October 1, 2026 · Joint Public Hearing · 22,885 words · 8 speakers · 310 segments
Good morning everyone. Well, good afternoon. All right, we're ready. We're just waiting for Senator Bacha who is literally walking in as we speak. But good afternoon and welcome to this joint public hearing with the standing committees of local governments, City 1 and Cities 2. This hearing was convened to examine the implementation, the fiscal impact and technical sufficiencies of the mandatory state water security and wastewater security regulations our waters and our wastewater systems are among the most essential pieces of infrastructure in our communities it provides services that new yorkers rely on every day and disruption to these systems can have significant consequences for public health public safety and the overall functioning of our municipalities at that same time threats facing this infrastructure continue to evolve municipalities and water systems across the country have increasingly had to confront cyber security threats including attacks which can disrupt operations compromise sensitive information and interfere with the systems communities depend on water and wastewater infrastructure is particularly important in the realm because these systems often involve complex technology operational networks while many municipalities and local water providers may have limited resources available to address these emerging challenges as policy makers here today it is our responsibility to understand these threats and ensure any requirement we put in place are effective technically sound and workable for the municipalities and water systems which are responsible for implementing them that is the purpose of today's hearing we want to better understand what protections are currently in place where gaps may exist and what additional measures may be necessary to strengthen the security and resilience of new york's water and wastewater infrastructure while examining the fiscal and operational implications of these requirements for our local municipalities we are fortunate to have here amongst us experts and i'd like to thank senator botcher and senator Ryan for co-sponsoring this joint hearing and the senators who are here as well Senator Fahey and Senator Chan. At this time I will now turn it over to my colleagues and my co-chairs for
their opening statements and we'll begin with Senator Watcher. It's on. Good afternoon. Thank you Chair Martinez to all my colleagues and everyone joining us today. I want to especially thank Chair Martinez for initiating today's hearing and for her leadership as chair of the local government committee and making sure our municipalities are prepared to confront emerging threats. We are here because something most New Yorkers rarely think about has become a potential target, our water. Every day millions of New Yorkers turn on the tap and expect clean, safe water. We cannot take that for granted. Cyber attacks on water systems are no longer hypothetical. Hackers have gained access to water systems and attempted to manipulate chemical levels. They've deployed ransomware against our water utilities. Iranian-affiliated actors have compromised the programmable controllers that operate critical infrastructure, changing programming and locking out operators from their own equipment. Something as simple as manipulating the chemicals used to treat our water could potentially render it unsafe to drink. An artificial intelligence could make these threats more sophisticated and more accessible. We also have to recognize that the nature of warfare itself is changing Future conflicts between major powers may not begin with conventional armies confronting one another on a battlefield They could increasingly be waged through cyber attacks against the infrastructure that makes modern society function. That is why preparation matters. New York has already taken important steps to strengthen cybersecurity and establish standards for our water systems. But today, we need to ask hard questions. What preparations have been made for a serious cyber attack against our water infrastructure? What scenarios are we preparing for? If hackers penetrate a system, how quickly can we detect it, isolate it, and keep safe water flowing? Are our municipalities conducting exercises that simulate these attacks? Do smaller communities have the personnel, technology, and resources they need? Because protecting our water is not simply an infrastructure issue. It's a public health issue, a public safety issue, and increasingly a national security issue. We need to prepare now, not after a crisis. Thank you, and I look forward to listening to our panelists.
Thank you, Senator Botcher, Senator Ryan.
Thank you. Thank you very much for everybody coming. It's a great turnout. Thank you for my colleagues, of course, Senator Botcher, and of course our chair, the great senator from Brentwood, Suffolk County. Thank you. So I'm really looking forward, and thank everybody who is going to be here as a witness, provide testimony. I am certainly looking forward to learning more about this. I think that we have to, looking forward to gaining a better insight and understanding some of these real-world costs, what the costs on municipalities as we have to increase our preparedness, understand how we can do more and what we can do better. And, you know, Senator Bacchus said it, right? I think it's just you turn on the faucet and you get clean water. And I think it's something that we take for granted. It's a public health issue. It's more than just cybersecurity and attacks. It's part of our daily lives, and it's a public health issue. So, again, I am definitely looking forward to learning more and what we can do to better protect the citizens of the state of New York. So thank you very much for coming. Appreciate it.
Thank you, Senator Ryan. Okay, just to lay out some of the ground rules for today's public hearing, each witness will have up to 10 minutes to provide their statement. Once those 10 minutes are up, that's going to make a really annoying sound. All right, so just be aware. After all the panelists have concluded their statements, the chairs and the senators who are here present may ask questions of each of the panelists called upon by the acting chairs. The question and answer portion will be 20 minutes, which gives us a little time to ask those questions to our panelists. And then once the questioning has concluded, we'll transition effectively and efficiently to our next panel. We do have five panels today, and we appreciate every single person ensuring that they have what they need for us to learn from them, and we appreciate everyone's cooperation in helping us keep the hearing today on schedule. So now we begin with our first panel Hello Megan Cook and you are the Executive Chamber of New York State Chief Cyber Officer Welcome Thank you Chairwoman Martinez Thank you for inviting me Senator Botcher Senator Ryan Senator Fahey Senator Chan
Thank you. This is, yes, Megan Cook, Chief Cyber Officer for the State of New York. And I want to thank you for the opportunity to testify and represent New York on this important topic of cybersecurity for water and wastewater systems and the critical role that New York State plays in proactively protecting New Yorkers. But when discussing cybersecurity and preparedness for water and wastewater sector, we have to confront an escalating and deeply asymmetric threat landscape. For years, the intelligence community has warned that nation, state, and affiliated actors are targeting critical infrastructure, positioning themselves for potential disruption and destruction, including in water and wastewater systems. And today, these threat actors are becoming increasingly sophisticated, efficient, and dangerous. They are rapidly leveraging the increasing availability of AI to enhance their offensive capabilities and scale their operations. And this creates an imbalance between offense and defense. adversaries only need to succeed a few times, while our defenders must succeed all the time. This asymmetry is pronounced in the water and wastewater sector, especially at facilities where resources for personnel and cybersecurity investments are a challenge. As we all saw this summer, our nation's water and wastewater systems were targeted in coordinated cyberattacks that spanned across at least 100 facilities across 12 states. the impacts were varied, ranging from a boil water advisory issuance to operators being locked out of their systems temporarily and switching to manual operations. While New York was not one of these affected states, these cyber attacks only underscore the importance of continuing to strategically strengthen our defenses. Governor Kathy Hochul's 2023 Whole of State Cybersecurity Strategy recognizes that building New York's security posture requires the state to use two types of levers. One, control. Two, fortification. Control levers, such as legislation, regulation, and enforcement, provide our water and wastewater systems clear expectations for baseline cybersecurity requirements that are threat and risk informed, as well as cost conscious. Fortification levers, such as cybersecurity and investments and services, provide our frontline operators practical resources needed to shore up their defenses. These two key lever types are organized across five pillars that work to reinforce each other. Number one, operate New York State government networks securely and resiliently. Two, collaborate with key stakeholders. Three, regulate critical industries. Four, communicate cybersecurity guidance. And five, grow the cybersecurity workforce and economy statewide. statewide. Over the years, New York State has proactively operationalized the statewide cybersecurity strategy to protect New Yorkers from cyber threats, especially across our critical infrastructure sectors. For the water and wastewater sector, Governor Hochul directed the state regulators with jurisdiction over water and wastewater to work hand in hand to promulgate threat and risk informed, cost conscious, and harmonized cyber regulations. these cyber regulations for the water sector and wastewater were adopted in March 26 through the New York State Department of Health DOH and New York State DEC Department of Environmental Conservation As a result New York State is the first in the nation to set cybersecurity regulations for water and wastewater and has achieved through a coordinated approach to reduce regulatory burden on covered entities while still at the same time ensuring common sense regulations setting minimum cybersecurity baselines. To ensure that the sector also had access to practical resources to fortify defenses, Governor Hochul also directed the New York State Environmental Facilities Corporation to develop a dedicated cybersecurity grant program in coordination with DOH and DEC and pair it with technical assistance services. In addition to the $10 billion in investments in water and wastewater infrastructure since 2017, the state has invested over $9 million in cybersecurity project funding for 150 local governments, 150 local government projects. Moreover, there has been an investment in capacity and capability building within and across the agencies, the Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services, or DHSES, DEC and DOH. The mandatory unified cyber reporting portal is now in place to report cyber incidents. The DOH Water and the DEC have expanded their cyber capacity and capability through the Bureau of Water Supply and Division of Water. Through continued training, interagency information sharing, and operational development, DOH and DEC continue to strengthen their ability to oversee water and wastewater sector. cybersecurity regulation and enforcement, analysis of risk cybersecurity risk assessments, and interagency information sharing. The Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services Critical Infrastructure Unit conducts no-cost cybersecurity assessments of critical infrastructure across the state, including for water and wastewater systems pursuant to New York State Executive Law, Article 26. In addition, they review cybersecurity vulnerability assessments that public water systems submit to DOH pursuant to public health law, Section 1125. These assessments are vitally important to the state's cybersecurity risk picture across the critical infrastructure sectors and provides a valuable gateway for critical infrastructure operators to receive trusted and custom recommendations for increased cyber resilience. In New York State, we have a leading threat intelligence gathering, analysis, and dissemination muscles that are routinely built through the state's cyber intelligence functions. Namely, within the New York State Police is the New York State Intelligence Center Cyber Analysis Unit, or as we call it, the NISIC-CAU. They provide intelligence analysis and dissemination for critical infrastructure stakeholders across the state. The NISIC-CAU serves as a trusted and centralized dissemination arm to curate threat intel and communicate indicators of compromise to numerous stakeholders throughout the state. Additionally, for many local governments that operate water and wastewater facilities, statewide offerings are available. For example, the statewide Cybersecurity Shared Service Program serves as an access point to receive cybersecurity tools and defenses throughout the state. This cyber shared services model leverages the economies of scale of the state and the state's buying power to maximize the return on cyber investment and continues to be a model throughout the nation. The statewide cyber shared services program works hand in hand with the Joint Security Operations Center. As you know, the JSOC, that supports state and local governments, 24 by 7 by 365, bringing together federal, state, city, county governments, critical businesses, and utilities to coordinate and operationalize cybersecurity incident response and threat intelligence. Through the establishment of the JSOC, the state has a more unified visibility of cybersecurity events and incidents across the state, the state networks, as well as the cities and counties currently enrolled in the security information and event management offering. The unification under JSOC continues to be instrumental in coordinating effective and efficient cybersecurity incident response operations across a range of partners through very purposeful centralization. centralization. My testimony today focuses on the evolving threat landscape facing frontline water and wastewater operators on a daily basis, as well as showcases New York State's proactive investments and a nation leading cyber whole of state approach so that we can continue to strengthen local resilience and reliability against cyber attacks together. Thank you.
Thank you. We did not hear the buzzer. Appreciate that. All right, great. So now, Megan, we will now ask you some questions, and we each have about four to five minutes for questions for you. First of all, I just want to say thank you for your testimony and also to the governor for her commitment. I know that she and I worked closely on the bill that was incorporated into the budget, and we do appreciate the funding. But before we talk about the funding, I did want to ask a couple of questions, too, in terms of things that were touched upon. So when, as chair of local government, and especially in Suffolk County, we encountered an attack. and we just didn't know what to do, especially our emergency response systems. So it was one of a kind, but we saw firsthand that this is now happening. So what cybersecurity tests or assessments or emergency response drills are currently required for critical water infrastructure in New York State to identify these vulnerabilities that could cause an attack to occur?
Thank you for your question. So there are cybersecurity regulations and cybersecurity best practices for local governments and also for water and wastewater facilities. So I believe that the regulation, when you hear from DOH and DEC, they're going to cover a lot of those regulations. For those local governments, the Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services offers a variety of services for them, including risk assessments, rapid risk assessments, penetration tests, exercises, as well as fishing campaign training. So there's a whole host. They offer them to all local governments. In many local governments where there is a water or wastewater facility, they are folded into that exercise, as well as the shared service offerings. So the shared service offerings are also extended to water and wastewater in there. As we continue to think about the future of cyber attacks, we know that expansion of the cyber shared services program which if you talk to any local governments will say that is one of the great things that they feel has been done by New York State and the governor We continue to expand that program
And how often are these assessments being done?
So DHSCS offers them at no cost for those who request it.
They're not mandated to request them?
No.
The local? Okay.
No, but there is tremendous input and tremendous interest in them, and they're done quite regularly.
Do you see any current gaps in existence that would cause municipalities not to opt in for assistance?
No, no. And so here's one of the places where New York State DHSCS has really stepped up as our federal government has backed away. So the Cybersecurity Infrastructure and Security Agency, or as we call CISA, would also provide services that some local governments were able to take part in. Those have pulled back, and so, therefore, DHSES, the Cyber Incident Response Team, which provides proactive and reactive services to cybersecurity, has really stepped up and provided more of those services.
Okay. Do you happen to know how many of New York's municipal water system continue to allow third-party operational technology vendors?
I do not know that answer.
Okay.
operational technology vendors are not unique to New York. They are throughout the entire industry.
Okay. Now I'm going to go back just to the money, right, because obviously one of the things that our local municipalities always encounter is the fact that more money is needed, right? You know, every single local government, whether it's from health care, shared services along the way to, it's always in need of additional funding. And granted, we appreciate the funding that is there now, but one of the issues that we have heard from our local municipalities is that how does the executive branch justify providing $3.8 billion in financial assistance for local water projects while directing less than a quarter percent of that capital towards defending the critical assets
against cyber attacks? Can you repeat the question? Yeah. So from what I'm hearing from the local
municipalities in the area across the state is that how does the executive branch justify providing $3.8 billion in financial assistance for local water projects in the fiscal year 2025 while directing less than 0.25 percent of that capital towards defending the critical assets
against cyber attacks? So funding is, if we were to talk about cybersecurity funding 10 years ago, we would have been the only ones in the room, right? Cybersecurity funding has consistently grown over the past 10, 15 years. I think the growth has been good in New York State, and one of the things that is really interesting about the funding, especially when we hear from the Environmental Facilities Corporation, that they were able to fund all of the eligible applicants that came in. So everything that came in that was applied for that was eligible, was able to be funded, all 153, and I know you'll hear more from DEC. But one of the things that we talk about is defense in depth. So defense in depth is a series of tools that help local governments water and wastewater facilities buy down risk So as we thinking about there are certain tools that are threat and risk informed as well as cost conscious And one of the things that Governor Hochul has done in the Cyber Shared Services Program is provide those services such as endpoint detection and response and attack surface management. So there are really some key tools that you can, if you can't afford everything, there are some key tools that can be used, especially when you're looking at IT and OT. So as we look ahead, that's why we're looking to expand the Cyber Shared Services Program.
Yes, because the other issue that we also have to keep in mind is that New York State is under the 2% tax cap, right?
And that would obviously hurt some municipalities to get fully funded.
The last thing any municipality wants to do is pierce a 2% cap, right? Right, so how can we balance that out in terms of, you know, we don't want to pierce the cap our local municipalities, so therefore, if more than 97% of water systems have received zero in the state funding, how do we expect them to fund mandatory cybersecurity analysis?
So thank you for your question. There's many cybersecurity defenses that can be taken that are user-based. So user-based training. Right now, the New York State Department of Information Technology Services offers their cybersecurity training free of charge to all local governments. So if there's not already training taking place, they offer theirs for anyone to do that. Included in there is a very basic approach around password security. And what we're learning is that password security, even though you've heard it, I've heard it, it sounds like we're saying the same thing over and over again. When you look at the attacks on water and wastewater, password security is paramount. So when I think about funding, I also think about the practices that are already in place that can help protect water and wastewater from the user perspective. And that is all through training. So that's one of the things that we're also, I know that DEC will talk about some of those requirements for water and wastewater operators. Thank you.
I appreciate your answers to the questions. I am now going to turn it over to Senator Botcher.
Thank you so much. You testified that within the New York State Police, there's a New York State Intelligence Center.
Yes.
And it provides intelligence analysis and dissemination, and it curates threat intelligence and communicates indicators of compromise to numerous stakeholders throughout the state. Who are the stakeholders that receive these notices, these indicators of compromise?
So the NISIC-CAU has developed the most robust dissemination list across the state, broken out by local governments, critical infrastructure, businesses. And because we are a decentralized state in cybersecurity, so there's many players, we needed one place to be able to take all of the threat intel information and get it out. So it is stakeholders, people who have technology backgrounds, as well as people who do not have technology backgrounds. You can sign up to get that threat intelligence.
And is that disseminated via email?
Yes.
And so is the executive chamber on that list Do you receive those as well Yes How often are these notices sent out to the stakeholders How often does this happen
So it is an as-needed basis, but it's rare that a week goes by that I'm not hearing from them on multiple, whether it's a digest of what's gone on nationally, not anything they've seen in New York State, or things that they may know are happening in New York State. So it's multiple times a week. And that's just the formal communication. The great thing about cybersecurity in New York State is that the agencies on the back end are doing a very good job of information sharing. So there's formal cyber analysis unit communication, and then there's informal communications among the state leaders and local government leaders.
What kind of threats are we talking about that have been communicated out, New York State-specific threats that get sent out to stakeholders? What kind of things are we talking about?
Thank you for that question. So there is vulnerabilities. So with the use of artificial intelligence, there are more vulnerabilities found in devices and systems that are in use not just in New York but throughout the world. And if there's a vulnerability found, there needs to be a patch. And so it is our job in New York State to help get that information out and do that patching. The patch has to be tested first and then patching. So the most recent one was a group of organization that was a vulnerability found in a device that could be used across the state. So all of that information was pulled from various sources and very quickly gotten out to all the stakeholders that gave them information on what the vulnerability is, where to find it, and how to patch it, and that the patch was tested. So when a patch is tested, it also needs recommendations on how you should implement it. So that's just one example.
Any other examples potentially of things such as ACH fraud?
So things to look out for.
How confident can we be that a sophisticated foreign actor hasn't already gained access to some water systems and is simply waiting?
Thank you for that question. One of the interesting things about the attack that I talked about that did not affect New York State was that they didn't use a sophisticated method. So it was around password security. It was around default passwords. So PLCs, programmable logic controllers, PLCs, they still in many places across the country had default passwords on them. So that password security is one of the major baseline components of keeping water and wastewater safe and secure. So as we look ahead, it's really looking at those areas of password security, multi-factor authentication, segmentation to put in place in our water and wastewater facilities. But there's always a risk. There's always a risk out there.
How do we gain confidence that they don't already have access to our systems?
Many of the water and wastewater facilities are under the regulation of DEC and DOH and have gone through cybersecurity assessments. So assessments are a way to look and see how the defenses are built inside and outside the entity, the networks, and all of the systems within there. And they're also meant to show if anyone has been in there. And one of the ways that I believe that we will continue to do this is through our Cyber Shared Services Program, which provides these endpoint detection and the attack surface management so we can see, so we can block. Thank you.
Thank you.
Senator Ryan.
Thank you for the testimony. I appreciate it. I want to focus a little bit more on our smaller, more rural water systems. So do you believe that we have a cybersecurity workforce gap? And I guess the second part of that question is, and if so, how does that gap affect the municipality's ability to comply with the new cybersecurity requirements?
Thank you for your question. So if we look nationally at cybersecurity workforce, there is a gap nationally. And if you look at large corporations, cybersecurity is typically in a position that reports directly to the executive. As you go through government and you go down in layers, there's just not an opportunity to have an entire department focused on cybersecurity. Many times it's embedded within the information technology department. IT and cybersecurity are not the same things. They are philosophically different in their approach, but larger organizations are able to have full departments. With that said, there is also an argument that IT and cybersecurity work well together because you have the two people, the two departments closely aligned to be able to talk about how to manage the business, how to provide tools and services for the business, while also keeping secure. One of the things that DHSES does is provide all of the proactive services, and many of them are to local rural communities. In that space, they may have a smaller perimeter, okay? And especially when you're looking at the defense in depth approach of what tools those communities that are eligible for Cyber Shared Services Program have signed up. So they've signed up for the tools necessary to protect, but then they've also begun to understand that password security is critically important as well. And I'll close on one last piece. 10, 15 years ago, if we were talking about cybersecurity, it was IT people in the room. It is not the case anymore. What we're finding is many executives, many procurement legal counsel are coming to the table. They're becoming more aware of the challenges and understanding how they play a role in protecting their government's assets. So procurement, a centralized review, a security check of all applications that are being purchased. So as people start to understand the role they play, then the resiliency becomes stronger because they become more of a unified unit in protecting their government.
So to me it kind of sounds like we do have a gap right Which is I think we have to care for that We have to get as many people as we can So second part of that so would you support developing a workforce training program in the I guess for the purpose of recruiting and retaining cybersecurity professionals for the municipalities?
And how does that, I guess, I would be willing to talk about that. I think we need a rigid workforce program that we need to train people. Yes, so thank you for the question. There are many cybersecurity programs throughout universities in New York State. There are four to five universities that offer clinics for local governments that allow the students to do hands-on training through that program. And I can get you that information off the top of my head. I'm trying to remember them. But there's also a discussion around the requirements of cybersecurity professionals. So there are a baseline education, but how much can be learned on the job as opposed to spending four years in school? So there's this ongoing conversation between can there be cybersecurity professionals who do a two-year program and go into a specific part as opposed to also four-year cybersecurity students going into a different part of the program because it's not just technical. It's policy. It is a whole range of areas.
Well, I'm hopeful, and I would like to see the state, us, probably do a little bit more working with our localities to be proactive. I guess are you proactively doing that? Are you proactively, is the state proactively promoting that and saying to our villages or towns or wherever the small, I have a rural district with some small wastewater treatment plants. They can't do all this, right? So I like to, are you doing anything proactively or what can we do? Last question.
Thank you for your question. The agencies, DEC, DOH Water, and DHSES are very proactive in reaching out to the communities, especially through the Cyber Shared Services Program. And I know I keep bringing that up, but that is one way where I have been able to meet numerous municipalities and talk with them about the basics of a defense in-depth approach and learn about some of the challenges that they face. Yes, cybersecurity professionals, we are looking at certifications, things we can do as a state that allow those IT professionals to go get cybersecurity qualifications in order to help.
And just if you could provide me with that information because I want to go back to my towns, villages, the county that may not have this. I want to say, listen, this is what we're doing. This is what you should be doing because it's serious. So thank you very much.
Thank you.
Thank you. Senator Fahey.
Thank you. Thank you. And thank you for joining us here. And thank you to all three chairs for conducting this hearing. I'm a member of two of the three committees here. and very pleased because I share the alarm with the growth of breaches, cybersecurity breaches and more. And I also appreciate that we have the first in the country in terms of regs. So thank you for sharing that, that the governor did launch regulations on cybersecurity earlier this year. that is very comforting, knowing that there's so much work to do ahead. I say all the time government always has a hard time keeping up with the rapid flow of technology And just in the last two months with all of the AI breaches and the generative AI alarms that have been set off I think we cannot be proactive enough. So I share the comments of all the chairs that have already discussed this. I also would be remiss if I didn't put a plug-in for UAlbany, which is in my district, They just launched a cybersecurity clinic this fall. They have an entire cybersecurity program or department, I should add. And just by coincidence, we were meeting with them earlier this week. And I really appreciated the five pillars that you mentioned, that you did mention growing the workforce. So I definitely share the interest that Senator Ryan alluded to. A couple of questions. You mentioned that the federal government has been backing away. Certainly, we have seen that the president has said he's not worried, not as concerned, and more generically on some of these AI breaches. Just this week, we also read about a major breach at the FBI. While that may not be water and wastewater systems, can you elaborate on what you mean by the federal government walking away?
I mean, clearly we are going to need assistance here. Every state is going to need assistance. Can you elaborate on what you meant by the federal government walking away
or backing away, to use your words?
So the agency CISA, C-I-S-A, is what we typically in the past would work with to get threat intelligence information sooner. And the threat intelligence feed has become extremely small to almost nothing. So therefore, what we're doing is New York State has built up our own threat intel gathering. And one of the things that we talked about was the NISIC-CAU. But as the community of agencies, we all come together on a regular basis daily with threat intel information. So we have filled that gap. But local governments also participated in CISA activities, and those activities are not supported anymore. So they're turning to us, as well as many other things that we slowly continue to hear about the services that CISA was providing to local governments in New York State and throughout the nation that they're no longer doing, that we are now taking a lead on.
Okay, thank you. And honestly, that only fuels my alarm because we certainly do need a federal partner, and it is deeply concerning to see that even the FBI, which said they would never again have another breach after one few years ago, and then to hear that they are backing away and that you are getting less of these threat intelligence feeds, which is really disconcerting. You mentioned that you provide no-cost assessments on public water, waste and water, cybersecurity assessments to local governments. I, too, as Senator Ryan pointed out, I represent a host of small towns and villages, in fact, a couple of dozen. Are you hearing from the towns and villages? Do you have a number of them seeking this no-cost assessment?
Yes through the DHSCS critical infrastructure unit They are hearing from municipalities that are that have water and wastewater for the cyber risk assessment So yes they are Okay and a number of them have you know they, we assume, do not have dedicated cyber security staff, especially the smaller municipalities, and yet even where I live in Albany, and even Albany Med, a much larger multi-billion dollar institution had cyber attacks, again, not with their water, but related.
Is there a training? Are you, in addition to assessing, do you help train municipality, town and village staff, or is it just an assessment to let them know how at risk they are?
So there is training available. I think what you're going to hear is that there's training available from multiple agencies, depending on the profession within the local government. So you're going to hear from DOH and DEC about what they provide to water and wastewater. For the rest of the staff, there are trainings held, but sometimes the best training is to exercise your incident response plan, and so we do that quite regularly with local governments.
I see. Okay. Thank you. Thank you. Last, just quick question. The growing use of generative AI, is that fueling a concern, especially as municipalities try to do predictive maintenance? Or do you think we are keeping up with some of the generative AI threats?
So, thank you for your question. Generative AI allows, is like a force multiplier in attacks, right?
Well put.
So it allows them to scale their operations, as I said, so reach more. Does it mean that all of the scale is sophisticated attacks? That is why the baseline cybersecurity regulations set forth by the governor for water and wastewater really help prevent. And so in the case, as I brought up, that we saw, changing passwords from default passwords on PLCs could have prevented some of that. But there are also sophisticated attacks that are occurring. One of the things that we go back to is we also work with our industry partners. So our industry partners have products and services already in place within water and wastewater facilities. How are they incorporating artificial intelligence to increase the defense? So we're working hand-in-hand with industry on that to make sure that what's already in place is truly a defense mechanism and complements the defense in depth approach.
Thank you. And thank you again to each of our chairs.
Of course.
Thank you.
And Senator Chan.
Good morning, Ms. Koch. I want to thank you for coming over here.
Thank you.
Hello? Okay, great. Great. Okay, so real quick, has there actually been any documented either successful or attempted cyber intrusion against a New York State drinking water supply system or treatment facility?
Right now, we don't have any documented ones. I know you'll hear more from DOH and DEC on the information that they've been able to collect.
Okay, so... Another thing that I'm concerned about is the fiscal impact of this. So do you have any idea what is the actual average cost to a municipal water system when these mandated requirements are implemented in 2027?
I do not have that number, but I'm happy to follow up and get back to you.
Right, so naturally you wouldn't know how many municipalities are actually approaching that $150,000 or the $5 million threshold according to their size, number of people they serve, right?
I don't have that information in front of me, but there's one thing to note about water and wastewater, especially as they range in size and the population that they have to serve. So they are configured in different ways. And so that also plays a role in determining the funds needed for each one.
So building on what Senator Ryan was saying earlier, we do have a shortage of qualified cybersecurity professionals to these municipalities.
So this is a, thank you for your question,
this is a two pronged thinking about cybersecurity professionals.
We can have cybersecurity professionals, we may not have the funding to hire them, the lines to bring them in. I believe in New York State through, thank you Senator Fahey for bringing up the University at Albany, also RIT, also Plattsburgh, also Columbia, have very strong programs in cybersecurity and are attracting students as well as the community colleges, the two-year programs. So I do believe working on cybersecurity workforce and understanding how you can leverage a shorter program for a more hands-on and then a four-year program for a different part of cybersecurity. So I believe that we can work on this together.
Okay, just a question or two, right?
So was there any specific vulnerabilities or incidents that led the state to conclude that these mandatory requirements are necessary at this time?
Thank you for that question. Cybersecurity across water, there has, for over many years, threat intelligence has said that nation-state threat actors are not coming after just water and wastewater, but generally in government. So this was a forward-thinking step that Governor Hochul took to get the agencies to come together to create the risk and threat-informed regulations that, I want to go back to the two levers. So in New York State, you really need two levers. the control, the regulations, the laws that set the baseline, the minimum, as well as the funding to fortify. And those two together can help protect.
And what is your opinion on the price of the water system upgrades?
My concern, of course, along with many other legislators, especially upstate New York, is the cost going to be passed down to the ratepayers. That's what it comes down to. I can certainly follow up with you on the actual cost breakdown of that. One of the things that I've mentioned a couple of times before is that there are basic cybersecurity mechanisms that can be put in place that will protect. And so it's looking at that whole first group of protections and saying, how much will it cost based on the size of the water and wastewater facility And it education of the user and its education around all of the areas such as procurement legal terms and conditions everything associated with buying applications within water and wastewater.
Okay, so right quick, just brush up on the cybersecurity upgrades, right? Is it going to require taking the critical infrastructure temporarily offline?
For upgrades? Yeah. cybersecurity upgrades can be done continuously while still maintain operation, full operation.
Okay. Thank you very much, Ms. Cook.
Thank you.
Okay. Thank you, Ms. Cook.
So clearly we went over the five minutes that we each were going to do and have.
No, we all did.
That's okay.
We all did.
But so I think we're going to adjust a little bit moving forward, okay? We will time ourselves as well, right, just to be fair. but since you're already in the hot seat we have two more follow-up questions oh good because we're
able to do that um senator vacher excellent hi i just wanted to follow up on a question that senator fahey asked are you saying that the federal government has stopped forwarding threats that it has learned about about attacks on our infrastructure to new york state
Thank you for the question. Established communication feeds from CISA have dwindled. Under the Biden administration, we would get a constant stream of information, including potential threats to our state's infrastructure. And we no longer receive those.
Is that a question?
Yes. the threat intel information that were through sustained channels before have dwindled. Therefore, New York State has fortified, built our own structures as we had before, but we have assumed that position. And yes.
Thank you. Thank you. And just one more follow-up from Senator Fahey's question regarding those who have benefited from this. But do you happen to know the exact number of how many localities outside the recent grant winners have taken the state's offer of these services out of the over 3,000 systems we have across the state?
Say that question again.
So how many of the localities outside of the recent grant winners have taken the state's offer?
for cyber shared services. So that is dependent on the county or the city. So if the water and wastewater facility falls within their purview, that is within their scope to decide if they're going to take the cyber shared service offering and have it used to cover for the water and wastewater. We know that there are many in there. You just don't have the exact number? No. Would
Did you get the number for us?
I will follow up.
Okay, thank you. Why not? Why not? So you mentioned that the FBI's notification to New York State in regards to the cybersecurity threats have dwindled.
I said the Cybersecurity Infrastructure and Security Agency, CISA. Okay, has dwindled but not stopped.
Am I correct to say that?
There are certain channels that are still open, but there were larger more sustained channels that do not have the same support Okay thank you Ms Cook thank you so much for being here with us and for sharing your expertise
And I know that we will also look forward to some of the follow-ups that we have asked for from your office. And thank you for being here.
Thank you. Have a great day.
Okay, so now moving forward, we're going to our next panel, which includes the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation. We have the Deputy Commissioner for Water Resources, AJ Smith, as well as the Environmental Program Specialist, Samantha McHart. Again, you will have ten minutes for your statements and Senators. We each have five minutes and we're not going over those five minutes.
Good afternoon. Good afternoon. Can you hear me okay? Yes.
Okay, good afternoon. Thank you for having us. Chairs Martinez, Ryan and Botcher and
also Senator Fahey and Senator Chan. Good to see you. As stated, I'm Alexander Smith. I'm Deputy Commissioner for Water Resources at New York State DEC. I'm accompanied by DEC's wastewater cybersecurity subject matter expert Samantha McCart. We thought that it would be great to have someone besides me here to talk to you about the important questions today. And Samantha was instrumental in developing DEC cybersecurity regulations for wastewater. It's a pleasure to be here today to review the nation-leading efforts that the department has engaged in to address cybersecurity at New York State wastewater facilities. we truly appreciate the opportunity thank you senator botcher i really appreciated the comments that you made earlier because i think uh it it very much rings true that oftentimes folks don't think about wastewater and how important the infrastructure actually is so really appreciated those comments i'll try to keep these remarks short so that we we can go into the the details and obviously we've provided written testimony outlining our approach to addressing wastewater cybersecurity. That said, I'd like to briefly highlight our efforts in partnership with our state agencies as we work to address the complex problem of cybersecurity. As you know, cybersecurity, particularly for lifeline critical infrastructure like that of wastewater, is a growing concern, both in New York State and beyond. We've heard a lot about that just now. DEC has collaborated with the Department of Health, the Department of Public Service, the Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Services and Environmental Facilities Corporation and the New York State Police and others. Beginning in January 2025 as part of the Governor Hochul's State of the State initiative to safeguard New York's water infrastructure, DEC began drafting minimum cyber security standards for wastewater systems. During development of these regulations, DEC engaged in significant stakeholder outreach that included representatives of various wastewater systems, municipalities, and wastewater professional associations On March 11 2026 after collaboration with partner agencies in a public comment period DEC adopted minimum cybersecurity standards for wastewater These standards we believe are threat risk and cost and will help ensure the New Yorkers continue to have access to safe and reliable wastewater services. These new regulations include amendments to New York's codes, rules, and regulations at Parts 616, 650, and 750, and they focus on mandatory cybersecurity incident reporting for all wastewater treatment facilities, required cybersecurity training for DEC certified wastewater operators, requirements that all publicly owned treatment works establish, maintain, and implement an emergency response plan, a cybersecurity incident response plan, written documentation that's related to access control and authentication, vulnerability management, and secure network structure, network monitoring and logging for POTWs, publicly owned treatment works, with a flow of greater than or equal to 10 million gallons per day, and annual certifications that the municipality is compliant with these requirements. Since rule adoption, DEC has engaged in extensive and ongoing outreach to the regulated community on the new cybersecurity requirements, important updates, and free training and resources to support implementation of the baseline cybersecurity standards. Additionally, DEC developed a new centralized webpage and online incident reporting portal. In closing, DEC's participation in New York State's coordinated effort to address cybersecurity at New York State wastewater facilities has strengthened cybersecurity postures across the regulated community. By establishing minimum cybersecurity standards and providing extensive research or extensive outreach, education, and training, New York State is helping wastewater systems better protect themselves and our communities against persistent cybersecurity threats. Again, thank you for the opportunity, and we're happy to try and answer any questions they might have.
Thank you. We will begin with Senator Ryan.
Thank you very much. I appreciate the testimony. Two quick questions. So currently the state, if I'm correct, requires two to four hours of cybersecurity training depending on an operator's certification level. So do you believe this is adequate? And or is it adequate, do you think, in your opinion? And also how does that compare to other state requirements and other agencies?
Yeah, so the wastewater operator certification training that we're requiring builds on the set of regulations that we actually already require for general wastewater operator training. And so I think important to note that we did a lot of outreach, right, with associations that represent wastewater operators in developing these regulations and found that that level of training should be sufficient. Obviously, it's risk-based, so the larger the number of hours is associated with the type of facility that the operator is going to be involved in managing, right? So more hours of training for a much larger, maybe more sophisticated system, which is an important note, but at a minimum providing, you know, that two to four hours. It's also a component of the overall number of total hours. So we didn't, we wanted to be clear that we weren't adding additional hours to certification requirements already. We wanted to make it part of what their existing requirements are. So I think the short answer is yes, we do believe that it is significant. and should be a very useful part of their overall training to be prepared. I don't know if you want to add anything else, Samantha. Just to answer the part of your question about what other states do,
most do not require cybersecurity training for wastewater operators.
Well, I think they should. Second question. And so the new rules regulations developed by DOHCC apply to community water systems serving more than 3,300 people. Are there any rules regulations for smaller water systems? Again, I'll go back to the rural areas, like why the cutoff and should we have them for smaller systems?
So the 3,300 population served limitation is for DOH's regulations for drinking water. So on the DEC side for wastewater, we do not have that exception. So we also require these things for the smaller systems. The training for operators is required for smaller systems as well.
So if one of my smaller villages has their own, because I have a couple, their own municipal wastewater treatment plans, there is no, they would be included in that. They're not carved out, if you will. They are still required to get that training. Okay, good.
Yeah, so I think it's important to note that we have, as part of the publicly owned treatment works universe, we're talking about 630 thereabout facilities statewide, as Samantha said, with no cutoff associated. The important distinction is levels of additional requirements for those facilities greater than 10 million gallons per day.
Thank you.
I think your mic might be working on.
Thank you.
Perfect.
You both did the same or you have your own?
I have my own. Yes. Okay.
But we'll continue with our questioning to Alexander. Senator Ryan? I mean, Boccia? If the state were to appropriate additional funds to your agency now, let's say $100 million, what would be the first thing you would dedicate that money to? Wow. $100 million. Specific to cybersecurity?
Security? No. I would say that one of the areas that we are often really wishing that we could do more in is advancing our support with local municipalities, including more rural municipalities as well. I think that we see it's not just a cybersecurity issue, but something that we've been working on broader over the years with our partners at EFC and elsewhere is trying to provide greater community assistance in ways to support communities to be able to advance the projects that they're trying to engage in, right, in this case advancing assessments or mitigating cybersecurity threat or just simply advancing additional facility upgrades, right. So I think the question about funding is an important one. I think we've heard it a little bit throughout the morning here. And so I think investments in that sort of work, the community assistance work right the building up of the support for those local municipalities to be able to engage in the type of things that we requiring is going to be really important The types of grants that EFC is now offering right I mean that is a great outlet We have the system set up and the programs in place within the department to facilitate the actual implementation of the regulations, which I think is really important.
And, you know, we have a long history of supporting speedy's permit compliance enforcement, right, and development.
And so I think we're well-based in that area.
I think we'll continue on on the funding piece. You know, the grants are one, the secure grants are one element.
But one of the things I think that is important to recognize, and I think it speaks to a question I heard earlier, is that wastewater facilities are often coming in for much larger infrastructure upgrades, right? And the types of activities that we're talking about on the cybersecurity front are trying to separate operational from information technologies. And the operational side is where you see a lot of upgrades for facilities, right? Big pumps and things being installed, and there are things that are controlling these pumps. If a municipality comes in for a grant or a financing application, those are the kinds of upgrades that could be part of larger infrastructure projects and funded through those applications as well. So I want to make sure that it's clear we're not just talking about the secure grant. There's a larger area of funding here. And when we talk about clean water infrastructure, that's $750 million this year total. Right?
Thank you.
Yeah.
Thank you. Okay, I guess I'll go. All right, thank you, and thank you for being here as well. Just to follow up on previous questions, too, DEC, you yourself, how many water systems outside of the 150 or so municipalities who have received a secure grant are you working with to help them secure their systems? Anyone? Thanks, Ann.
Yeah, so we have 630 publicly owned treatment works across the state of New York. Some of them are applied for and received funds through EFC's secure grant. For the others, we're focused on educating them at this point about the regulations, about basic cyber hygiene, and making sure that our certified operators are going out and getting that training that they need because they are the boots on the ground. They're the first line of defense. They're the ones who will notice if something is off. And, you know, they are not cybersecurity professionals, but we do rely on them to sort of notice if there is something that is not right with their system.
Now, you're saying that those who have brought in and educating them, Obviously, not all municipalities have joined in on this. What efforts are you doing to ensure that these municipalities are doing that and are applying for this grant? And aside from that, are you also seeking additional funding elsewhere outside of New York State? Yes.
I think it's important to recognize the collaboration that DEC has with Environmental Facilities Corporation. So EFC can speak to it when they have time. But they have robust community assistance teams. Those community assistance teams are also connected directly with DEC wastewater staff as well as all of our regional offices right So we have nine regional offices all of whom have a water program and our our engagement with our wastewater facilities starts with those regional offices as well as our programs back in Albany and the coordination that we have with with EFC so we should be clear that we are coordinating with all of our POTWs right And part of our rollout is making sure that we have enough engagement before we roll out with something like this so that they are aware. And as we go through implementation of the new regulations, as I mentioned before, DEC has a robust compliance and enforcement strategy associated with the SPDY's program. And one of the pillars of that is our inspection activities. right so that means that routinely we are going out to wastewater facilities and working with publicly owned treatment works to inspect the facility and as part of that under these new regulations that also will mean now reviewing emergency response plans incident response plans talking to them during those inspections about the process and plans that they've put in place to meet the regulations that we are being beginning to implement and you just mentioned
incident reporting um do you feel that it is enough time to give municipalities to report not just incidents within 24 hours and or the vulnerabilities within 48 hours i mean we have states like maryland who are doing it within the hour yeah so is it enough time yeah uh yeah i think
it's plenty of time uh it's actually a routine requirement already right so um if you want to to add anything to this but basically currently if there's an upset or a bypass if there's an issue with a facility the the operators are required to report to us within a certain number of hours and we've basically aligned these new cyber security regs to to play right into that existing structure but with a little bit more added you know element to it specific to this type of incident. Is there anything you want to add to that? Yeah, I'll just add that we have, and I believe Megan mentioned this, we have created a shared reporting portal to lower
the reporting burdens by allowing drinking water facilities, wastewater facilities, and municipalities to report to the three agencies all on the same portal rather than doing three separate reporting mechanisms so they can report to DEC, DOH, and DISHES using the same reporting portal. Okay well I have 15 seconds left but I know you're you have your own testimony so I have
another question that I will ask you since I have run out of time. All right well thank you. Thank
you. All right Ms. Samantha. We had shared testimony. Yeah. Oh you did have shared testimony. I thought you had your own.
Okay. All right. Then I guess you're – can I take their minutes?
Just kidding.
You can.
I guess I can.
That's up to you, right? All right. So I do have another question for you. Sure. So nearly 88% of the secure – and again, we're going back to the grants here, right? So nearly 88% of the secure grant winners were for only assessments and not implementation, right? So why did a greater percentage of those not qualify for implementation?
I think we probably have to defer to EFC on the specifics about qualifying eligibility for the grants themselves
yeah I don't have enough information to be able to answer okay uh can we get a follow-up on that
yeah okay yeah if if EFC is not able to answer the question EFC and DEC will talk and be able to
provide uh the detail that you're looking for okay that'd be great all right well thank you thank you Have a great day.
You too.
Okay. We're moving along. Okay. Our next panel, panel number three. We have the Environmental Facilities Corporation. Thank you.
Our testimony is also shared.
Okay, thank you.
Good afternoon, Chair Martinez. Are we ready to go? Yes, you're all set. Great. Chair Martinez, thanks for having us here. Senator Botcher and Senator Ryan, thank you for having us here. I'm Michael Hale, I'm the Executive Vice President of the Environmental Facilities Corporation, otherwise known as EFC, which has been brought up here several times. So I'm pleased to be here today to speak about EFC's role in executing Governor Hochul's nation-leading statewide cybersecurity strategy, and specifically the first in the nation water infrastructure cybersecurity regulations and the funding that EFC has administered along with that. EFC is New York State's water infrastructure bank, and our mission is to make critical water infrastructure projects affordable for all New Yorkers. We offer expert technical assistance to help communities with capital projects as well as these cyber implementation grants. Governor Hochul's 2025 State of the State Agenda called for the creation of a grant program specifically meant to strengthen cybersecurity protocols of the water and wastewater sectors. The program provides technical assistance and funding for utilities to assess their cybersecurity posture, develop a cybersecurity plan, and improve their cybersecurity resilience. At the same time, DEC was directed to draft minimum standards for wastewater systems, and the Departments of Health and Public Service were directed to draft minimum standards for drinking water systems. EFC is providing both technical assistance and funding through our SECURE program. This two-pronged response reflects New York's commitment to providing communities with resources to affordably strengthen their drinking water and wastewater systems against increasingly sophisticated and dangerous cyber threats, protecting services that millions of New Yorkers rely on. EFC launched its technical assistance program while DOH and DEC were developing the regulations that set forth the minimum standards. This was to provide immediate resources to communities to start assessing their cyber posture. EFC expanded its existing community assistance teams initiative that since 2023 has bolstered our support for local governments in addressing their water and water. and wastewater needs. EFC has created an online cybersecurity hub to aggregate best practices, exercise, training from U.S. EPA and CISA, as well as other resources from around the cybersecurity universe. The hub launched on July 22, 2025, and it includes a meeting request form so that anyone can request a one-on-one consultation with EFC and our partner agencies. EFC coordinates with DOH and DEC and updates the hub regularly to ensure the resources align with the state's cyber regulations and remains current. The hub is one of the top pages visited on EFC's website, which has more than 100,000 users annually. EFC has handled hundreds of inquiries about cybersecurity and coordinated several one-on-one cybersecurity consultations to help communities address their unique concerns and navigate funding opportunities. As the secure grants, we opened applications for those grants on March 11, 2026, the same day the final cybersecurity standards were adopted by DOH and DEC. We provided a streamlined application process to ensure communities could easily apply for this funding. The awards were fast-tracked after federal authorities announced a series of cyber attacks on water utilities outside of New York that were discussed earlier today. Governor Hochul announced this summer that more than 9 million in grants to support 152 local government projects statewide. The total amount awarded was increased more than threefold above the original $2.5 million commitment to meet the full financial needs requested by the communities that applied for secure grants. The grants provide funding for cybersecurity assessments and implementation of cybersecurity controls at both drinking water and wastewater utilities, communities, ensuring EFC can help communities at every stage in the process of strengthening their cybersecurity resiliency. To understand a system's cybersecurity risk, the utility must perform a cybersecurity assessment. EFC's hub provides resources to assist with this effort, as do DOH's cybersecurity hub and DEC's wastewater cybersecurity resources webpage. EFC awarded 126 grants for initial assessments. Once a system has undertaken an assessment and understands its cybersecurity risks, it can begin to implement cybersecurity measures to address those risks. EFC awarded 26 implementation grants. EFC engaged with grant recipients in a pair of webinars held soon after the Governor announced the awards. EFC hosted a webinar for assessment grants and another for implementation grants to ensure the discussion was tailored to the recipients. Over 150 participants registered for these webinars. EFC implemented a simplified process to help communities enter into a grant agreement and put the grant funds to work quickly. All awardees have received a grant agreement from EFC for execution and over a third of those have been returned to our office as of today. Many communities will be accessing these funds very shortly Water infrastructure is essential to public health safety economic stability and national security making it an attractive target Cyber attacks cost money time and valuable resources and can potentially halt water services and threaten public health and the environment. That's why EFC is helping local systems strengthen their cybersecurity while keeping costs down for communities and ratepayers. Governor Hochul's initiative to safeguard New York's water infrastructure is emblematic of New York's leadership in cybersecurity, environmental protection, and affordability. EFC is proud to support the Governor's vision by helping communities assess risks, implement solutions, and build more resilient water infrastructure. Thank you.
Thank you. Yeah, Senator Ryan.
Okay, let me just ask a couple questions about the grant allocation and secure grants. So for economic development regions, Central New York, Mohawk Valley, North Country, and the Southern Tier, there was zero implementation grants were awarded, I believe. Just fact check that. So, you know, that's, to me, somebody who represents Central New York. That's a little, I think it's concerning. And I'd like to ask, what's the rationale for leaving those regions and those municipalities behind?
The rationale is that in order to qualify for an implementation grant, you have to have conducted the assessment. And the implementation grant does exactly what it describes, which is to take that assessment, identify the risks, and then implement the measures to mitigate that. So, those communities that came in from your district, Senator,
likely did not have an assessment that met the standards set forth in the regulations. And Senator, could you repeat the regions? New York, Mohawk Valley, North Country, and Southern Tier.
So the Mohawk Valley, North Country, and Southern Tier did receive implementation grants. Which ones? I can get you the specifics on those. But like Vice President Hale said, the communities applied, and for many of them, I think they were focused on the assessments, and in order to get the implementation grant, they had to provide a completed, acceptable assessment.
What was the timeframe on the assessment? The timeframe on the assessment, you had to have it completed within six months prior to the end of the grant program.
So from the, when the regulations were finalized.
And that's on the municipality to perform an assessment?
Yeah, that would have happened at that point.
And why we set that six-month window is because we want the assessment to be current, right?
so that you're looking at what's actually in place. Then when you go to implement the cybersecurity measures, you're doing it on the existing infrastructure that's in place. So part of that, second, because I, you know,
so some of the smaller areas, smaller towns or villages, you know, they may not have the, I think that's something that we should probably consider, right? So I think that not everybody has the ability. And then, so I, and you mentioned the word accelerated.
I'm talking about the window.
You said the window to apply, right?
Was that was it March to May But you said something was you used the word accelerate Explain that to me We accelerated the application process as well as the process we used to get when we award a grant we then have to get into an agreement with the regular you know standard terms and conditions So we streamlined everywhere we could So we announced the awards in we announced the grants as being available in March We announced the awards in May and we are under agreement we have agreements out as of the middle of September to every community that came in. What's the what was the window for the
application period? There's a two month window. Okay. Yes. See you know just let
me just say this though I think sometimes bear in mind you know not everything is you know New York City right and then there's we don't some of the smaller towns I represent two cities one one city and my and my my district is under significant financial constraints and some of the municipalities may not have the awareness or the resources to turn that around. Just to be, and I'm not being critical. I don't want you to think that I am, but I think that different parts of state, different geography, different municipalities. So just being mindful that some of the municipalities and the cities that need it probably most who don't even have the resources to do any cybersecurity, right? So I think just bear in mind that maybe we could open it back up.
We understand that, and our technical assistance remains available so that we can work with communities to assess what their needs may be in this relationship. And look forward to doing it. And when I go back and I can put some of my municipalities or the cities in touch, and that would be good. But I guess in the future, if we do continue a grant program, which, you know, hopefully we will, just bear in mind that not everybody has that short window to turn that around. And just to expand a little bit on the application. So it was a two-month period, but we did simplify the application, so there was less that was required to actually submit. Thank you.
Yes. Thank you. I will follow up on a couple of questions that Senator Ryan just posed. So in terms of being mindful now, I think what we're seeing here is the fact that more money is needed, right? We have 150 grants out there or so when we have 2,788 community water systems across the state and we have a thousand municipal wastewater systems across the state. So I think there's an issue here in terms of funding and making sure that our state is safe against these cyber attacks. Now, my next question, because we're hearing about assessment and implementation, out of these localities that have secured funding, how many of them have a FEMA hazard mitigation plan?
I don't think we would be in a position to answer that. That might be best answered by the Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services on a state level. DEC may be able to speak to that, but I don't think we could. But if you could also take that back, you know, as a follow-up. Sure. Because, for example, Suffolk County. I spoke about that before. They had a FEMA plan expired earlier this year.
They just submitted a new one Now my question is within the assessment and implementation are we seeing that again maybe you can answer this but I hope someone here can If you have these municipalities who have this FEMA mitigation plan, are they in a better position to then
receive this funding and not others? Potentially, yes, if they have done the assessment that that meets the state regulatory standards, yes. I would say so.
Do we know if it's a requirement?
I don't. I can't answer that on the regulatory side.
All right. Hopefully I get the answer today, though. It did come up earlier, the Department of Homeland Security's offerings to communities,
And I can tell you from personal experience, we had them in EFC's offices on multiple occasions to do an assessment tabletop exercises. And we have municipalities that have also worked with them. And the feedback from our organization, as well as those municipalities, is absolutely 100% positive. They do a great job. They really do. So it's a great resource.
I appreciate that. Thank you.
Senator Boccia?
You okay? Any other questions? No. I think I'm okay.
All right. Well, thank you both. Great. Thank you all.
Thank you. Of course.
Thank you.
I'm not too worried about it. Good for you. Hi. Good morning.
No, good morning. I don't want to keep saying good morning, but it's good afternoon. All right, good afternoon. We are now on our fourth panel. And with us we have today Ms. DeFalco from the New York City Department of Environmental Protection. And we also have Ari from, not on my glasses, but also from the New York City Department of Environmental Protection. And I will now give you the mic.
Terrific. Thank you so much, Senator. My name is Beth DeFalco. I'm a Deputy Commissioner for Public Affairs and Communications at the New York City Department of Environmental Protection. I am joined here by Ari Moss, our Deputy Commissioner for Police and Security. along with several of our colleagues behind me here from DEP. I'd like to start off with a little bit of context because when we talk about water security, scale matters. DEP operates the largest municipal water system in the country. Our watershed spans roughly 2,000 square miles with 19 reservoirs and three controlled lakes. Every single day, we deliver roughly a billion gallons of drinking water to New York City and communities around the city and north of the city. We also operate 14 wastewater resource recovery facilities that treat approximately 1.3 billion gallons of waste wastewater each day, and we manage stormwater and flooding across much of New York City. Altogether, our system serves nearly 10 million people. That's roughly half of the state entirely. That scale is one of our greatest strengths, but it also makes our infrastructure an attractive target for anyone looking to cause widespread disruption or harm. And that's why security is not something that we just layer on to our operations. It is fundamental to how we operate. Threats to critical infrastructure today don't have to come from somebody physically approaching a reservoir or a treatment plant. They can come through a computer, as we all know. Our most critical operational systems, though, are designed to function independently from the outside world. Our core systems are isolated from the public Internet. We also maintain the ability to operate essential parts of our wastewater and water treatment systems manually. So if computers go down, New Yorkers still need to be able to drink water, toilets still need to flush, wastewater still needs to be treated. Our redundancy and the redundancy that I just mentioned, combined with 24-hour staffing at critical facilities and close coordination with the city, state, and federal cybersecurity partners, is central to our approach. DEP supports the state's goal of establishing strong cybersecurity standards for water and wastewater systems. Where we see room for improvement is in implementation. New York's water systems are extraordinarily diverse. Requirements that work for small utilities may not make sense for a system serving nearly 10 million people. We believe the state should align requirements with established frameworks like the NISD Cyber Security Framework and emphasize risk-based standards rather than overly prescriptive mandates. There should also be clear thresholds for when a cybersecurity event requires outside reporting and strong protections to ensure sensitive assessments of system vulnerabilities and that they don't become publicly available necessarily. Cybersecurity is not a checklist. Threats change, technologies change, and systems are different. Effective regulations should establish strong standards while giving utilities the flexibility to determine the safest and most effective way to meet them. DEP is the only water utility in New York State with its own fully accredited police force. DEP police were first formed in 1908 to protect the construction of the Catskill Aqueduct. Today they protect reservoirs, dams, aqueducts, and other critical infrastructure across multiple counties. These are sworn officers trained to respond to terrorism and to protect infrastructure serving nearly 10 million people. And yet, despite their enormous responsibility, the physical hardship and the risks that they take, DEP police are the only fully accredited police force in New York State without a years of service retirement plan. Instead, our new recruits work until age 63, regardless of how many years of service they put in. DEP police successfully keep the water system safe every day, but their lack of law enforcement pension has contributed to significant vacancies. The DEP police vacancy rate exceeded 30 percent for much of fiscal year 2026. This contributed to declines in routine safety security checks and enforcement activities. Earlier this year, Senator Brian Kavanaugh and Assemblymember Stacey Fefframato sponsored S9356 and A10414, which would establish a 25-year retirement plan for DEP police, and we're grateful to the Senate and Assembly for passing this bill. In conclusion, New York City has spent more than a century building one of the safest and most reliable water systems in the world. Protecting it today requires police officers guarding reservoirs and critical infrastructure, cybersecurity professionals defending our systems, and thousands of DEP employees maintaining the redundancy that keeps water flowing even when technology fails The tools have changed Our responsibilities have not We appreciate the Senate focus on protecting this critical infrastructure and we look forward to continuing the work together to make these regulations strong, practical, and effective. Thank you. Our colleagues and I are happy to answer any questions, of course, with the caveat that depending on some of them, we might not be able to answer them fully in this format because of security issues.
Of course. Now, thank you. I'm going to have my city folks go first. Senator Botcher? Senator Ryan, he's giving you the baton.
Oh, well, I'm not, you know, I'm not a New York City guy, but I do have a question.
You are a city guy.
Well, it hurt. You, this is a, I'm interested in this. You stated that New York's proposed cybersecurity requirements should be risk-based rather than overly prescriptive. What does that mean? Provide me some contact. What do you mean by that?
I think what we, our security needs can be different than some smaller utilities. And when we say risk-based rather than overly prescriptive, it's what might be a simple potential cybersecurity, you know, attempt that might be – that might not happen as small for smaller utilities, might happen far more routinely for us based on the size, even if it's what we would consider to be a small attempt or threat. But, you know, having overly prescriptive requirements to report and maintain these, we would like to be able to work on a way that makes sense so that we are not spending all of our resources documenting and logging smaller potential intrusions versus larger ones. I think that there's just a different scale of requirement when you're talking about a utility that serves half the state.
So if I'm understanding what you're saying, so it's sort of like this. We have, and I don't want to put words in your mouth, right? So we have in the state a one-size-fits-all kind of, we have reporting the same small treatment facility in upstate New York that might 5,000 or 6,000 people can't be expected to have the same requirements or perhaps as 10 million people. it's moving 1.3 billion gallons of water a day. Is that what you're saying?
Yeah. To put it in a different but hopefully comparable context, I would imagine that other municipalities get complaints about clogged catch basins when it floods. We have 154,000 of them. The number of complaints that we get each time it rains, far different. And if we were asked to log every single one of those, the resources needed just to log them, even if it was a small So scale matters, I think, in that same context, if you were to take that and apply it to some cybersecurity.
Okay. And the only reason I ask is only because of what I said when I – my opening statement. I want to learn from everybody here. Like, obviously, New York City, any cyber attack is about anywhere. But, I mean, it could be catastrophic in the biggest city in the country. So I just want to understand that. And if there some changes that possibly we need that might not be a one size fits all we can tailor it then I guess I interested in hearing that A little bit more on a follow And some of the other differences I think that are worth noting
we've been delivering water for 184 years, far, most of the time, without the Internet, obviously. And so I don't think that some smaller utilities have some of the capabilities that we do, because they may be more reliant on different systems than we are might not be able to operate manually in the way that we can. So I think that we're just looking to make sure that things aren't so overly prescriptive that they would have inadvertent effects on a utility of our size.
Okay. Thank you. Thank you.
Senator Botcher.
Ms. DeFalco, if a cyber attack occurred tomorrow and New York City's water treatment systems lost their automated controls. Is a system capable of switching to manual operation? And if so, how long could it safely operate that way? Yes, it is absolutely, yes. If we lose power and we do drills on this all the
time, we're able to operate. I'm not going to talk about how long we could operate safely, because I'm sure you're not the only one. Or there are many people watching this hearing today. I don't think that that would be something that we should talk about publicly.
Mr. Moss, as the Deputy Commissioner of Police and Security at the agency responsible for New York City's water supply, what keeps you up at night? Without obviously divulging anything that could compromise security, What are you most concerned about right now that needs to be addressed?
I think one of the issues that we're facing, and Mr. Falco touched upon it, is the lack of our pension for our officers is keeping our attrition rate constantly turning over. So as of this morning, we have 36 vacancies from my top head count. So as we train people, we lose them. So I'm losing all that knowledge, that institutional knowledge, because as much as they, antidotally, as much as we find out during talking to them while they're exiting our agency, they like working for us, but the opportunity to be able to work younger, retire younger, and spend, you know, more years with their family is causing them to leave our agency.
For the NYPD?
They generally, I don't want to speak for the NYPD, but they generally leave for other New York State agencies outside of New York City. Just so you're aware, the majority, in fact, I would say the vast majority of our DEP police officers are assigned outside of the city in the watershed. There's some areas in the Bronx where they work, but the vast majority is the counties in the watershed counties. So they are constantly leaving our agency and going to other agencies which get highly trained police officers with no costs for training because the city just footed the bill to train them.
Are you concerned that because of a shortage of staffing that there could be scenarios in which we have facilities that are not as secure as they should be because we haven't addressed that issue?
So I just want to stress that the system is safe. We do a very good job of securing the system. The police agency spends their time dedicated to just doing that What I concerned about is that the money now spent to backfill the vacancies with overtime hiring new recruits to replace those that left could be spent whether it's on physical security, you know, gates and things like that. The money could be spent other places other than having to spend that money to bring back folks and pay for the overtime.
That's very helpful. You've identified something that the state legislature could do to step in and help in your mission. Ms. DeFalgo, if you could wave a magic wand and have the state legislature do something to help your agency, your mission, what would it be?
I think that the legislature has stepped in. I think the bill has been passed and we're hopeful that it will be signed and that we'll be able to move forward and to have an easier time, you know, I think, doing recruitment. So overall, we're pretty positive about that. But in this day and time, in this moment in time right now, that's one of our biggest challenges.
Thank you. Thank you. Just a couple follow-ups on my end.
And again, just following. Question? You're not up yet. Oh, sorry. No, you'll be next, sorry. Okay. You took some minutes away from me. I'm sorry.
Just to follow up on conversations that have been talked about. But first I want to say thank you to our DP police for being out there. And please know that we are fighting for that bill for you. But I just want to say thank you for everything that you do and for your service. Second, we talked about the FEMA plan before. Has New York City applied for the FEMA Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities? Do you happen to know if you have?
I think we might have to get back to you on that one. I'm sorry, I don't have that one readily available. We'll see if we can get it before the end of the hearing.
That would be great. Because I would like to know if you have, other municipalities have, if New York City as a whole has applied for this grant. Okay, thank you.
All right, Senator Chan, it's all you.
Thank you. Okay. Good afternoon, Commissioners, Chief. So you mentioned earlier that you're 36 police officers short in the DEP police force. It's 36 out of how many?
We're authorized for 221.
221, okay, great. So you're just about 10 to 15% short, right? Has there been an increase in applications since the passing of S9356? I know it's not signed yet.
I don't think there's been any increase in applications for that.
I'm not even sure if folks know that that's... Right. Okay. So, I'm sorry, I missed the first couple of minutes of your presentation. So has anything been implemented against cybersecurity attacks? I mean implemented, I don't mean assessed, in the New York City DEP?
Like, has anything been... Yes. Oh.
Unequivocally. I'm so sorry. I guess I missed that part. Has there ever been like a wrong amount of chemicals?
First of all, do we use caustic chemicals such as sodium hydroxide in our water supply? I can understand if you're not at liberty. I'm definitely not your scientist that you want to talk to about what chemicals are called water supply, nor do I think that this is the right form to talk about that.
Because I want to know, has there been any instances of the wrongful amount of these chemicals released, like, added to our water supply at any given time?
Not that I know of, no.
Whether it's human error or attack? I mean, are you talking about like an attack or a threat?
Or even a human error, like somebody just punched in the wrong number and the wrong amount of, wrong ratio of, let's say, chloride or sodium hydroxide was sent into our water supply. Do we have any instances of that? None that I'm aware of.
But again, I think that that's not a cybersecurity topic. That's a daily operational function topic. We're happy to talk about that at a different time with the right people in the room. Right. Okay, I think that's all I got. Thank you so much.
All right, we're done here. Thank you. All right, now we're moving to our last and final panel. Thank you. Good afternoon. We now have our fifth and final panel. We have the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Lauren Williams. And you are the Deputy Director and Senior Fellow Strategic Technologies Program. And we're also joined by Daniel Dubois, New York Section American Water Works Association. And of course, I know Dan also from Suffolk County Water Authority. Welcome to you both.
Thank you.
You may begin.
Thank you very much, Chairwoman Senator Botcher, Senator Ryan, Senator Fahey, and Senator Chan for the invitation to provide testimony today. As mentioned, I'm Lauren Williams and I serve as Deputy Director and Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., which is a national security focused think tank. And I focus on what have become very much so headline making issues like AI, cybersecurity, and the intersection with cybersecurity, space security, importantly, critical infrastructure, cybersecurity. And over the years, my organization has built a strong reputation in these areas. Prior to CSIS, my government experience includes the Pentagon's Defense Industrial Based Policy Office as well as the White House Office of the National Cyber Director and the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration, all based in DC. And I served in these senior USG roles in areas that overlap with the issues that we'll be discussing today. And I thank you and commend New York for convening this hearing and its leading role in developing concrete regulations to protect critical water systems operated by state and local entities across the state as we've already heard so far. The topic of today's hearing is one in which it goes without saying that the United States has long been vulnerable to cyber attacks on digital networks and our physical critical infrastructure. Nation state actors including Iran and China are intent on targeting our infrastructure, including waste and water and wastewater facilities due to its importance to every aspect of American life These utilities of which there are more than 148 across the entirety of the United States are essential critical infrastructure and they're essential to every aspect of our lives and economy. Most Americans take water for granted, and they take for granted that other sectors like healthcare, energy, schools, emergency response, and the industrial base more broadly rely on water for daily operations. and of course any disruptions to our drinking water and wastewater facilities whether those are caused by cyber or other incidents can have outsized impacts that ripple across the united states and i'll speak about this issue more from the strategic perspective so as we've heard discussed a couple of times already in late july 2026 minnesota officials were the first to report anomalies at their water utilities statewide and those that eventually totaled about 30 observed incidents. Over several days, more reports came in, and federal agencies and state officials reported known cyber attacks in at least seven states. And news reports eventually placed that number at 12, and 100 municipal water facilities affected. These attacks were broad, and they were relatively unsophisticated, targeting a vulnerable internet-connected node that we've heard about already, the Programmable Logic Controller, or PLC, that allow utilities across the United States to remotely control their system operations. And these are, of course, often weakly protected by default or no passwords at all. So far, the intelligence community has not yet formally attributed these attacks. The Cyber Avengers hacking group, however, has claimed responsibility for this massive campaign, writing in late July that the attacks were, quote, only a small fraction of our capabilities and intended as a warning amid the ongoing Middle East conflict. And Cyber Avengers is, of course, an Iran-affiliated group. Iran has also demonstrated a specific interest in targeting U.S. water systems, and CISA has updated in the recent months previous warnings to water utilities just before these attacks took place. It urgently alerted utilities to take their systems offline, to revert to manual operations in some cases, and all to maintain drinking water free of contamination. So these attacks were alarming for their ability, of course, to sow disruption across the United States. These attacks were noteworthy for their scale, but they were, of course, relatively unsophisticated tactics designed to exploit lax cybersecurity procedures, and they were precedented in nature. By targeting a vulnerable component that's widely used in American water utilities, the attacker's intent was likely to sow disruption and cause confusion across states rather than a targeted goal such as a ransom or financial gain. The attackers' relatively unsophisticated tactics simply included compromising remote control capabilities, exploiting those weak or non-existent passwords. In 2013, we saw a precedent for these attacks. An Iran-affiliated hacker group was indicted for compromising and accessing the control system of dam in Rye, New York. And further in 2023, the same cyber avengers group previously targeted PLCs during an attack on a Pennsylvania water system, demonstrating a pattern of intent and capability. And since the United States launched kinetic attacks against Iran in February 2026, government officials and experts like myself have warned that the regime would likely use its cyber capabilities and its network of aligned hacktivist groups to cause outsized disruption relative to its kinetic capabilities, where the United States, of course, has a significant advantage. In addition to water sector hacks Iran groups have claimed responsibility for targeting a medical technology firm back in March Stryker and conducting a hack and leak operation against FBI Director Kash Patel. Across the United States, water utilities have found themselves in the crosshairs of nation-state cyber threat actors, and they face many entrenched systemic challenges. Many are operated, as we've heard, by private entities or small local utilities that lack resources and personnel to prioritize cybersecurity and defensive best practices, not least when their adversaries are sophisticated, highly capable nation-state actors. This reality is in stark contrast to the importance of these facilities in the U.S. and globally. And the attacks also came as federal cybersecurity-focused agencies like CISA have been operating in a strained staffing and budgetary environment, which has also come up today, as far as implications, since the conflict in Iran began. So these attacks, of course, should be considered in a broad cyber threat landscape. And I won't spend too much more time talking about the Iran threat, but I'll note that the People's Republic of China, the PRC, which is the most well-resourced and sophisticated threat actor, has also, through a linked group known as Volt Typhoon, demonstrated an interest in gaining access to and prepositioning on critical infrastructure networks, including water, energy, and communications for years. likely to be able to disrupt these networks in the future, potentially in a conflict scenario. And it's possible that these actors may not have been fully uprooted from U.S. networks. AI, of course, is also making it increasingly possible for all would-be cyber actors to enhance the speed, scope, and scale of their attacks, not least since this past spring, revelations around Anthropics Mythos model, OpenAI's pre-release models accessing the Internet and hacking their way into the networks of a company called Hugging Face and other networks as we've seen take place over recent weeks and the prevalence of Chinese open weight models have changed the cyber threat landscape and increased the likelihood of even more frequent attacks by state and criminal cyber actors. So given these developments and including waste and wastewater utilities that Americans are dependent upon, we must urgently prioritize cybersecurity and resilience to withstand the types of attacks that are described above. I'm very glad to be here in New York State because New York is a trailblazer for setting nationwide standards, for setting state-specific standards that have a nationwide precedence for the water and wastewater sector, and pairing them with needed resources, even as efforts at the national level have so far stalled. Governor Hochul's announcement that the state would implement the first ever cybersecurity regulations backed by a $2.5 million grant is a powerful start. The regulation implements mandatory cybersecurity requirements, incident reporting, risk-based standards, all of which we've heard already. And in August, when we saw the spate of attacks take place across the United States, of course, New York stepped up its own investment to inject an additional $9 million in funds to those $150 plus utilities statewide. And this, of course, demonstrates action-oriented leadership that other states could follow. At the same time, federal level efforts have lagged. Cyber guidelines at the national level tend to be fragmented. They are voluntary in nature, and they lack the funds to execute them. The executive branch and Congress have been slow to establish national cybersecurity requirements or pair them with the needed resources. However, following the summer's attacks, both Congress and the executive appear to be making moves toward seeking ways to empower the Environmental Protection Agency, which is the agency responsible for water sector resilience including through the Water Cyber Shield Act that Senators Adam Schiff and Amy Klobuchar have introduced And then a 2025 effort that Representative Rick Crawford spearheaded to create a new water risk and resilience organization That proposal is also receiving renewed attention given this summer's events. And those efforts follow an unsuccessful 2023 attempt by the Biden administration to mandate cyber standards for the water sector. In late August, the White House, along with Texas, announced Project Watershed 2050, which is designed to ensure Texas water operators have free access to cybersecurity resources statewide. These actions are promising, and of course they need to be sustained beyond the current moment and also can be scaled nationally and paired with solutions to meet
the challenges that water utility operators across the country face. And finally, I'll just conclude with some recommendations. Going forward, New York should, of course, continue the proactive path that it's taken and that it's committed to. And in the short term, waste and wastewater utility operators should implement basic cybersecurity hygiene, even as state and nationwide initiatives take shape. We've heard about what some of those actions are and happy to discuss in questions. Operators should monitor their systems for anomalous activities and report them to state and federal level authorities. But perhaps most importantly, the executive branch in Congress should act urgently to empower federal agencies like the EPA and establish minimum cybersecurity standards for the water sector nationwide, pairing these with funding and maybe expanding projects like Watershed 2050 Beyond Texas. In the medium and the long term, agencies should partner more closely with state and local entities to ensure they receive the appropriate threat intelligence, as we've discussed already earlier today, to protect against nation's state level threat actors and also work to strengthen the cyber workforce pipeline with critical infrastructure already vulnerable and nation-state actors demonstrating consistent intent and a capability the nation cannot afford to wait to make these changes thank you for the opportunity to provide my testimony today i look forward to answering your questions thank you that was very informative
of a lot to take in and well so thank you for that first I just if you could please explain to us and me specifically to just get a better understanding what is what what did you mean
by pre-positioning what does that mean sure so in the case of this China linked China nation state-length threat actor, Volt Typhoon, what we – when I was in government in the 2023, kind of into the Biden administration, there were lots of discussions around this. Essentially, these actors have taken an approach of gaining access to U.S. critical infrastructure, including water, energy, and communications, and maintaining that access persistently. And what's different about this approach is that it is not tied to any ransom, not tied to financial gain, but to maintain that persistent access, which has led the intelligence community and government officials to assume that China's intent is to disrupt these systems in the future, as opposed to in the present moment.
Thank you. So now with that, what should these operators be looking for? Can you help us with that? Are there specific things that an operator should be looking for? Kind of like a heads up type deal?
Sure. It's a great question. And fortunately there is a lot of written material that CISA and the FBI and the A wide range actually of intelligence agencies have put out the specific technical detail to answer your question. But more broadly, this really comes to the need for kind of consistent monitoring of networks and of systems so that any one of us who are operating critical infrastructure are able to notice when anomalies are taking place. And in the present day and age with AI uplifting the capability of any cyber threat actor, we also need to be implementing AI in our cyber defenses to be able to more persistently monitor for those anomalies.
If you had one thing that you really would want these operators to be required to do, what would that be?
Sure. A lot of things. Maybe a top three. Sure, sure, sure. So the top three for operators, and I think this gets to the specifics of the New York regulations, is to have, you know, individuals to have staff who are focused on cybersecurity and for there to be, you know, funding to maintain that staff. And I think outside of the New York City context, looking to much smaller kind of rural utilities, there may just be one or two people total who are monitoring those systems and they're using remotely controlled operations. and they might not have the resources to be focusing on cybersecurity. So what we really need to do is to be training up the workforce and to be making sure that however many people are on duty at a utility, that cybersecurity is a top priority for them or making sure that there is resourcing to add someone to a staff that is focused on cybersecurity specifically.
That's it?
I think that to my mind.
I gave you a top three.
Oh, you did give me a top three. Yeah, so that's one. Yeah, so that's one. We need to make sure that we're prioritizing cybersecurity. And then specifically, and we talked about risk-based requirements. Risk-based specifications are important, but identifying what that minimum tier of actions that any utility, and we're talking New York, but I look nationally, that any utility should be implementing. That's incredibly important. This state has taken a sector-by-sector approach, with water being the focus that we're talking about today. That obviously is not the case nationally, and so there is not one set of clear, you know, you must do these things requirements at the national level, and that's really essential, and that's where the national legislation that I spoke about gets to those specifics. So we really do need that. And then the last thing, as we've discussed, we've heard discussed, threatened intelligence sharing is essential. We've lost staff at the federal executive level who are able to provide this type of intelligence. But even with the right staffing, it's really challenging. We need to make sure that at the state level, there are people who can receive the information that is being shared from the executive level, how they have the right clearances so that they can be aware of things like Iran or nation state, Russia or China nation state level cyber threats. And if you don't have that ability to share information, the right people and the amount of information being shared at the executive level and that it's being accurately and completely portrayed to the states, then we're missing a whole level of information that helps make cyber security requirements more effective.
I appreciate that. Thank you. Senator Abacha?
Yes. So today the New York State Chief Cyber Officer shared with us that the intelligence that New York State had been receiving from the federal government regarding potential cyber security threats against our infrastructure had slowed to a trickle since Donald Trump became president
Is that something that you're aware of? Is that something that's happening in all 50 states? Thank you for the question. So what I am aware of in the period of time over the past year plus in which there have been substantial executive branch level staffing cuts is that the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency has lost at least one third of its workforce in the past year plus. Its funding has also been about $700 million, and CISA funding have also been on the chopping block. And this is all as the United States is engaged over the last several months in a new conflict in the Middle East. And so CISA officials have talked about the fact that the threat and the conflict is placing a burden even on the reduced amount of staff that they already have. So to answer your question specifically, less staff means less people able to keep track of these threats and likely less people able to share those threats with the states. And this is in an age when cyber warfare is the new frontier. The wars of the future are arguably not going to be fought with conventional weapons. We're talking about cyber attacks against infrastructure, including civilian infrastructure.
Are we less safe because of the federal government's cuts to these agencies?
So what we are seeing, to agree with your comment, especially in this current conflict, is that for an actor such as Iran whose kinetic capabilities cannot match those of the United States and they also can't necessarily reach the homeland, And there has been a concerted pivot in a focus on leveraging cyber capabilities, as well as space and other non-kinetic kind of digital capabilities. And that is certainly the way that warfare is pivoting, which makes cybersecurity at this level, as we're discussing, incredibly important. And as I mentioned earlier, we're also in an era of AI-enabled cyber conflict. And so we need to be also thinking about the right and appropriate ways to introduce AI-enabled defenses at all levels.
Thank you.
Thank you. Senator Fahey.
Thank you. Very powerful and, once again, very disconcerting. is there an area that you would say where we are particularly underestimating potential cybersecurity threats that we are not, you hit on a number of areas, whether that's underestimating here in New York or underestimating nationally, is there a particular, what's keeping you up at night on some of this? because a lot of it is certainly keeping me up at night with the growing number of AI breaches and cybersecurity breaches. And, Warren, as you mentioned, the fact that part of this growing concern is the fact that the war in Iran has only fueled concerns about breaches.
Thank you for the question. And so maybe to just narrow in on one of the things that keeps me up at night from a public servant and national security perspective at heart and to the kind of scale of the AI cyber threat but also just the advancement of the fast-moving advancements of frontier model capabilities. What keeps me up at night is that always, and even in a best-case scenario, policy lags technology advancement. that that's the case uh regardless of whether we're in 2026 or a decade before but right now we're seeing that challenge exacerbated um at an incredible scale and yet uh i mean i think it has been positive to see just this week that tech executives were at the white house having direct conversations with executive officials um those sorts of combination conversations of course need to happen at the state level as well. But the kind of slow pace of government movement, I think at all levels to engage with the technical advancements and come up with frameworks, broader governance mechanisms so that all Americans can feel safe that their government is on top of advancements that are moving very quickly. I also want to note you mentioned, as we heard earlier this afternoon from the governor's office, about this trickle or the fact that intelligence feeds have dwindled. And what we hadn't heard is that the staff at the federal level is one-third what it was.
Are you seeing, given what has just happened in the last month, and as you noted there was at least a meeting held although the President himself has dismissed some of the overall threats here are you seeing a change? Do you expect them to restaff or are you seeing any help? Because I do believe as much as I'm so pleased that New York as you said is a trailblazer and thank you for that. It gives a bit of comfort but despite the fact that we may be trailblazing on these efforts, are you seeing where we will get any additional help or support and this dwindling of intelligence feeds will turn around at any time soon?
Absolutely. It's a great question, and there is some cause for comfort because I have in recent weeks, maybe months, at the same time as there has been an outflow of expertise from different areas of the federal government, including at CISA, I think senior leaders are starting to recognize that maybe the measures of a year ago were not positioning us well for the threats we face today. And so I think there are actually new hiring initiatives. So that's positive. There's some attempt to kind of turn around the tide of exits from these agencies. However, on the flip side, some of the best expertise has already gone out the door and has gone to industry into other sectors that may have otherwise remained in the executive branch. And so it's hard to know and maybe unlikely to expect that the staffing levels and the expertise that you might have seen before the exodus will return to those levels. But there are attempts now to reinstate hiring.
Thank you. I've only got a couple seconds left here, and I want to be respectful. You mentioned the Adam Schiff and Amy Klobuchar bill. Clearly, that's not a bipartisan bill. and we're in a very partisan phase. Does that, if things change, do you see where that is something that New York can learn from or adopt or what the governor in Texas has put out with the project watershed Do you see something there that we should be looking at on either of those fronts Absolutely So I think yes definitely the
Water Cyber Shield Act, the project water shield activities. And I also noted a Arkansas initiative by Representative Rick Crawford to, I think that was to bolster or to create a water risk and resilience organization. That was in 2025, and that's being reintroduced. So there are some bipartisan efforts.
Good. Thank you.
Thank you, Chair. Thank you. Senator Ryan?
Thank you very much for the information. A couple questions. I've got three quick questions and a request. So you mentioned New York is leading in regulations, which is great. I'm glad that we're a leader. New York's always a leader. But in your opinion, in your assessment, how are we doing as a state implementing those through New York State?
Sure. So I certainly learned a lot from listening to the agencies that have already spoken and would defer to maybe utilities on the ground to provide the best answer. But what stands out most importantly for me and which is what is the key for implementation are the resources that have been allocated and have been matched to the policy requirements, which is, as I noted, very different than what we've seen on the federal level. So that gives me a lot of cause for hope that one of the main sticking points, which is lack of funds, is being addressed through that over $11 million that's now been set aside.
So you think we're doing a good job, we just have to keep funding them?
I would agree with that.
Okay. Second question. What are the most effective implementation systems for water and wastewater systems that plug vulnerabilities?
Can you repeat the question? What are the most effective implementation for systems for wastewater and water systems that plug our vulnerabilities?
What can we do?
Sure. In the most effective way. So fortunately, I've already heard the best answer in the first panel today, which is password 111 cannot be our default or no password at all. These are simple cyber hygiene type activities that we really need to be making sure we're all enacting. essentially the Iranian actors were able to get into these systems and lock out their operators because of those very low-hanging fruit types of activities. So that's step number one. And then maybe I would just footstomp the fact that cybersecurity has to be top of mind for utilities. I think it is now much more than it was before, but it can't recede to become a number 10 priority on our list once we're past the current events.
Okay. I don't know if you can answer this, but I don't know how we can find out. So how many systems, small or rural systems, would you guess currently have Internet-connected operational technology that lacks adequate monitoring and or authentication?
It is a great question and it's one I can take back.
Okay. So the other one I want you to take back is what do you believe is the single greatest cause of our vulnerabilities? And I don't mean like the Iranian war and you know we know that we have hackers, I mean like what causes Where it's password protection or bad passwords and don't use 111. We have people that use the internet that are tied in and they can get in the back door. So that's another question for a takeaway. What would you think would be there? What's the single greatest cause for our vulnerabilities? And then lastly, just a request. If you could provide me with some information. If you were a senator and or tell me what you think that I need to know. Tell me what you think we should know and what we need to do to implement policies, procedures that goes back to the answer, how do we lessen our vulnerabilities? And obviously that's a conversation for another day. But if you could provide me with that information, that would be helpful, and I would appreciate that.
I'd be happy to. Thank you.
Okay. Thank you.
Thank you. Well, Ms. Williams, thank you so much for being here, for your testimony, for your expertise. You definitely opened our eyes to a lot more through your testimony, so thank you.
Good afternoon, Dan.
Thank you. Good afternoon.
Can you hear me?
Yes.
All right. Chair Martinez, Senator Botcher, Senator Ryan, Senator Fahey, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the implementation, fiscal impact, and technical sufficiency of New York's water and wastewater cybersecurity regulations. My name is Daniel Dubois. I'm a member of the Water Utility Council and testifying on behalf of the New York State American Water Works Association. I'm also the director of communications and external affairs for the Suffolk County Water Authority, so wearing two hats today. New York State AWWA is the statewide voice of water professionals who safeguard public health and sustain New York's essential water infrastructure. Our members include operators, engineers, water utility leaders, scientists, regulators, manufacturers, service providers, and other experts who bring firsthand knowledge of the operational, technical, and financial realities facing water systems of every size. New York State AWWA supports New York's efforts to strengthen the cybersecurity and operational resilience of its water and wastewater systems. As the state moves from adopting these regulations to implementing them, the focus must be on ensuring that the requirements achieve meaningful risk reduction within the complex operating environments of public utilities. Every affected utility will be responsible for meeting these requirements, but utilities do not all have the same staffing, financial resources, infrastructure, or access to specialized expertise. Successful implementation will require sustained funding, professionals who understand both cybersecurity and operational technology, clear guidance from each state agency, and reasonable implementation timelines. With the right support, these regulations can strengthen security and resilience while allowing utilities to continue to provide safe and reliable service. Water and wastewater systems operate continuously and cannot simply be shut down for extensive technology upgrades. Many utilities rely on a combination of modern information technology, specialized operational technology, supervisory control and data acquisition systems, and legacy equipment designed to remain in service continuously. This is a presentation of the Department of systems treatment processes and the public health consequences of service disruptions That expertise is limited and can be especially difficult for smaller and resource-constrained utilities to obtain. Technical sufficiency, therefore, cannot be measured only by whether a utility has completed a required document or installed a particular product. The requirements must produce measurable risk reduction without disrupting treatment operations. Implementation guidance should recognize the difference between information technology and operational technology, allow appropriate compensating controls for legacy equipment, and remain adaptable as threats and technologies evolve. It should be developed with continuing input from utility operators, engineers, and cybersecurity professionals. The Department of Health and Department of Environmental Conservation Regulations adopted in 2026 appropriately address operator training, incident reporting, emergency and incident response planning, asset inventories, access controls, vulnerability management, network security, monitoring, documentation, and recurring certification. These are reasonable security objectives. Implementing them correctly, however, requires sustained attention and ongoing investment. The two agencies regulate different systems and impose different requirements. The Department of Health requirements apply to community water systems serving more than 3,300 people, with additional provisions for systems serving more than 50,000 people. The Department of Environmental Conservation requirements include reporting requirements for state pollutant discharge elimination system permittees, as well as additional controls for publicly owned treatment works and monitoring and logging requirements for larger facilities. Utilities must understand which provisions apply, identify qualified assistance, complete assessments, develop or revise plans, procure technology and services, train personnel, and document compliance. Major implementation deadlines beginning in January and March 2027 leave a limited window for this work. Each agency should provide clear, practical guidance so utilities can determine which requirements apply and avoid repeating work already completed. Many water utilities also operate within larger municipal IT environments. Changes such as network segmentation or dedicated systems may require coordination with municipal staff, specialized integration, and additional funding. Implementation guidance should account for these shared systems and the time needed to make changes safely. New York State AWWA recently conducted a preliminary survey of its utility members to better understand the financial impact of the new regulations. Because the sample is preliminary, these results should not be treated as a statewide average. They nevertheless show the magnitude and variability of the costs utilities are confronting. Utilities serving between 10,000 and 50,000 people estimate initial costs of approximately $15,000 to $300,000 and continuing annual costs of approximately $15,000 to $90,000. Utilities serving between 50,000 and 100,000 people estimate costs approximately 15,000 to 350,000 in initial costs and 40,000 to 500,000 in annual costs. Among responding utilities serving 100,000 people or more, estimated initial costs range from approximately 20,000 to more than 350,000, while annual costs ranged from approximately 50,000 to more than 700,000 per year. These estimates include vulnerability assessments third monitoring and scanning software and licensing consulting cybersecurity insurance penetration testing equipment training documentation and staff time The survey confirms that compliance creates both substantial initial expenses and significant recurring obligations In many cases, the annual cost of continuous monitoring, scanning, licensing, testing, and expert support may exceed the initial implementation costs. Utilities also identify broader implementation challenges, including uncertainty about the regulatory expectations, limited staff capacity, compressed timelines, legacy equipment, and difficulty obtaining qualified cybersecurity and operational technology expertise. These issues are interconnected. A utility may understand what must be done but still lack the personnel, procurement flexibility, or financial capacity to complete it on schedule. For a smaller utility with a few licensed operators, the same employees responsible for treatment and daily operations may also have to manage assessments, procurement, training, and cybersecurity documentation. Time away for training or implementation requires staff coverage, while specialized monitoring and support contracts are spread across a limited customer base. This is why recurring funding and access to shared technical expertise matter as much as help with the initial upgrade. Traditional municipal procurement processes can present another obstacle. Cybersecurity and SCADA projects often require specialized qualifications, careful integration, rapid response to evolving risks. Lowest price bidding alone may not identify the provider best qualified to protect an operational system. The legislature should evaluate whether municipalities need expanded access to qualifications-based selection, design-build authority, cooperative purchasing, and updated bidding and bonding thresholds for specialized cybersecurity and SCADA projects. New York State AWWA appreciates the state's early support, including more than $9 million awarded in August 2026 through the Secure Grant Program for 153 cybersecurity projects. This was an important step. However, one-time grants cannot by themselves support continuing monitoring, licensing, testing, training, maintenance, and specialized assistance. Sustainable compliance will require recurring support. New York State AWWA respectfully recommends the legislature take the following actions. Provide recurring funding for both implementation and operations funding should be should cover eligible capital improvements as well as ongoing monitoring software and licensing testing training maintenance documentation and specialized professional services programs should use streamlined applications reasonable local match requirements and predictable funding cycles prioritize systems with limited financial and technical capacity state support should account for utilities customer not only for customers utility-based staffing existing infrastructure fiscal fiscal capacity but also the level of risk not simply the size of an individual product project compliance should not force utilities to choose between cyber security and other public health invest investments that are essential expand accessible technical assistance shared or regional access to professionals who understand both cyber security and water sector operational technology could could expand access to specialized expertise, reduce duplication, and help more utilities use limited public funding effectively. Assistance should include assessments, procurement support, implementation planning, incident response exercises, and workforce training. Use existing processes to identify implementation needs, direct DOH and DEC to draw on regulatory oversight, state grant programs and confidential utility input to brief the legislature on common costs and barriers Report findings in aggregate so future funding reflects demonstrated need without exposing sensitive information I about out of time but I got one more recommendation for you Protect sensitive information and maintain utility involvement Cybersecurity plans network details, vulnerability assessments, and incident information must be protected from unnecessary public disclosure. Utilities should remain directly involved as guidance and programs are refined, working with state and trusted partners such as CISA, EPA, and the American Water Works Association. New York's water and wastewater utilities understand the seriousness of cyber threat and their responsibility to protect the communities we serve. They're prepared to do this work, but durable security depends on more than a compliance deadline. It requires sustained investment, specialized expertise, practical guidance, and a long-term partnership between the state and its utilities. We ask the legislature to support recurring funding, accessible technical assistance, appropriate procurement tools, protection of sensitive information, and aggregate reporting on implementation costs with continued utility input these actions can turn regulatory requirements into measurable risk reduction and lasting operational resilience thank you for the opportunity to testify new york state awwa work looks forward to working with the legislature state agencies and our utility partners on effective implementation i appreciate any questions you have that was a lot no thank you would you like to go first well actually no it's
It's Suffolk County, I'm going first. Thanks, Dan, for being here. Okay, just a couple of questions. We keep hearing funding, right? New York State put in, I believe, 2.5 first. We bumped it up to 9. Clearly, that's not enough. Is that what I got from you two? Can you confirm that $9 million is not enough to secure, secure our municipalities?
Yes, certainly. Statewide, the investment is appreciated, and it certainly goes a long way to helping with that initial implementation. As we've heard today, a lot of the funding went towards initial implementation. I'm sorry, for the initial assessments, but the implementation that's going to follow is going to be expensive. And then, as I've outlined in my testimony, it's the recurring costs that are going to be a major factor. In some cases, as I mentioned, the annual costs in just a single year will outstrip the implementation costs. Those ongoing subscriptions, the contracts for outside contractors who can assist with this technical knowledge that a lot of the smaller utilities do not have on staff, that's all going to be critical and that's going to be recurring. And the requirements as technology continues to improve, we expect the regulations are going to evolve with time. So those costs are only going to increase on top of the additional requirements when it comes to, you know, standards for water quality, infrastructure management, all of these increasing costs that water utilities are facing. This is yet another expense that we have to manage and balance with everything else that we're required to do.
And thank you for that. Thank you for that. Do you feel that the two-month window to apply for this grant was enough time for municipalities?
So I will say, putting on my SCWA hat for a moment, and I am responsible for a lot of our grant applications, the process for the secure grant was extremely simple. And that was very much appreciated as you compare it to a water infrastructure grant, which requires environmental reviews, it requires engineering reports, and a lot of information that we need to provide to the state for them to assess the viability of a project. These grants were very simple. CWA applied for an assessment grant because that two-month window was a very short time span in order to have a timely assessment ready to go. So it was, I will say, it was a very simple process, which is very appreciated, but it was a very short window of time.
Thank you for that. And I know that you gave quite a few recommendations here for the legislature. If there was one, one that we could address those barriers that you put on here, which one would you feel is most important for our municipalities of all these recommendations you gave?
I would certainly recurring funding. It's why I put it first. But also with the understanding that it should not necessarily be based on an application, a competitive grant. It needs to look at the size of the municipality, and not necessarily the size of the project itself, but the number of people that are being served and the technical capabilities of the water provider. So, you know, as we talk about very large water providers like New York City or SCWA, which is a very close second to New York City with 1.2 million people to their 10. We have a sophisticated IT department that understands a lot of this. We have dedicated cybersecurity personnel, which we're very proud of, and that's great. Even we still need assistance with this, and we need to do assessments and assistance with the implementation. When you're talking about utilities that are very small and they're operating with only a few operators who have very little expertise on the IT side, they may understand operational technology, that is something that is significant. But I would also conversely say that for the larger utilities, there may be a philosophy change that's happening right now, which is moving over a lot of this from operational technology, which traditionally may have been operated by the operations side, and IT was not necessarily involved in that. And now because the cybersecurity requirements are becoming more stringent, we have to move that expertise over to IT. So even in that, there's a lot of ongoing costs that are going to be tied to this. So certainly it's the recurring costs.
I have 20 more seconds to go, and I'm not sure it will be followed up by my chairs here, but you mentioned procurements, right, and helping being able to go into a bidding process. Any type of reform to general municipal law that you would recommend?
A specific reform I can follow up with you and I can talk to the folks at EWRA to see if they have something specifically But generally speaking as I mentioned you know having lowest bidder requirements on some of this may not provide the expertise necessary for some of this. Because as I said, it's a very specialized type of person that you need. You need someone who doesn't just understand IT and cybersecurity. You need someone who understands operational technology and, you know, public water processes. They need to understand what it means to take some of these systems offline for a prolonged period of time to make an upgrade. If they don't have that expertise, they're going to come in, they're going to make recommendations that are just not going to be practical. And, you know, that could lead to delays or wasted resources. So, yeah, I think that, you know, that's definitely what I would say.
I appreciate that. Thank you, Dan.
Senator Bacher, or?
I want to thank you for these very specific recommendations. Very helpful. especially the need to focus on recurring funding instead of one-off grants, grants that aren't necessarily always a competitive contest. I really appreciate this testimony.
Thank you.
Senator Ryan? You talked about funding and recurring funding, but then you mentioned the technical capabilities. Could you expand on that? What do you define that, or what did you mean by that?
So operational technology is, as I said, differentiated from information technology. And I will say, you know, I am not in the IT field. I won't pretend to be an expert. But in talking with the IT staff at the Suffolk County Water Authority, you know, they have mentioned that it's a very different philosophy when it comes to IT versus OT. With IT, you know, you want to get the latest firmware updates. You want to have your technology as patched and updated as quickly as possible. With OT, you're dealing with legacy systems that may no longer be supported. And you need to have certain technical steps in place to create an acceptable level of risk because you can't just take your system offline to do widespread updates of firmware. That's not something that you can do. So you need to be looking at things like air gapping, ensuring that these OT systems are not on any internet-based network or they have to have secure networks. So that's the kind of expertise that, you know, an operator of a small system may not fully understand. And having an outside consultant who does that is critical but there a limited number of people Yeah it kind of been a common theme right So I smaller they may not have the expertise to do that So speaking of that the new regulations taking effect beginning in January 2027
Do you believe that the utilities have enough time to understand these requirements and implement the changes safely and effectively?
We're talking about a wide range of groups, and obviously from the more sophisticated, larger utilities. A lot of these regulations are already aligned with best practices. So in that case, yes, we can certainly, you know, certainly a lot of these things are already things that you have been or should be doing already. But when we start talking about the smaller utilities, it's going to be more of a challenge because they may not be as up to date. and they may not have a full understanding, which is where the partnership with the state can really be effective for providing the guidelines that it's clear of what the expectations are. And that's also going to be going into the future. As these technologies change, clear guidance to the utilities to let them know, here's what the expectations are going to be and here are your implementation guidelines so that we're not taking steps that will be outdated by the time they actually come online or they're not going to meet the requirements. So having this understanding as far in advance as possible is going to be helpful. So thank you for that.
And you kind of answered it, but, I mean, I won't hold you to this because it's a bit of a hypothetical, but, you know, what particular challenges do you think for some of our small or more rural water systems, what challenge do you anticipate them having to be in compliance?
Again, it depends. We're dealing with a different range of how utilities operate. In talking with some of the water providers in Nassau County, our neighboring Nassau County, which there's a large number of smaller water providers in Nassau County, and they do not have any IT staff in-house. So everything is contracted out. They have outside consultants, and many of the consultants are operating for many different water districts. One of the things that is a concern is that if we see a widespread sort of attack that could affect multiple people, you've got the same contractors having to respond to multiple systems at once. So it's the, you know, just having the amount of expertise out there I think could be a real concern.
Last question. I'm going to go back to the procurement again. Senator Martinez talked about that. But what so obviously in current so you recommending changes so currently what we have isn necessarily working out that well I think we need to make some modifications to that But is that like really happening? Are we seeing where either municipalities are being hamstrung, if you will, and or getting less than top quality vendors due to the regulations?
I guess the hamstrung – we're not hamstrung. in many superpowers. I guess that's my first question. Yeah, I would say I can't speak to any specific incident that but this is a concern that you know, we want to be sure that we're thinking about this for the future. Well, correct. So I think as we get as the attacks get more sophisticated, and it's not listen, it's not going to get any better. And then that's unfortunate. But as the attacks get more sophisticated, in greater frequency, we're going to need talent to do that. Certainly. And that would be the motivation to change. Yes, yes, I agree with that.
Thank you.
Well, thank you. I really want to say thank you to all of our panelists who were here today, but specifically to both of you right in front of us. You have shown us that there are gaps that we need to close and things that we are doing right, things that we can be doing better. things that we can look into and honestly be even more of a leading state for the rest of the nation. So thank you for that. And I appreciate your expertise on this topic. And again, thank you to each of our witnesses for their participation and their testimony today. And of course, to all our senators who joined us here, to my two co-chairs, Senator Bacher and Senator Ryan. It's been an honor to serve this public hearing, both of you. to all of our team members behind us and next to us. Thank you for all your efforts to put this public hearing together. And, of course, to all of you who provided your time, expertise, and support. We also had written testimony being presented by New York State Association of Counties, New York Conference of Mayors, and the Association of Towns. Thank you for their written testimony. And, of course, this is, again, an important step to better understand the threats that confront us, and this information will allow us to continue to lead the way. in protecting our state infrastructure, municipalities, and water resources. Again, thank you to everyone who came in today and for the apparent work that we're doing to keep New Yorkers safe. This concludes our joint hearing of the local government, Cities 1 and Cities 2 public hearing. Thank you. Thank you.