits should be done, being able to actually build an assessment tool to walk around the home and figure out based on the actual risk profile of that home, where is it adjacent to an open wildland area, What are the construction features? Then be able to prioritize using cost-benefit tools determining, again, the prioritization of the actual retrofits or mitigations that need to be occurred. Those were some of the initial barriers. I'll turn to my colleague, but I'm going to make one comment. The biggest barrier has been, as Deputy Director Fennig has mentioned, being able to access the federal dollars and not being able to actually start work on the homes that are in the pipeline until they get FEMA approval. I really have nothing to add. I think that is honestly the number one barrier is trying to get the homeowners, the retrofits completed because of the access to the human dollars. But, Senator, your point about the contractors and the labor just yesterday met with the Contractors Association, a meeting I have quarterly with them talking about how do we continue to scale up the education of contractors to be able to do this work. The building code has been around now for 20 years, so builders know. The building industry has been part of writing that code. But the point you brought up is a barrier, maybe not the largest barrier, but making sure that there is the labor force to do it and the skilled contractors to want to bid on these projects. We want to make sure that we've closed that gap. And so that's where ongoing work with the contractors is a focus for us. Okay. This feels like an important work stream here. The. For deputy director are there other stage agencies could be affected partners in home hardening beyond Cal OES and State Fire Marshal Yes So I know the housing and community development through the CDBG programs both the disaster post allocations those kind of after-the-fact appropriations for disaster recovery, as well as their traditional CDBG program. There are specific programs that they have set up or are trying to set up with locals to do some retrofitting or defensible space, and it really is dependent on the specific appropriation notice of funding opportunity. and HUD is, as the federal sponsoring agency, the CDBGDR program in particular has a lot of kind of headquarters discretion for the Notice of Funding Opportunity process, which is very different than the FEMA grant-making process. But I think the HUD grants are kind of the more traditional avenue outside of the FEMA grants that CalES administers or the grants that CAL FIRE administers. Okay, thank you for that. For Mr. Wright, I don't know if there have been repeated calls to provide more granular and detailed data transparency. We talked a lot about data here today, the WUI data comments concept. So can you comment on any challenges related to collecting and making data available? Well, again, as I said earlier, I think we've got a really good handle on landscape scale data. The real challenge, but we're working on this with Cal Fire, with the insurance companies and others, is getting that parcel to parcel data on who's done defensible space, who's done home hardening. Once we get that information and can put it into models, then we'll be able to significantly improve our ability to pinpoint high priority areas. Can you just run your proposed spending plan through Aon's model in 254? I'm sorry, I'm not sure what you're referring to as our proposed spending plan. Oh, I was saying you were outlining all your landscapes, I mean, all the spending you just outlined. Well, again, most of our work and CalPIRE's work is accomplished through grants to local and regional entities. They then take their bundles of projects and run them through these models. Some areas are further along than others. I was just saying, like the Stanislaus, you projected 16%. If you take that proposal, for example, and run it through, if you're lacking data, is there an issue with that? For 254, we just have you, we have your models on loan right now, basically through your agreements. Is that something that we can sort of get a more updated set of kind of granularity about what kind of bang for our buck our plans currently have? We'd have to work with CEA on how to do that. Because you've sort of done it. You didn't base your projections on what Cal Fire has articulated here per se. You did your own version of sort of working backwards from average annualized loss avoidance. We started with a California-wide what we call industry exposure database and then modeled that and then carried that through a suite of models. Maybe that's something we can follow up on. And is that something you'd be open to, Mr. Wright or Chief Berlant here, of how to sort of – I know we do have data gaps, but if we're able to utilize industry data, at least in the near term, to give ourselves some directional sense of what we could accomplish, Is that something we might be able to just go through the exercise of seeing what we could I mean I looking at the Prop 4 funds We got million left and we got whatever it is on the GGRF side projected potentially Take all that, run it through the model. How far do you think we could get with the money? Is that something we can do? I absolutely look forward to the conversation. Okay. Thank you. Yeah, we're going to move quickly. I'm going to do a couple quick things. Just for Mr. Wright, because I know we'll probably talk about it in the next panel, too. Do you have any comment on the effectiveness of the utility spending on wildfire? We'll be getting into that shortly, probably. But do you have any comment on, you know, we've talked about the probably $9 billion a year the utilities are spending. Do you have any comments on that effectiveness? So as far as we know, we're working very closely with utilities on trying to match our efforts with theirs. these regional and sub-regional plans we talked about. Increasingly, we're including utility projects in them so that we can model not just our work separately from the utility work, but model the benefits you get when you combine them. There is a fairly comprehensive process led by the Office of Energy Safety to review those community plans that you can look to to tell you exactly their view on the effectiveness of each one. Interesting. There also is, we should note, there is a $19 million, very small, but within CAL FIRE also for you all to reduce risk from electricity transmission. Is that correct? Yes, that's correct. Any plans for that at this point? Yeah, we're working with- Not a lot of money. Yeah, in the coming- $40 billion, but- Yeah, it is a small amount of money, but we are working with utilities to kind of coordinate how do we really build upon the work they are doing in and around communities, fund local communities to expand their efforts. Interesting. Okay. Great. Well, a couple of things. I just wanted to thank Cal Fire and plug a couple of bills we have this year. So the county coordinator bill that we have this year to continue that and codify that really successful model. We appreciate your recommendation to improve home inspections. and we've put forward SB 9-1-1 in that vein. And we appreciate you bringing that to our attention. We hope that that bill, that's meant to close the loophole in the wood bill, where upon transfer, that's a great time to go in and do those home inspections. But we heard from CAL FIRE they often don't know when those sales occur. So we're just trying to close that loophole, and we hope that that bill continues to be moved forward. I mean, there was a price tag put on it, but hopefully that continues to move forward because it's really just about helping you all do, I think, what you're trying to do. Just a question, you know, if CALFAR is doing risk reduction modeling, why do you think SB 326 last year was vetoed? Because that was really all about this kind of coordination piece we've been talking about. Yeah, I don't want to opine on the governor's decision there, but what I will stress to you is the policy on really moving towards risk reduction modeling continues to be something we are building from. I know you'll hear from Michael Warren and there are a number of others in this space that very much have been leading the direction. Milliman is such a great example as well. And so how we figure out within the tools and the resources that we have available to us, how we start to incorporate that. I mentioned in the testimony, we're really excited that we have been able to fund with our one dollars a platform for our own CAL FIRE units to use risk reduction modeling to help us determine which mitigations and where And I think for us what we like to see based on available funding being able to scale that up so that communities have access to that as well So that county level CWPPs can run through that same risk reduction effort. And so what I will tell you, we've got, again, opining on the bill's status last year is just that we very much recognize that we have to move away from, again, just random work into really using risk reduction. But it's easier said than done. I just want to be clear on that. Like some of my comments here, it is much harder to get agreement to the data sets we are using. You referenced the WUI data commons. That has worked to try to tackle that and has really pushed us in a good direction. But then how do we collect that data? That's something we've been piloting as part of this process is being able to figure out at a local level, local scale, getting home hardening data. There is no database we can just access that tells us today did the homeowner go and do some retrofits on their own. We have to actually figure out how do we get either inspectors on the ground or, again, access data sets that we can then incorporate in at a statewide level. But at the end of the day, what I think a lot comes down to is just figuring out how do we provide a stable and ongoing funds to be able to do not just the risk model projections, but the work to then actually do the mitigations. And, you know, one piece I just want to be clear on, it is not our perspective that the state is responsible for hardening 4 million homes. We very much have focused in on those that are most vulnerable in California. But it is our responsibility at the State Fire Marshal's Office to provide the tools and the resources to local governments, whether that's model ordinance programs, whether that is training for inspectors, and whether that is educational materials. The resources to make the locals be successful is part of that overall strategy, but it's not necessarily on the state. And, you know, that may be a policy conversation for you all to determine what's at right level. But with the available funds that we have, we very much narrowly focus in on vulnerable communities. Okay. Well, thank you. Yeah, I think we do need to focus on who should be doing which work and make sure that we're doing that coordination. So I think we're all aligned here today, but, you know, probably some good follow up to come out of all of this. Yeah, and I would just ask, especially to our friends from the private sector who are helping the state here with this, are there shortcuts, you think, on the data side? I mean, your reaction, I mean, this whole data gap, we're trying to understand, it seems like the insurance industry has plenty of data. Maybe, you know, there's competition between different models and parametric insurance and things like that. I'm not saying there's one magical data set, But is there a faster way for CAL FIRE, the state fire marshal, to kind of get to that without having to spend two years and more budget time and just wait on a data collection exercise here? There's always multiple data sets, multiple models that can be used. I sympathize, actually, with CAL FIRE on the challenge that it is to actually find a data set that meets the particular needs of the modeling that you're doing. and the granularity of that data. So I would say there is collaboration that is possible. I agree we look forward to the discussions. There is a British statistician involved in World War II. You might have heard this phrase before, Henry Box. All models are wrong and some models are useful. So one of the things that they and we deal with is selecting the right model for the application that you're using and then knowing that all the modeling requires then interpretation. So we look forward to the collaboration to use these indicators to help us find and triangulate on what truth is. Thanks for that. Thank you to LAO as well for coming to testify, and we'll let you guys off the hook for now. Thank you. Yeah, appreciate all your work. We will move on to our second panel here. Ms. Chen, if you don't mind joining us up here along with Mr. Brown and Mr. Wera. Thank you, Sarah.
presentations, but please, it's yours. The floor is yours. Thank you, Chair Stern. Thank you, Senator.
My name is Joy Chen. I'm an Eaton Fire Survivor and Executive Director of the Every Fire Survivors Network, the nation's largest survivor recovery hub, and with over 10,000 Eaton and Palisades fire survivors. I'm also a former Deputy Mayor of Los Angeles. Let me tell you how this all started for us. For two years before the fire, I was the admin of the Pickleball WhatsApp of the Altadena Country Club. We scheduled games and used it to share Pickleball memes. Then on January 7th of last year at 6 24 p.m., someone texted into our chat, there's a fire on the mountain. Instantly, that chat became our emergency evacuation network in the absence of official evacuations. We triangulated where the fire was based on who could see it from their homes. And we rushed to call friends, evacuate everyone that we could, and get our own families out of harm's way. There were no firefighters in Altadena that night, and so we became our own fire brigade. When the fire advanced to people's homes, we rushed over and put out spot fires with buckets of water from pools. It was chaotic and terrifying. Thank God and thanks to our pickleball chat, we all survived. But 19 of my neighbors died that night. By morning, our country club was gone, half our homes were gone, and every one of us was displaced. In the weeks that followed, I called every official that I could. Thank you. There was no one single number to call. No point of contact at the state. No map of how recovery was supposed to work. So we built it ourselves. We invited everyone that we could find to come into our pickleball WhatsApp. It was no longer a pickleball WhatsApp. We reached out to friends in the Palisades. We invited Palisades friends in. When we outgrew WhatsApp's 1,000-person limit, we moved to Discord. and we set up about 50 channels, a channel for all different like FEMA, soils, remediation, etc. And we set up a channel for every insurance company so that we could together understand how different insurers were you know understand our policies and just figure out how to navigate our claims A few weeks in I noticed something unusual Whether a family was recovering or not depended largely on which insurance company they were with It was pretty obvious very quickly that the worst private carrier was State Farm. We reached out to Commissioner Lara seeking help. We collected nearly 500 firsthand accounts from Eaton and Palisades fire survivors of misconduct. We asked him for help. And we asked him, if we break the law, we go to prison. Why would a company violating the law on a massive scale be rewarded with a billion-dollar rate hike? And then we met Senator Sasha Renee Perez. She immediately jumped in to champion us. Together, she and we pushed publicly and persistently until Commissioner Lara finally announced a market conduct exam last June. The exam concluded last week. The findings were staggering. 398 violations across just 220 sample claims. Everything survivors have been saying for 16 months was confirmed. But honestly, the findings were not just damning of State Farm. They were damning of the state government that has allowed all this misconduct to continue for 16 months. The nonprofit Department of Angels has surveyed LA Fire survivors and found that 70% of insured LA Fire survivors are having delays and denials and underpayments derailing their recovery. 70%. Right now, insurers owe survivors tens of billions of dollars while families spiral financially and emotionally. This has precedence in history. After the five major California fires between 2017 and 2020, only 38% of destroyed homes had been rebuilt by 2025, eight years later. And the biggest predictor of recovery was whether insurance paid what it owed. The second, by the way, was whether if a utility was at fault, whether the utility paid. That's another matter we discussed yesterday and that we can go back to today if you like. So when the state fails to regulate the insurance industry, the insurance industry has massive financial incentives to delay and deny, and the entire Los Angeles recovery goes into crisis. Where are we now? Two out of three L.A. fire survivors are still displaced, according to the Department of Angels. 40% can only afford temporary housing for a few more months. Credit cards are maxed, retirement savings are gone, and mental health providers report rising suicidal ideation tied directly to financial stress and housing insecurity. And despite the market conduct exam confirming massive illegal conduct, thousands of survivor complaints filed with the CDI, California Department of Insurance, still are unresolved. For survivors, complaining to the state feels like a black box. As the LA Times is documented, complaints are often closed before disputes are resolved. Survivors are then told to stop contacting their own complaint handlers. And when one 32-year veteran CDI agent, CDI complaint officer, cited State Farm for what she called shoddy and shameful conduct, State Farm lawyer complained to the department and the department reassigned her caseload and docked her pay by 10 To survivors this feels like our department is working for the industry it is charged to regulate rather than for the people. And despite leading the nation's largest survivor recovery hub, I have never been contacted by a California state official asking what survivors need or whether state programs are actually reaching families. We are in direct contact every day with thousands of survivors trying to navigate insurance, housing, smoke remediation, rebuilding, FEMA, mental health crises. If a state has programs, resources, grants, or protections survivors should know about, I ask you to work with survivor groups, people that survivors already trust to help get that information out. I'll close with four suggestions. 1. Fix the evacuation alert systems and firefighter coordination failures. Communities should not have to depend on pickleball chats to survive. 2. Resolve the thousands of insurance complaints that survivors have already filed. Publish transparent public recording on how many complaints were received, how many were closed without resolutions, how many resulted in enforcement action, and how many remain unresolved. Reopen complaints that were prematurely closed and enforce the law. When 70% of survivors cannot access the insurance benefits they're owed after a disaster, recovery will never move forward in California. Three, pursuant to the previous panel's excellent discussion, provide guaranteed insurance coverage for fire-safe homes. This is something that 94% of Californians want. guaranteed fire insurance for fire-safe homes. We need to incentivize people to make these investments in our homes. There's no, you know, survivors are terrified that when we remediate, when we rebuild, we won't be able to get insurance. Survivors, every survivor wants to make our home fire-safe. But, you know, how could we make that investment if we don't know that we can get insurance on the other side? Four, when the state creates recovery programs, collaborate with survivor groups to make sure that people actually hear about them, understand them, and can access them. When your offices do create programs or resources for survivors, I'd be glad to amplify them through the Every Fire Survivor Network newsletter, Discord, 1,000-person Zoom webinars. And if you want to understand what recovery actually looks like on the ground, I invite you all to subscribe to the EFSN Weekly. More than 10,000 survivors and allies get it every week. And you'll see up close what families are facing, where recovery gaps exist, and where there are opportunities for government to help. That's at efsurvivors.net. Thank you. And also, Chair Stern, Chair Becker, pursuant to yesterday's discussion, I did bring information on all those different audits that we reference on wildfire mitigation spending. So if you want to chat about that, I'd be glad to. Okay.
Did you run through? Yeah, let's keep going and then come back. Yeah, well, thank you for that. And I was pulling up an email from a good friend of mine that, and I quoted from that at a previous insurance committee hearing. but you know for this it's just a friend writing you know a lot of what you just said so this system set up to appear to help but all they want to do is you know cut corners pay out as little as possible find loopholes make us relive the pain i mean this is his experience and i said the pain is real and long unfortunately hasn dissipated in a year probably won for a long time so i sure that is similar to many feeling many of in your network so thank you for being here thank you um let's go through mark do you want to we'll go turn to mr
brown next you bet good morning chair becker chair stirred committee members my name is mark brown I'm the executive officer for the Bryn Wildfire Prevention Authority. Prior to that, I was the deputy fire chief for the Bryn County Fire Department, which is a contract county. A contract county, as Senator here knows, performs Cal Fire's mission within our county rather than Cal Fire having a presence in that county. So we had a robust wildfire mitigation program. I also spent 15 years as an operations section chief on a Cal Fire incident management team. And some of the incidents I was assigned to range from the Nunn's Fire, Thomas Fire in Ventura, the Camp Fire in Paradise, the August Complex, and the North Complex out in 2020. My experiences on those wildfires really changed the direction of my career. After 30 years of chasing fire, I decided it was time to put my energy and effort into pre-fire work and get the work done prior to fires ever igniting. My household has been evacuated twice, once from the Nuns Fire, once from the Glass Fire. The Glass Fire was 200 feet from my house. I cannot compare to your experience. The closest home that was destroyed to my house or near my house was my high school friend five doors down. And I've been non-renewed from State Farm and had to get new insurance, and now I'm kind of glad I got non-renewed and I was able to get farmer's insurance after hearing that last story. Marin Wildfire Prevention Authority is the 17-member Joint Powers Authority that was born in 2020. We came about after a lessons learned panel that we conducted of the North Bay fires in 2017. We invited the land management, fire, and law enforcement agencies from Sonoma County down to Marin. We asked them what they were doing before the fires, during the fires, after the fires. We asked them what their successes were and what their challenges were. We came up with six and a half pages of action items, and not a single entity was charged to make sure those action items occurred. They crossed all jurisdictional boundaries. They crossed all disciplines of government. And you guys know government budgeting as well as I do. If you don't increase a revenue source, you have a zero-sum budget. Zero agencies were budgeted to do this. So that's why we created the Joint Powers Authority with a property tax of $0.10 per square foot of built space, and it's now generating about a $23 million a year budget for us. We have five goals in our strategic plan with very detailed measures. Sorry, just to repeat that again, what was the funding mechanism again? Say it one more time. Ten cents per square foot of building space, commercial and private, or residential. So that brings us to a $23 million a year budget. We have five strategic goals with very detailed measures of success. Our budget funds vegetation management, public education, grants for our residents, evacuation routes improvements, evacuation alert and warning system improvements, and also inspections. Approximately 55% of our budget goes to on-parcel work. We're in the process of developing our seventh annual work plan, and it just feels like now is when we are getting our stride. It took us quite a bit of time to get our stride. We're performing over 30,000 inspections per year. We have a very aggressive grant program, perform vegetation management in the form of many shaded fuel breaks along the wild and urban interface boundary. We have over 100 miles of shaded fuel breaks. We have a couple hundred miles of evacuation routes. We've hired the right people for environmental compliance. When we started, we thought CEQA was going to be a huge hurdle for us. We would now have well over 40 projects that have been approved and through environmental compliance, no litigation on environmental compliance. And we actually no longer see environmental compliance as a hurdle because we've learned how to get through the system. We have four Cal VTP approvals. We also have taken advantage of the governor's exemption for work within our coastal zone, which was vital. We were held up with that. That was a tremendous hurdle to get through the Coastal Commission. But the governor's proclamation has allowed us to start doing work in the coastal zone now. Being a lifelong local government employee, I tend to believe that these types of problems are best solved and attacked at the local level with the state in support. At the local level, we are the trusted source of information. We're the people that the community comes to. We can also tailor our actions to best meet our community's needs, because I think you guys all know this. One size fits all doesn't work. Even within the tiny county that Marin County is, probably one of the smallest counties in the state, home hardening and defensible space needs are different, and opinions on how to implement them are different throughout Marin. This allows us, but working at the local level, we're able to tailor our programs to meet our community's needs. We also are able to prioritize because, as we've been talking about, we can't treat all the properties and all the acres at once. Our grant program has treated more than 5,000 homes since we've started. We find that even people with financial resources need support and or motivation from a grant program. What we're finding is for every dollar that Bryn Wildfire spends on a grant to help our residents, they're spending $6 to $7. So while the residents, I feel, are getting a return on their investment by paying taxes and getting to participate in a grant program, I see this as a return on our investment as Bryn Wildfire seeing our community members amplify the dollars we're giving them by 6% to 700%. And we've also had some of our residents through our work get off the California fare plan and into an admitted market insurer. This has just happened. We're really excited about this latest success. And we find that public outreach and education is so vitally important. Just having the firefighters come to the house and say, we need you to do this because we told you so, doesn't work so well. You need to let people know why and how. I had a neighbor, a friend of mine, who had to become Zone Zero compliant in order to get his insurance, and he had no idea how to do it. That's why we've started what we are calling our Ember Ready program. Ember Ready is designed to help our homeowners become Zone Zero compliant and home hardened. We figured there's going to be one of three reasons people are going to want to do this, or maybe a combination of reasons. While for preparedness, coming in alignment with ordinances, we're probably most likely insured. They want to be insured because a lot of insurers are going to say you shall be compliant or we're not going to insure you. So our team is designed to work and work with our residents to become compliant. We have a tremendous amount of data. I think I can honestly say no one has more data in a four-a county than we're in wildfire. Through over 150,000 inspections that we perform, we have millions of data points for on parcel. We do not share the parcel data with anybody except our member agencies and our modelers We also have great vegetation management data and rather than just modeling or counting our acres to your point we actually showing the decrease in the rate of spread decrease in fire line intensity and decrease of how much fire is actually getting into the canopy because we know that once the fire gets in the canopy that's when we get to spotting and that's when we start getting the urban conflagrations. This allows us to plan and be strategic about where we do our work, but it also allows us to show our residents their return on investment that they're making in us because we don't want to show up by having a fire rip through one of our communities and say, look at the great work we did. And we also are using that data with our new CWPP, Community Wildfire Protection Plan, that we are about to approve in two months. And we are producing risk maps at our evacuation zone level. And we have seven different themes of risk. And this is allowing our member agencies to really tailor their work to meet their community's needs. And I think the last thing I'll touch on is that one of our messages that we've been really powerful, or been strong about, is that we want our residents to accept their responsibility that they have to keep their homes from becoming ignited. They can't just wait for the government entities to take care of it for them. We need to be there to support them, but we also need our residents to take responsibility on their own to get that work done for them. And I think our partnership as a county-level agency with our 17-member agency, our 17 members within the JPA, that's how we get down to that granular level. And we feel that, again, I'm biased. I have 35 years of local government employment. I think this is where we can get the work done. I very much appreciate the support we do receive from the Wildfire Task Force. I meet with Patrick quite frequently, and we do get a lot of support from the task force. We get a lot of support from CAL FIRE. We just need to start, I think, streamlining the way that we can get the money into the locals' hands. But I also think that the locals need to have a stake in the game. They need to be able to come to the table with some type of revenue because the state and federal dollars aren't going to make it sustainable. We need to show that the locals can be able to carry the mantle when the state and federal dollars dry up. Thank you.
Really terrific. Thank you.
We will get to questions in a moment, but thank you. Mr. Wara.
Good morning, Senator Becker, Senator Stern, Senator Cerato, Senator Perez. Thank you for having me today. I direct the Climate and Energy Policy Program at Stanford University. Today I am speaking in my personal capacity, but many of the things I'm going to say are really influenced and informed by the superb team that supports me at Stanford. At the highest level, this problem is one that has changed enormously in the last quarter century, and we need to recognize that. It's due to climate change. It's due to lots of land use and fire management decisions we made over 150 years. But because of climate change, the problem is going to continue to get worse. What that means in practice is that events like the L.A. firestorm in January of last year or the correlated wind events in 2019 that caused Camp and Woolsey to occur on the same day are much more likely now and even more likely in the future than they have been in our history. And that really means we need to change what we doing We need to change our approach to fire management in fundamental ways I think we heard today a lot about how we need to maybe adopt a different balance in our fire investments in the state. We've spent about $6 billion mostly so far on fuels reduction, but I think we heard from the prior panel, from Chief Berlant and from Patrick Wright, that that focus is shifting and that is appropriate in my view. Five years ago, I was arguing for that kind of a balance and I'm heartened to see it happening today. But what is missing? I've long been an advocate for risk targeting of expenditures. I think we are moving in that direction and we hear that from all the voices in state government. I would just urge that all of you continue to push that focus. It is not okay in this context to peanut butter the money around. We need to focus on where the expenditures will be most valuable. Typically, that requires using fairly advanced fire modeling tools, and I would agree with some of the former panel that those tools are also developing, particularly with respect to the risk of urban conflagration, the urban fires, like we saw tragically in Altadena in January of last year. I just recommend, if you're interested, to take a look at a paper that Nancy Watkins, who was on a panel yesterday with me, and Dave Winokur, who was the fire chief in Orinda and Moraga, recently retired and now works for the Western Fire Chiefs Association, just authored. Happy to share that with you if you're interested about how to develop a risk-targeting framework for the state. But we're moving in the right direction. We just need to go further. I'd also reinforce something that Mark Brown just said, which is it and sort of shifted a little bit. We need a clear answer, I think, from the state about what it expects from local government and homeowners as a cost share on community mitigation. This is not something that the state can afford to do alone. It also creates a set of benefits at the parcel level, at the local level in terms of preserving property tax value, and at the state level in terms of mitigating the insurance crisis that we face and the electric utility affordability crisis that we face. So there's benefits at multiple levels. There should be contributions at multiple levels. the local ask however needs to be tailored so that the locals and homeowners have skin in the game like i said but also aren't locked out because of property values low density or both notably where i live in marin county the work that mark brown is doing and i would just reinforce what he said they are hitting their stride you see it if you know what to look for on the landscape in terms of fire management you see it now in the last year or two and i've i've as a resident and a taxpayer have been wondering, when will I start to see the work that Mark is doing in my day-to-day? And I would just say it is visible and increasingly visible and sort of emergent at both the community scale and the landscape scale, hiking on the lands that Marin is lucky to have for us to recreate, but especially in and around the communities. And it's really exciting to see. We need to make that kind of success available, not just to the Marines. And another successful example is actually is in is Montecito that did a ton of work before the Thomas fire and was very successful in the fire protection effort. Obviously the mudslides that happened later were a terrible tragedy but but they did not lose structures because they did the work before and that's another but those places Marin, Montecito what do they have in common? Money. That's what we need to make a program work for Siskiyou County not just Marin and that how the state as a whole will derive benefits in terms of affordable energy and affordable and available insurance So a question not necessarily, I think, well addressed. I very much appreciate the work of the 254 process. And I think they stayed away from this question because it's kind of a third rail. But I'm going to go touch the third rail now is where do we get this money at the state level? I think, as mentioned earlier, cap and trade is a less reliable source for lots of reasons. I'm not going to weigh in on the changes that are happening at IRB, but they are changing. Things are changing, and we need to be real about that. So where could the state get more money? I think we need to get it from a place where risk and wealth impact how much people pay. Like the property values at risk need to be factored in. And the logical place there, I think, would be a fee on insurance policies that was then spent in a very careful and regulated way, probably with a lot of governance from insurance companies that know a lot about risk, maybe hiring Andy Neal, maybe he's still sitting behind me, people like that to help target the money. Also, probably from the electric utilities that know a lot about where the risks from their system are or are not, so that we make sure that the money is spent well. But, you know, we need to find a source that's stable and long term because it takes a while for these programs to really gain momentum, as Mark Brown just described. Finally, and I'll close with this, I think we need to talk about changes in firefighting strategy. As was mentioned by Chair Stern, currently, Cal Fire judges its own operational success by containing 95 percent of fires at 10 acres or less on initial attack. Now, I think there are places in California where that strategy makes 100% sense. But it may not make sense where we don't have structures at risk, where we are talking about truly wildland fire, and there, Cal Fire faces a similar obligation. They're going out right now in the early season and putting out everything because that's the job. That's the mission they've been given by the legislature and how they interpret their statutory mandate. I think it's a reasonable question to ask whether that strategy makes sense in the context of a wildlands that is fire evolved and where we have been fire suppressing for 150 years since the Native Americans were extirpated from their lands. The how we change strategy to allow a little bit more moderate to low severity fire to occur in the shoulder seasons when it's safe to do that, I think is a complicated question that's going to require a lot of engagement with Cal Fire leadership because they have to be bought in. This is not something that can happen by direction. Firefighters and firefighter culture are thick, and I want that culture to be maintained. I value the work that those people contribute enormously. But we also need to recognize the context we're in and, frankly, recognize the wisdom of the firefighters. I'll just end with one example of this. When the Dixie Fire was burning back a few years ago, firefighters were making enormous efforts to contain that fire. It resisted those efforts and burned all the way to the east side of the Sierra. A few years later, Park Fire ignites for reasons that are, you know, exemplify why we will never ignite, eliminate ignitions, right? A person having a mental health episode stole his mom's car, lit it on fire, and dumped it in a ravine. How are you going to stop that? So, Park, what did CAL FIRE do in trying to contain this monster of a fire? They directed it into the Dixie Fire burn perimeter, right? So they steered the fire toward the black, the fire that had occurred a few years prior. We need more patches of black on the lands. in the wildlands. We need to build a moat around communities as best we can, as Mark Brown is working on in Marin. And we need to do that for all Californians, with locals taking the lead, because they do know the context. They know how to work with their communities to get actual things done on the ground at scale. Thank you very much. I'm happy to take questions.
Okay, well, thank you all. And all important perspectives on the ground and the victim's perspective. It's what we're seeing in one community that was quite impressive. I knew pieces of that, did not know the sort of full context there. And then a big picture. Let me turn it over to our colleagues first, and then we'll have some comments.
Yeah.
You want to go to Senator Perez?
Senator Perez. Go ahead. Certainly. And just want to thank you all for being here today and being a part of this discussion. I've been grateful that we've been having our committees come together so that we can host these hearings. The SB 254 touched on so many different topic areas, and it's hard for us to even weigh in without kind of also weighing into other jurisdictions because there's so much of this work that's inextricably linked. What we're talking about here touches upon energy and utilities. It touches upon insurance and natural resources, emergency management, and I think that's important to highlight. You know, as I was thinking about some of the issues that we're speaking to today, this issue of mitigation, of reducing risk, wildfire mitigation, and how critical it is. And our, you know, report, too, that we have here, the background, discusses, you know, some of the need for us to incentivize homeowners to be able to make those investments. I represent Altadena. I have many constituents who are going through the rebuild process right now. And as you could imagine, it's incredibly expensive to do home hardening. You know, folks have lots of questions about implementing zone zero. You know, people are trying to do what's right in order to make sure that their homes are fire safe in case another disaster happens. But one of the biggest questions I get asked is, if I make all of these investments, am I going to receive insurance coverage? And that is, I think, one of the biggest challenges that we continue to face in trying to incentivize folks to invest dollars into making sure that they are home hardening. why would I invest upwards of $100,000 into doing home hardening if I don't have a guarantee that I'm going to receive insurance coverage? In addition to that, the whole goal of us doing this kind of home hardening, and the report even talks about this, is it's not just to have a single person harden their home. We want entire neighborhoods, entire cities to participate in home hardening, especially in areas that have very significant fire risk. But we're not seeing people do that because they need to see more incentives, more benefits in order for them to do that. And so I point that out because I think it's a really critical component to this discussion that people that are even going through the rebuild process of building their home from the ground up are asking themselves these questions They making a cost analysis and they are looking for something beyond just small grants in order to incentivize them to make that decision to home harden. I know the SB254 report itself also talks about the need for us to tie insurance coverage to hardening. It points that out as an issue that the state needs to address. And so I speak to that because I think it's one of the missing puzzle pieces when we talk about fire mitigation, when we talk about ensuring that entire communities, not just single homes, entire communities are home hardening. The other piece that I wanted to speak to is, you know, I know the report also talks about the need to create a local disaster recovery framework to pre-identify community recovery priorities and partnerships and creating a plan for post-disaster recovery with expedited decision-making processes and key staff roles and responsibilities. We actually worked on legislation on this issue area last year. It was SB 782, which created an increment financing district and allowed for communities that have faced a disaster to create a local disaster recovery district. So the county of Los Angeles has already utilized my bill, and what it does is it bases the funding for this based off of future property tax revenues and generates a bond based off – so the county, for example, is basing their bond off of projected property tax revenues 45 years into the future. because we know that Altadena is going to be rebuilding, but we need the dollars, the benefit of those dollars right now so that we can begin that process, which I think is really important and critical. As we discussed some of the wildfire mitigation processes, investments that we need to make into communities, I think it's really important to highlight the different ways that fires start, How the Palisades fire occurred, which was my understanding, is there was an area where there was a fire. That fire was not fully put out, and so there were still embers. It continued to burn, and then ultimately we saw this larger fire begin to develop over time. Altadena was a very different situation. We saw 110 mile per hour winds cause sparks from to jump to a decommissioned line, which ultimately, that was owned by SoCal Edison, which ultimately caused the fire. And so that's a very different scenario, right? And given how close that equipment was located to single-family homes and residences, many of which had not home-hardened, and many homes that were very, very old, it created a situation where you had this kind of massive fire. In addition to all of the weather dynamics and conditions, us not seeing rain for almost 10 months. So I understand and want to underscore, you know, it is certainly important for us to do brush mitigation, for us to make sure that we're addressing our forest. That is also, I think, a challenge for certain areas. But in a more densely populated area in Los Angeles, you're going to see some nuance there in terms of how we reduce risk. And in Altadena for example the needs there in order to reduce that risk was more related to equipment that was owned by utilities rather than us making sure that we were clearing our forest And so I just want to point that out. But would love for any of the committee members to just speak to how we get to that point of encouraging more of our communities to harden. so we're not just having single-family homes and that we're seeing neighborhoods and entire communities get to home hardening, how you see insurance playing a role with that in addition to the state's grants programs. My board of directors have tasked me to put a lot of energy and focus of my time into helping solve the insurance crisis because if members of people who are paying in the Marin Wildfire were losing their homeowner's insurance because of wildfire risk, that how could Marin Wildfire be considered a success? And so we've been working very closely with CDI, with the insurance industry. I had residents asking me, Mark, why aren't you selling what we're doing in Marin harder to the insurance industry? And we had been passively letting the insurance industry know what we were doing, but we were being very cautious with the parcel-level data because a lot of our residents were afraid that our inspections would drive non-renewals, that our inspection data would get into the hands of the insurance industry, and that would cause the non-renewal. No insurer has ever asked us for our data. They get their own data. Plus, we have it protected. But I did take on that suggestion, and we reached out to Mercury, being one of the more aggressive insurers in high-risk areas, and said, I would like you to come into Marin and see the type of work that we're doing. And they told me that their number one goal is to get people off the California fare plan. Inverness is an area that we have 36% of our properties are on a California fare plan. Mercury has a very reasonable list of requirements to come off the California fare plan. So this is where our data that we have was able to come into play. Eight to 900 homes within that zip code. But 200 to 300 of those homes were one or two items away from meeting Mercury's requirements. So we got Mercury's contact information, shared that with our Firewise communities out there, and put them in direct contact with Mercury. As of today, we have three properties that have been pulled off the fare plan that are now insured by Mercury. We have two more that are coming. So within the next month, we're going to have five properties. Mercury is now asking where else in Marin can we do this type of work with you? And I have CSAA asking me when can we come in and do the same thing? So we went from residents having a California fare plan and a wraparound policy at $10,000 plus a year, now paying an admitted carrier at about $3,200 a year. So they're realizing close to $7,000 a year on a return on their investment. So the $10,000, $15,000 that they did to become compliant with what Mercury was asking for, they get that back in two years. And so we feel that that type of model is really going to invigorate. And that's also where our Ember Ready program is. Our Ember Ready program has developed a subsection. They're calling it the Community Adaptation Program. Because as everyone's been talking about, one house being resilient doesn't protect the community. It takes the community being resilient. So our Ember Ready program is going to Firewise communities and going, okay, we want to help you make your community resilient. And you can't tackle it all at once. So we have one community that focusing 100 on removing all vegetation from zone zero We have another community that said you know what our number one goal is vents So all they tackling right now is getting their vents done And then we start each community will say okay now it time for us to take on that next step And when I mentioned the Ember Ready program to Mercury, that we're working at that community scale, that really started to pique their interest. So I think that's the type of work that's going to bring this all together. Anyone else like to comment on the question? I just say I think what what Mark is saying and Senator Prez, what you obviously already understand is that, you know, there are huge spillovers between for a single parcel doing something both negative and positive. Right. If they do the right thing, actually, the houses downwind of them in a fire will benefit. They're in the shadow of that house that's hardened. If they don't do the right thing, they can be like a Roman candle in a neighborhood and showering embers on everybody else. And so that emphasizes the importance of local government action and empowering the locals to do the thing that they need to do and to figure out the politics around this. Obviously, the politics of Zone Zero, we've seen in the Board of Forestry conversation, are complicated. The science is pretty clear, and that's difficult. I recognize for everybody sitting on the dais. But the local governments and local leaders are best positioned to start to move their communities as a whole in the right direction. Will we get to 100% everywhere? Probably not. But this is sort of like I think about this as like safety in our cars, right? When I was a kid, my parents did not make me wear a seatbelt in the car. And we'd crawl all around the big Oldsmobile station wagon, back, front, who knows. and then we put on seatbelts and then airbags and now collision avoidance at some point autonomous driving perhaps right will be the way that we get around in cars every step makes us safer does it mean that lots of people don't die in car accidents no it means that the odds of dying in a car accident are much lower it means that if you get in an accident going 30 miles an hour you're going to be fine today whereas in the old days you would have probably been killed and that's where we need to be moving with fire safety, like where the state is providing that overall push and local governments are stepping up with a cost share, their dollars, and also their knowledge of the politics of their community to get them as far as they can go, does that mean that the insurance industry will care? I think we have to be honest here that it may mean that they care. It will mean in some places that they care. But also, this risk is one that is very difficult to understand and price. And in the riskiest places, it is going to be hard to insure people with private insurance. I think that is just a reality. What we need to do is get the less risky places, the more moderate risk places out of the fair plan so that we can better manage that core extreme risk population and have places like Pacific Palisades, perhaps like Altadena, fully mitigated and with superbly capable fire services so that on a bad day, that combination of mitigation and skilled fire suppression can work. Let me ask one question here, because we've been talking a lot about kind of data collection programs and data collection programs with FireSafe organizations and others. You know, should the state have a coordinated data collection program with FireSafe? communities to achieve kind of the fine-grained risk analysis that everyone's talking about? I'll give it to you. I believe so. And ideas unite, details divide. And how that data is structured, how that data is collected, what granularity, that's where, so there's a lot of momentum and a lot of support for the data commons. Patrick Wright made a really good point, though. The real big stumbling block is the parcel-level data and whether or not agencies are going to be willing to share that parcel-level data to the data commons because of protecting their residents' data. And agencies like mine are going to need to be willing to be collaborative with it and say, all right, if the state standard ends up being different than the way we're collecting data, we're going to align with that state standard. And I think it's going to rely on that type of flexibility. It's also bigger than the state, though. I think we need to look at the western United States creating the same type of data standard. That will be the first thing. If we can establish a data standard, then we can start collecting, collating data under one clearinghouse. I would strongly agree that a data commons is important at this point. We need to be creating information and then guarding privacy in a way that's appropriate, but creating the information so that the insurers and especially the CAT model users can actually price into premiums and prior to that be factoring in in their underwriting the good work that's getting done. And that requires collecting the data. It's also, and we've got to be honest about this, there's a lot of places that are unmitigated in California. Otherwise, this committee wouldn't be having this hearing today. And collecting better data is going to make that more clear. It's going to emphasize the need to do more work, not necessarily at first, you know, the need to or the desire to pat ourselves on the back for what we've done. Right. And, you know, of course, again, back to Ms. Chen's comment, there is the insurance link on all this part. And you talked, it was interesting to hear your experience there in Marin. But the 254 report also goes into that, right? And that's the 1.22, I guess what you talked about. You have to tighten the link between risk reduction and insurance. So it's very, very clear. Okay, now unless you have anything. Senator Rubio. Hi. Hello, everyone. You know, thank you. I love seeing some of the folks that have been before my committee in, you know, sharing your thoughts and ideas. You know, and I shared that yesterday. Some of my thoughts around the fact that I, you know, my heart breaks every time I see a fire, which has been happening more and more commonly in the state of California. My heart breaks every time I visit it, you know, and I have every time a community burns down, I go and meet with stakeholders and those impacted. And I feel very strongly that we are at a crossroads where we need to really figure this out in a way that's meaningful. You know, everything that I've heard from Senator Perez and right now, you know, we're talking about, you know, how maybe a community has one house that maybe did the home hardening that was prepared. And the reality is that one home may not save an entire community. And, in fact, the whole conversation was about creating, you know, incentivizing, you know, entire neighborhoods to home harden so they can be prepared. but you know for me I guess the frustration is that it not a new concept in fact I think you guys know this Last year I had a bill that was going to specifically create a home hardening commission or committee that will bring stakeholders together because we wanted to standardize those home hardening suggestions because it also means different things to different people different areas have also different considerations, whether it's the high-risk areas or down below in the inland, you know, communities. Because the one thing that I did realize, and I think it wasn't just done by myself, in fact, it's through some of the hearings that I've had. And I think Michael Ware has been part of many of the committees, and I, you know, I do take this information very seriously. And with the insurance commissioner and other stakeholders, you know, that's, I think that the issue here is, again, When you talk about home hardening, it means different things to different people. So this committee that I still plan to push forward at some point was to bring those stakeholders together from firefighters to the insurance commissioner to the insurance industry because they have to play a part if we're to solve this issue. Yesterday I talked about how a lot of the times I hear is local pushback. Locals are getting in the way of some of these efforts. Right. So we need to also bring local municipalities to be part of the process because they're so different in so many different ways. But the goal was, you know, how do we standardize something that works across the entire state of California and not ice in isolation? Because, you know, I know that in Marin you have these fire safe communities and I think you've had them for a while. But again, you were talking about how one of the insurance industries has standards on how they can bring people to be insured if they only do X, Y, and Z. And my goal would be to, again, standardize that for the entire state because then everyone, let's just say Altadena or Pasadena is rebuilding their – not Pasadena, I'm sorry, Palisades is rebuilding their communities. I mean, the ideal would be to have those standards already outlined so as they're building, you have them already understanding what the benefits are. And quite frankly, if I wasn't in this committee or have been chair of the insurance, I don't even know what – I wouldn't even know what home hardening is, right? And so, you know, I had that bill last year, and it didn't make it. But here we're talking about what we need, and what we're talking about is what I had last year that didn't make it. So at some point, we have to really figure out who those stakeholders are that could sit with us. Because, again, what you heard yesterday is my frustration because they're not new concepts. They're not new ideas. But I think it's now a time where maybe we figure out how to bring all the stakeholders together. And that was my goal. Everyone has to pay a part. And I think I shared that yesterday. It's not necessarily anyone's fault, but, you know, climate change is a real thing. We're seeing a lot more devastation just based on climate and other issues. But I want to thank Michael because I've had you many times, and you're always so amazing in terms of the information you bring to the table. And this committee or commission that I wanted to create, I wanted to specifically have science-based welfare data because I've also invited industries that are creating a little bit better structures because they're testing the science on what can repel fire, what is, you know, a better material to build with right Including you know yesterday I think I heard Senator Richardson talk about how she does a good job in her home but then she sees around her and all the people have all the brush And again I would like to see a standardized list of items that families can do so that we are not talking about that one structure that didn do their job and then the fire jumped around But again, I want to put it out there because I do want to continue to have that conversation. It died last year, which was so important to me that we continue the conversation because it's not just about saving lives, saving structures, but ultimately this is not going to get better. We already know based on the science that I've heard many of you speak about, it's only going to get worse. And so I hope that I can call each one of you to engage you once again because we don't want to see anybody lose lives. I'm right next to Altadena, so it is a little bit personal to me. I'm not in Altadena, but I'm the neighbor, and we had so many of our friends and neighbors evacuated. I was there time and time again, visiting, touring, and it's really difficult to see that continue to happen. So I really just want to, you know, put it out there because there is a few ideas that have already been here. In fact, in 2020, I proposed an IMAP idea that would help track every person that got on the fair plan early on so that we can see on a map where the fair plan homes were being consolidated so we can at least have a sense of where people were being dropped from their insurance. and that we as a state could step in and immediately tackle the issue so that we didn't overpopulate the fair plan. That bill died as well. And I venture to say had we had something like that in place, we would have been able to catch those that continue to be dropped so that we could find solutions early on. But the problem is also the fair plan. It used to be the insurer of last resort, and now unfortunately some of our families don't have another option, And now it's so overpopulated that that at some point is going to break. And I want to just set these issues out in public because, again, I know I've heard all these conversations, but they're not new. And I think we have an opportunity to really let's go revisit some of these ideas that were left on the table that could work. And I'm not saying they're perfect solutions or ideal solutions, but I think instead of trying to reinvent the wheel, we probably need to go back to things that maybe didn't seem as useful or perhaps as prominent at the time when we didn't have so many fires. But now it's time to maybe do that. And I ask the chair that maybe we can have a separate meeting where we can bring these ideas to the table in a more specific, strategic way. Because at the end of the day, we could have 10 communities with 10 different standards of home hardening. But what we want is to have those standardized become credits so that we can take it to the insurers because unless they also know that the risk is minimized, it's difficult to put it on them when we're not doing our part as well. So I just feel everyone has a part to play. But lives need to be saved, and that's where my heart is right now. But just thank you for letting me share some of the ideas that have been on the table that I think we could expand on. I appreciate you bringing not just your heart but your head because you've had experience here. And I side with your frustration about our inability to solve that piece. I mean, we actually passed a law in 2020, I think, that I wrote, SB 63, which Cal Fire is no longer here. But under Section 4291.5, right now the Public Resources Code, Cal Fire is assigned, the director is assigned the role of establishing a common reporting platform that allows defensible space and home hardening assessment data and that they shall compile that data under Section C2 So the shall, right? What does shall mean? And have we done that yet? It seems like we've still got a ways to go, but, you know, it's one thing to pass a law and another thing, I think, to get the work done. And so that's where I'm at with you, maybe revisiting some of these things that we can strengthen because, you know, when you've been here long enough, you've heard most of the ideas, but it's getting everyone to the table to see the value. I know the IMAP idea back in 2020 just seems so primitive, right? But now in retrospect, something that could have alerted us to areas where the fair plan was overpopulating, that would have given us an inclination that we needed to tackle that immediately. What's happening? Why are they being dropped? Can we step in as a state to see if we can mitigate some of those issues? And I think the fair plan would have stayed a little bit. We could have contained it, but now it's a little bit far gone. But I like the fact that you're bringing your bill because there's a lot of good things that we've done. It's a matter of just revisiting and trying to see if we can do better and making sure that they're working. Yeah, and look, this haunts me, a bill like that, because that data, if it had been properly collected and we had oriented our fire mitigation funding, would have seen the urban conflagration risk sitting in Ms. Chen's neighborhood. Right. And all those funds that we pushed out the door, millions, billions of dollars, none went to getting you guys some mesh on your vents, you know, or clearing out some of that underbrush or dealing with Bougainvillea or, OK, you have a neighbor with a tricky, you know, shingled roof and you have older home construction. None of that was there. We got some funding out to the San Gabriel Valley over the past few years through the conservancies. But if you look at the vast majority of your fire zones, Ms. Rubio, Azusa, Duarte, those hillside communities, those are the next Altadena sitting right there. I don't mean to be alarmist about it, but it's not as if you're alone here. It may feel like you're alone some days, but you're not because all those foothills throughout all those superpopulated areas are not at the front of the line right now. They have to go compete because they don't have acreage. You're not going to cover a bunch of acres by doing, you know, dealing with mesh, right? That's not going to get you there. And I want to add one more thing, if I may. And I'll go to Vice Chair afterwards. You may not remember this, but Sangiro Valley was not included in some of the funding that we were pushing out. And you may remember how loud and vocal I was about including the Sangiro Valley. I was, you know, really loud. and because of how loud I was, we were able to get, I think it was $12 million for the conservancy when it was originally left out. And so those $12 million I was very proud of because I know we had the Bobcat fire. We had so much that we needed to do. And, again, the funding is there, and so now it's time to revisit how do we do better and making sure that we are using it in the most strategic and positive ways so that people don't have to go through this. But, yeah, thank you for pointing that out. Thank you. And it's nice to have a panel of people that work in the real world and can bring us their expertise in what they're doing. Because, you know, we have covered a lot of ground today. And what you see is when you're talking about prevention, the best way to prevent or to not have a recovery process is to not allow a catastrophic incident to happen in the first place. So it all starts with the prevention aspect, and that's what we talked about a little bit earlier. And there are a whole lot of facets to that. We could talk about just the prevention stuff and have hearings on that all day long. But then you move into the response. And I heard you mention the need to have robust responses to today's climate. And I can tell you for the last 30 years that fire departments, in a lot of respects, are unable to handle some of the hazards that we have out there. When you talk about reserve apparatus, that's what two-thirds of the workforce can come back and get on and go to a fire on. And just because there is a vehicle sitting in a fire station doesn't mean that you have response capabilities. That thing has to be equipped. It has to be able to be used. And in many cases, they're just old fire equipment that we keep for years and years so that we can say we have reserve fire apparatus. and and so that's an aspect that really has to be examined is what is our response you know and then the recovery the recovery is all about the coordination between actually
getting work done getting people back to their lives faster obviously what we're doing right now is not working and and what all of this is what this whole incident the Altadena and Eaton Eton Canyon, that's exposed. We've been exposed for California. We've been neglecting what we should have been doing for so many years. And now these poor folks get to pay the price of being the people that expose us to how inadequate we are in our responses. it's funny you had brought up a good a good point about you know when we have a burn why do we have to put it out right away when mother nature used to create burns that went for miles and miles and and the answer is i think that's a great idea except for the legal liability If you're an IC standing in the station fire and you let that burn, which was a forced people decision, you wind up with two dead bodies down the road. you have to have the fuel management done in an area to be able to contain that and say hey we're going to let this this burn so we'll have a burned area that we can you know help mitigate later on but you have to have something around it and you have to have you know the because the liability of letting them run uh becomes tremendous especially with the amount of brush that we have just looking at the Eaton Canyon start. I went down there. I'm friends with the fire chief and everything. I belong to that fire department and I covered the entire foothills as a battalion chief. When you look up there you see brush. You see palm trees that shouldn even be there They not native to the area You see 10 years of growth that go all the way down Those things in a strong wind break off go into power lines and then they keep going They're just big, huge embers that go into neighborhoods, especially in those conditions. If that were gravel all around there and a spark fell down, it wouldn't matter because it wouldn't go out. I mean, it would just go out. but that's the prevention part of this and that's something that we have to acknowledge that we're so far behind in our prevention efforts and part of that is we can't get out of our own way from a regulatory standpoint. We have all sorts of projects and I'm sure in that area I'll bet you they probably needed to do that but there's a regulatory process you've got to go through for five years before you can actually do something. So the gamble is that something doesn't happen within that five years. And the other gamble is that they just give up and just let it be what it's going to be. So that's something that we have to look at. The insurance part. We're going to have to come to grips with our insurance structure does not work. In 1990s, we had a couple of pretty big earthquakes. And guess what? The insurance industry almost went under. So what did they do? They separated out the risk from regular insurance and the catastrophic risk from earthquakes. Well, we have catastrophic risk from earthquakes, fires, and floods in California. That's our catastrophic risk. And that, our regular insurance, which is 99.9% of what we need for insurance, is held hostage by this. We have to figure out how to handle our increased risk. and our increased catastrophic risk better. And I think there's some deep conversations that have to be had and open conversations, and frankly I've been having them for the last year. And you keep hitting walls because you hit these walls of territorialism. People don't want to lose their territory, and so, you know, oh, no, that can't be done. And that was on 31 and 32 of this. They dismiss the idea of recognizing that separation of catastrophic risk in, like, one paragraph. We have to look at that, and we have to have that conversation. And that's something that, going forward, I'm hoping that the Emergency Management Committee can start doing. Because I don't want to see any more of these incidents. We've had enough. We've had enough people affected to show us how exposed we are. It's time for the state to act on those things. And so hopefully we will continue to do that. And with that, Mr. Chair, you can have your meeting back. Thank you. Thank you. I think we're going to turn to a public comment. I just want to give a last question to Mr. Brown. You know, if you have that one case where there's just one home who won't do anything, like is there a stick at some point in your conception of the plan? Currently out of our 17 member agencies, only one of our agencies is using the stick approach. We're going to be watching it closely to see how well the stick approach works because our fear with the stick approach is sometimes the cure is more expensive than the stick. And so they're just willing to pay the fine. another portion of it is if they know they have a violation in their backyard are they going to let our inspectors onto their property And so those are our concerns about the STIC approach But we do realize at some point after we exhausted all of our educational opportunities we believe, especially when the Zone Zero ordinance starts coming in and we have the three- to five-year grace periods, we anticipate the majority of our member agencies will start having some type of fine mechanism. three to five years down the road. Okay. I think Ms. Chen had a comment, too. Yes. Did you want to go through the welfare mitigation spending and whether utilities are actually spending the money? Because I think it's from yesterday. Did you want to? I think we probably need to move to public comment. And I'm sorry. I actually apologize. I'm going to have to step up in a minute. And I think Senator Stern has about 10 minutes. So we may. What I would say on that is if you, I don't want to be the sole recipient of that. I want that to come to actually all the committees. Do you think that's something you can prepare and submit so that we can make sure the Energy Committee also has it, too? Because I think that I don't want to shortchange them. Because we've also. Yeah. I'll just tell you what's in it. Yeah, sure. Yeah. And because we've also gotten other folks who submitted stuff from because the CPC couldn't be there yesterday about. Oh, great. You know, saying, hey, you know, this review does happen in these ways. So I think it would be good to have that, you know, holistically. But before you do that, I was just going to, again, thank you. I'm going to thank all the panel in case I've stepped out. But thank you particularly because I know every time to be here, it's emotional. I mean, to relive it. I mean, you have better sense than I do, certainly. But, you know, to come here and relive it and to be the advocate on behalf of all the victims. I'm just really, really, really appreciative. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Yeah. So let's follow up on your point. We'll drill down deeper. We'll turn to public comment. Is that okay? All right. Is that okay? Did you want a super brief summary, or is that okay to go to public comment? Sure, I can do a super brief summary on this. Basically, yesterday we were talking about wildfire mitigations. How do we stop these wildfires? How do we prevent these from happening? The study talks about how it's important for utilities to spend money on wildfire mitigation. They collect $9 billion a year from rate payers. The problem is that there's evidence that they have not been actually spending the money. So they collect the money from us, so customers pay. But when they don't spend the money on wildfire mitigation, then customers pay again through our lives. And the last time this was even audited was in 2021 by OEIS, as OEIS was starting up. PUC safety employees did the first and only independent audit that's ever been done. At the time, they collected $6 billion, and $2.5 billion, the auditors found, they disallowed. They said that they never – they couldn't find any evidence of spending. So all of this is publicly available in our sponsor letter for AB 1774, which requires audits. And then the other thing that I'll submit also is Edison actually provides to the CPUC a risk spending accountability report every year. And the April 2025 report shows that they could not account for $500 million that they collected from us customers. and that includes for maintaining the ghost lines, one of which caused our fire. So we hope that any legislation comes through. Well that why we have AB 1774 which simply requires the wildfire mitigation spending to be audited every year and they have to show that they actually spent the money on wildfire mitigation before they get more Okay good Thank you We collect that And we have gotten some other additional data about some of the reviews, but we'll take that into consideration. I really appreciate it. And it's not only – was it spent? Also, are we getting the bang for the buck, I think, as the panel talked about today? So good. I'm glad to let you summarize that a little bit. Okay, we'll open it up. Thank you all. Thank you.
Good afternoon, Chair Spector, Stern members. Paul Mason with Pacific Forest Trust. I want to make three brief points. I mean, this panel and this discussion today was really robust and obviously focused largely on communities and reducing the level of loss we're seeing right there. I do want to highlight that out in the broader wildland areas and the state responsibility area is an area where the state does obviously have responsibility under the statute for good reasons. It's where our water comes from. It's where we have statutory constitutional responsibilities for wildlife. But it's also what oftentimes carries these big destructive fires into communities. And we have the campfire rolling into Paradise or the Tubbs fire into Santa Rosa or the Dixie fire that took out Greenville. These are large, you know, these are not fires you're going to stop just by doing home hardening and defensible space. The second point I want to highlight is I'm really thrilled that Mark Brown was here talking about the work in Marin County because the focus of the hearing today is not going to get solved at the state level. It's going to require engagement at the local jurisdiction, by homeowners, at the real local responsibility area. There's things that the state can do, and there's some good bills out there right now that Senator Becker and Senator Zallen are both pushing on that I think will really help there. But fundamentally, the locals are going to need to drive on those local actions. Last point is that the loss of a stable source of funding from the Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund is a terrible body blow to our ability to have a sustained effort here. And the legislature really needs to figure that out this year, whether it is reprioritizing that $200 million as a top priority for GGRF or some other ongoing stable source of funding. Thank you.
Thank you. I would note we didn't get into fire fees today, but there is pending legislation that I'm authoring that actually would put some skin in the game from those in SRA fee areas where we're currently paying about $100 million a year to backfill. So something to note. Yes.
Kim Stone of Stone Advocacy on behalf of Consumer Watchdog. Thanks to the chair and members for a really enlightening committee. And when you, Senator Stern, were asking about the available state money and how many homes that translated into hardening, I think that really brought home the problem of investing in home hardening and if there is sufficient state money to do that or not. And one of the solutions that Consumer Watchdog has proposed is to reward homeowners who do harden their homes by requiring insurance companies to offer them commercial insurance if they do that, either on the home level or on the community level. And just want to offer that again. That was Senator Perez's SB 1076, which unfortunately didn't move out of committee, but is nevertheless a really solid idea. The idea is alive. Yeah, thank you. And Consumer Watchdog also urges fair and prompt payment of insurance claims and urges the legislature to not bail out utilities if they are responsible for burning down communities. Thank you very much.
Thank you. Probably should. If you all can just take a shot at it. I don't want to be just one minute if you can. I think Kim got the extra.
seconds there, but go ahead. Good afternoon. Thank you, Chair and members for this important hearing. My name is Brooke Rose, and I'm commenting on behalf of the Wildfire Solutions Coalition, organization of over 80 organizations across California working to fully fund wildfire resilience. The coalition strongly supports the development of funding and financing strategies to reduce wildfire risk to communities, natural landscapes, and infrastructure across California. We also want to highlight Strategy 3.2 in the SB254 report, which lays out the essential role of state government in funding risk reduction. The governor's January budget proposed the second smallest investment in wildfire resilience this decade. The coalition urges the legislature to maintain the $200 million from the greenhouse gas reduction fund for wildfire resilience, which is currently the state's only ongoing investment in wildfire risk reduction. California right now cannot afford to cut wildfire funding. Thank you so much.
Thank you.
Good afternoon. Michael Jarre with the Nature Conservancy. I would like to echo the comments from the Wildfire Solutions Coalition and also urge the legislature to not pit investments in local fire prevention, ignition reduction, beneficial fire, and forest health against home hardening and structure hardening. Wildfire resilience is built by stacking layers of risk reduction on top of one another, which requires concurrent investment in hardening and defensible space, community protection, and landscape restoration. The coalition believes there are essential policies the legislature should act on to not only increase state funds for home hardening and structural hardening, but to also incentivize, finance, and leverage private investment in the same. The state should also continue supporting proven oversubscribed programs with shovel-ready projects that will save lives and reduce the devastating impacts of wildfire. Thanks for the time.
Thank you.
Thank you so much for hosting this hearing. Melissa Sparks-Crans with the League of California Cities here to talk about the local government perspective. We do strongly support a welfare risk reduction legislative package this year. we do believe the legislature has introduced a handful of bills that are hitting on these very topics in the 254 report already. I just want to bring attention to a few of the comments made today. You know, we would support a strong statewide certification program for home hardening through CAL FIRE that really helps us provide uniform standards. We would support the codification of the governor's executive order to expedite fuel management that you've brought up today. We're also working on legislation this year to require OSFM Cal Fire to provide us the fire hazard severity zone designations every five years. Up until last year, local governments, cities, counties, and fire districts have not received those maps in over 15 years. What tells us in those maps, what that tells us is what spreads a fire in our community, the environmental conditions that spreads fire. And that is directly tied to fire code, building code, and to defensible space mitigations. So we have to have that information at the local level before we can talk about standards and holding local governments accountable We want to be accountable We here to protect our communities safely and safety So we really appreciate the discussion today
We think you're hitting right on the nail on the head. And we want to be on the record as well that, again, we need to make those changes first before we can talk about liability shifts in this conversation. Thank you. Thank you.
Good afternoon. John Kennedy with the Rural Counties. First of all, I want to say I'd like to align my comments with Paul Mason, Michael Jared, Melissa, and many others. This can't be an either or when we're talking about funding. We need funding both for wildfire fuel reduction in the forest context and also for home hardening for a number of reasons. Happy to have more discussions on the SRA fee as someone who helped negotiate that deal back with the previous cap and trade reauthorization. Have lots of thoughts on that and approaches there. So strongly support risk targeting as we're looking at funding and funding disbursements. and really strongly supportive of your interest in the permit reform codification of the governor's executive order. Melissa, CSAC, the League, our CRC, and I know some of my friends in the IOUs have been strongly supportive of that as well. I think that's one of the low-hanging fruit concepts that we should pursue. As you're contemplating the STIC approach, I would urge a lot of caution. we have a lot of very low-income communities, a lot of very low-income homeowners in the rural part of the state, even the urban parts of the state. And so home-hardening may not be a choice, especially when we're talking about $50,000 to $60,000 per household. So thank you.
Look forward to continuing to work on this. These are hard issues, but appreciate the focus. Thank you, John.
Welcome. Mr. Chair, members, Brady Van Ingram here on behalf of Southern California Addison. I want to speak briefly about the state's streamlined permitting process. I think a couple of my other friends before me spoke about it as well, too, and I think what you're hearing is there's a pretty common consensus to see the EO extended or codified moving forward. Edison received approval under the proclamation to utilize the streamlined process to address portions of its FEDS management program. This enabled more timely execution of route line clearing, dead and dying tree removals, and structure brushing that has historically been subjected to lengthy permitting delays. We see it as a valuable tool in addressing our wildfire risk reduction, and we urge the legislature to codify this language so Edison's vegetation management activities continue to be formed in a way that best addresses risks and supports grid reliability.
Understood. Thank you.
Good afternoon. Brandon Ebeck here on behalf of Pacific Gas and Electric. For the sake of time, I'll align my comments with those from Edison and the local governments in support of the executive order. Thank you.
Okay. Thank you, Brandon.
Greetings, Sharon, members of the committee. My name is Marquise King-Mason. We've been in these for two days now, so I'll keep it brief. The state needs durable progressive funding sources for wildfire prevention but ones that are not built primarily off our electricity rates California ratepayers have paid billion in the last half ticket for wildfire prevention over four times that prevention investment from the state budget These costs discourage electrification and regressively fall on low-income households. California needs a solution to prevent wildfire, but electricity customers should not be the ones who put up the brunt of that.
Thanks so much. Appreciate it. Thank you. Point taken.
Good day, Chair and members. Caitlin Leventhal on behalf of the California State Association of Counties. We are deeply concerned about the report options that would effectively insulate utilities from accountability and the corresponding real-world impacts those options would have on utility systems, safety, and survivor and community recovery. We are supporting a package of legislation proposals this year that would meaningfully advance fire mitigation and risk reduction and respectfully urge the legislature to prioritize these policies that help move the needle to prevent catastrophic wildfires.
Thank you so much. Thank you.
Bill Ward, PumpPod USA. Senator Stern, very passionate beginning statement you made. It's really great to have someone who knows exactly what the ramifications are when you do it. and also Senator Ciarto because of his expertise in fire. So that being said, there is a third rail that I want to talk about. I think that the state, whether it's CAL FIRE, whether it's natural resources, has got tunnel vision on vegetation mitigation and the capabilities of risk management. It's all valuable information. It's all valuable what they're accomplishing, but there needs to be a dual track for response mitigation. Senator, you put forth with us SB90 last year trying to accomplish community protection and community-wide protection and community-wide hardening. There needs to be something, and Senator Stern, you used the word cover acreage. Each one of the helicopter dip tanks that we make and that are deployed all over the state cover 15,000 acres. That covers the whole community while other people are trying to get their home hardening and parcel hardening and so on and so forth done. And the part that I wanted to mention is that we just found out just today that the attempt to match your bill in the assembly, 1853, was just dequeued by Cal Fire because they call it suppression. It's installed before the fire is happening, just like goats, just like the vegetation mitigation. So that's something if we can try to fix that and get that done, that would be much helpful.
Appreciate the feedback. Thank you.
Good afternoon. Chloe Shea with California Environmental Voters. We greatly appreciate this conversation and the emphasis on communities suffering from rising energy infrastructure insurance and recovery costs from climate disasters but we cannot overlook the role that the fossil fuel industry plays in this issue Ratepayers, taxpayers, and frontline communities cannot continue to absorb these climate costs and safety risks alone, while oil and gas companies continue to profit and avoid accountability. California is nearing wildfire season, and these risks are becoming increasingly salient, so we have to examine this issue holistically. We urge the legislature to evaluate mechanisms that require major corporate polluters to help support wildfire liability costs, resilience investments, disaster recovery, and insurance stabilization efforts. Thank you.
Good afternoon. My name is Kerry Stephen. I'm actually a wildfire survivor from Altadena. I'm also with the company Helipod and Investi. We make the water tanks and portable mobile equipment to preplace resources for firefighters. And I want to speak to our situations here in Altadena, where we were previously requested grants and resources to place units in Altadena. and there needs to be, and I think Senator Stern, you brought it up, there needs to be an evaluation between where the state spends money and how quickly other resources can be on the ground to provide overarching protection to the communities. That's the goal. With the 16,000 acres, five-mile separation, we can actually respond to and do it in a very short period of time within a few months. and that becomes salient to the other programs and vegetation programs that take years to accomplish. Thank you.
I just want to make sure that that's realized. Understood. Yes.
Good afternoon, Chair Martin Radosevich. On behalf of Megafire Action, we'd just like to commend both chairs of this committee, the vice chair and the members, for your leadership on this issue. We greatly appreciate Senator Becker naming SB 973 on establishing the county coordinator program, which we are co-sponsoring with California Fire Safe Council. Pleased to see that recommended in the SB 254 report, along with our other legislation, SB 879, Ben Allen, to create a home hardening program. Thank you so much.
And, of course, your legislation, SB 879. Can't forget that one. Don't worry. I won't. We won't forget it. Thank you all for your comments today, for your participation. And this is just the beginning. So just ask you all to stay engaged as we develop some solution sets here. We're not going to walk away from this. With that, I'm going to just take the privilege of adjoining this hearing.