Ohio House Technology and Innovation Committee - 5-19-2026

Good morning. I will now call this meeting of the House Technology Innovation Committee to order. If you are able, please stand for the Pledge of Allegiance.

Clerk, if you please call the roll. Chair Claggett? Here.

Ranking Member Mohammed. Rep Bryant Bailey is excused.

Representative Demetrio? Here.

Representative Hall? Here.

Representative Ty Matthews? Here.

Representative Miller? Representative White is excused.

for a motion. Thank you, Chair. I move to amend House Bill 317 with amendment AM 1362322-1.

Chair briefly explain the amendment? This bill delays the bill's provisions prohibiting the purchase and operation of small unmanned aircraft systems manufactured by certain foreign entities until 24 months after the bill's effective date and exempts a public entity from the bill's prohibition against purchasing or operating small unmanned aircraft systems manufactured by foreign entities if the public entity obtains written permission from the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration, the Federal Communications Commission, or the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Thank you.

Please proceed, sir. Thank you. Thank you. Chair Claggett, Vice Chair Workman, I know Ranking Member Wilhelmideson here and members of the House Technology and Innovation Committee Thank you for the opportunity to provide testimony regarding House Bill 317 My name is Scott Malakar I the retired assistant chief for the lead fire department current administrative officer I'm also the chief in charge of the Lake County Unmanned Response Team. I am also the director of the Ohio Public Safety U.S. Coordination Group, or OGRU, and the director of the Northeast Ohio Public Safety Unmanned Response Teams Group. I've served for public safety for 43 years, including the last decade, developing and operating public safety drone programs in our area and across Ohio. I'm here representing Ohio public safety agencies from across the state that share serious concerns regarding House Bill 317. Many of the concerns I'm presenting today were already raised during testimony on Senate Bill 180 earlier this year. During consideration of SB 180, extensive operational, financial, and public safety concerns were presented. regarding the bill regarding the retroactive prohibition of existing public safety drone fleets. The Senate heard those concerns and ultimately chose not to advance that legislation. In addition, following the FCC action in December, the decision not to move forward with SB 180, many public safety agencies believed clear direction had finally emerged regarding future procurement while allowing continued operation of those systems. Many agencies knew the FCC ruling was coming. They weren't sure what direction they would take, and once they knew what direction they would take, that provided them the ability to move forward, because a lot of them were holding off on replacing aged equipment or starting new equipment. Unfortunately, that uncertainty has now returned. And I kind of regress here. There's two bills, 317, House Bill 251, which your house originally addressed law enforcement use of UAS, and contain no operational restrictions when it passed the House. This was amended in the Senate to include language that prohibit future use of legally purchased public safety aircraft without providing replacement funding. Now House Bill 317 recreates the same issues and expands many of the same operation on financial concerns previously identified in the Senate testimony during 180. I understand the intent behind House Bill 317. I've actually met with Representative Matthews probably a year ago, and we discussed that related to another bill, that any ban on the aircraft we had would be of concern to us, and that we definitely needed time to transition to that, because we knew that changes were coming, and we understood that. Protecting critical infrastructure, sensitive data, and public safety operations from domestic and foreign threats is a responsibility we don't take lightly, and we do take measures now as we fly to make sure our data is locked down. I understand, however, as written, the House Bill 317 does not eliminate this risk. It shifts operational risk and financial burden back onto first responders and the communities that they protect. Public agencies across Ohio rely on small-in-man aircraft systems every day to support search and rescue, fire ground, hazmat operations, disaster damage assessment, law enforcement and SWAT operations, counter-UAS, and a whole lot more. It's become an integral part of what we do. It's no different than the defibrillator on the fire truck, the hose on the ladder, or a firearm to a police officer. I have personally seen these drone operations make difference between missing person being lost indefinitely and being safely returned to their family. These systems are no longer emerging technology They mission tools and they reduce responder risk and they improve outcomes At the same time I recognize cybersecurity concerns are real and deserve thoughtful discussion But these concerns surrounding foreign manufacturer drones are not primarily aircraft issues they are data management issues, and those risks can be effectively controlled. Drone data can be secured by disabling cloud connectivity, retaining imagery on government-controlled servers, operating on secured agency networks, and using agency-issued MDM-managed devices. I'd say that we already manage far more sensitive information including body-worn camera footage, investigative video, EMS records, criminal incident recordings using these same controls. To date, there has been no documented case of public safety drone data being compromised or exfiltrated due to manufacturing access. House Bill 3171 prohibit the continued operation of existing public safety drones, and I know this was amended for two years after passage, I believe, without reading it, that was the thing. And that, honestly, is just not enough time. And we tried to communicate that when we testified for Bill 180. They had mentioned three to four years. What we're asking for is end of life, and I'll explain a little bit more here in a minute. This provision alone, in two years, would ground 98% of public safety drone fleet statewide. Basically all of them. Force agencies to abandon fully functional aircraft. Many agencies, after the passage of the FCC role where they had clarity, now went and started purchasing and replacing. Our agency included aircraft. So all of those aircraft now that we've reinvested in and spent time on, now they're two years in. Our service life on these aircraft range five to eight years, and we budget for that. These are capital budgets. Force agencies to abandon fully functional aircraft and validate thousands of dollars of training and certification, and the bottom line is create a major unfunded replacement cost. We all know that NDA-compliant drones are more expensive, and that's fine given if we have time to budget for that. But budget cycles run three to five years. These are capital purchases. It's nothing we could even come close to doing within that time frame. We have begun compiling, and I looked at the financial data that was reported from this bill, and we have begun compiling data through the Ohio Public Safety U.S. Coordination Group to assess existing inventory and projected cost of compliance for 317. While those statewide figures are still being evaluated, they're a very high number, and I don't want to rely on them. Alden's going to use numbers from our team in Lake County. We've been in use for 10 years. We have about 20 aircraft. It covers all of Lake County, big and small. While those, if our existing public safety drone fleet were required to remove from service and replace with compliant aircraft, the first year replacement cost would be $775,600, three quarters of a million dollars. That's just to turn around and replace what we have. When ongoing licensing and software and sustainment costs are included, projected five-year cost is $1.53 million. I know I can't go to the narcotics board, the board of commissioners, and say, hey, fun fact, all of the drones that we have and that we rely upon now will need to be replaced. We have a two-year window. So in the first year, I need three-quarters of a million dollars, and then I will need about $1.5 million over three to five years for data. It's just not something that's going to happen. And this is just Lake County. There are 88 counties in Ohio, and I can assure you all of those counties at some level are now integrated and are using unmanned aircraft. For many smaller rural and regional agencies this would not be a transition It would effectively end the public safety drone program I can assure you because no replacement funding exists and due to increased cost of India compliant models they could not sustain a program and those are agencies that typically have less manpower and therefore a drone is having the ability to utilize an unmanned aircraft is of great benefit when you have far fewer people to go looking for the lost or missing person where it was going on. As I already mentioned, on December 22, 2025, the FCC Commission took action restricting authorized pathways for new foreign manufactured drone models entering the U.S. market without FCC approval. This is already happening at the federal level. Importantly, that action was not retroactive. Federal regulars did not order first responders to ground existing aircraft to prohibit operation of lawfully authorized systems. They recognized critical distinction stopping future procurement is fundamentally different from from grounding existing public safety capabilities and they also I might add not only targeted countries of origin which is essentially what this bill does they said all foreign-made drones and components so they actually took it far further to ensure that all of that data and supply chain was covered all right federal regulators federal regulators understood that any transition will require both time and proper funding and that's honestly what we're asking for here today. If FEC is determined it's inappropriate to retroactively ground public safety fleet it raises a serious policy question of why Ohio would impose restrictions the federal government explicitly declined to apply. And additionally House Bill 317 prohibits the use of state funds in connection with restricted drones to contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements. This language creates significant unintended consequences during large-scale emergencies. Ohio routinely relies upon mutual aid partners, specialized contractors that come in, the train derailment. There were people from all over the place in East Palestine, right? Multi-state response from teams during tornado outbreaks, power companies come in and help us restore the power, mass casualties, infrastructure failures, and other major disasters. Under House Bill 317, these resources may be unable to deploy critical aerial capabilities and they do use them if state funds are involved, even when those agencies are fully trained, federally compliant, operating lawfully from their home states. States have acted similar legislation, particularly Florida was kind of the first one to go and you may be aware of. And about four years ago, the bill went through, they literally said you have this much time and they banned them within a year. It decimated the state. The first hurricane that came rolling through Florida, when all of those agencies now did not have, were spooled up, had aircraft, and all the subcontractors came in to restore the power and the lights and everything else, they were all using the aircraft that we have, typically aircraft that come from China. If you ban those, legally, those assets would not be able to come in and utilize that hardware. So I know it's an unintended thing, but Florida is a really good case where they actually had to pivot, adjust the legislation, and And in addition to that, provided funding for what they had done. When they realized how big of a problem it was, they provided, I think it was $25 to $35 million in funding to help agencies replace their aircraft. The other serious concern is that House Bill 3-7 districts train public safety agencies but not the general public. This means civilians and volunteers and hobbyists can legally purchase new drones or our stuff, because we're going to have to sell it, right, to be able to afford new drones. And they could fly those wherever they want in any way they They could show up at my fire scene, provide me wonderful pictures, they can fly over facilities, which they do now, we all know this, because there's no restraints on them. They're not policy driven, alright, they're certainly not securing data. Those aircraft aren't disappearing, they're not getting shredded up, they're going to still be in that chain, and again, that increases the risk, doesn't lessen the operational risk. Ohio Public Safety agencies have invested significant time, training, and taxpayer resources into coordinated drone programs. Over the past several years, we have formed the Ohio Public Safety U.S. Coordination Group, conducted statewide emergency planning surveys working with Ohio EMA and Ohio Homeland Security, expanded regional training programs across four regions of the state, developed the Ohio Public Safety Drone Conference at the Ohio Fire Academy, The Law Enforcement Drone Association formed a chapter here in Ohio to do just that, to help coordinate and train responders. And we train hundreds of public safety pilots annually, supporting and expanding these public safety programs that are so critical to our response. House Bill 317 risks significantly reversing that progress, not because of a demonstrated public safety failure, but because of a policy approach misaligned with operational reality, physical responsibility, and current federal precedent. I respectfully ask the committee to remove any operational ban of existing equipment until we reach end of life. Two years is too short, and I'll use an example I thought of on my drive down here. If they were to tell me that my EKG or a chip in my truck was now not secured, and they said you have to get rid of all those EKGs within two years, and you can replace them, but you haven't budgeted for it, and it's going to cost you significantly more, so you would need more time. I would lose all of that life-critical hardware. I might be able to buy one or two, might be able to get one or two. Remember with the replacement thing, if this occurs, the U.S. supply chain, and we've seen this with other agencies, aren't capable right now. I know agencies that have purchased NDA-compliant drones and waited six to eight months just because they're not spooled up to handle this change. And so the FCC recognized that and did that. But now you call for an ambulance, and the ambulance shows up, and they go, well, we don't have an EKG, I'm sorry, life-critical piece of equipment, but we can only have one, and it's tied up over here. You're taking equipment that we rely upon. We can't replace one for one if we don't have funding. So if you're going to ask for an operational ban and set a thing for two years, then our ask would simply be, then we need some help and support as they did in Florida. Align the Ohio law with current FCC policy in addressing future procurement without retroactively grounding existing fleets. Establish a fully funded one-for-one replacement program before requiring equipment removal. And lastly, form a multidisciplinary working group of public safety, aviation, and cybersecurity professionals to establish best practices specifically related to data, because regardless of whether the aircraft is made here or it's made in China or it's made anyplace else, data and that security of that data is important. And so we should be talking with each other and handling these problems. House Bill 317 is well-intentioned, but as written, creates a greater operational financial risk while solving none that had not already been addressed at their federal level. Public safety agencies are not asking to expand or modernize with restricted technology, nor are we ignoring the importance of cybersecurity and data protection. We simply asking to continue using the tools already purchased with taxpayer dollars and community donations that public safety agencies depend on every day to protect and save lives across Ohio as well as support and funding to transition to NDA aircraft as we move forward We are asking for practical policy that protects both security and ability to save lives. Ohio should not impose a retroactive ban that even the federal government declined to implement. I thank you all for your time and consideration. I'd be happy to answer any questions.

Good morning, Chief. Thank you for coming in today, and thank you for your many years of service to the state of Ohio and keeping your community safe. I just got off the fire truck this morning at 6 o'clock. Some of that equipment you're talking about, we used yesterday in different calls, and you're absolutely right. I just have two quick questions for you, not to try and catch you on anything. Just in regards to the Florida example you used, if there was an appropriation that was added or considered by this committee, what would that appropriation look like as far as an amount up to? In your opinion, it can be a rough number. And then the second thing, kind of what you talked about there at the end of your testimony, talking about the data security, was there any other measures that other states or that FORDA did specifically in your research that shows that they focused on that data security piece as well going forward? To the House, to the representative.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Yeah, on the data, and that's a good question because a lot of times that seems to be the impetus behind a lot of these bills, right? They're concerned that that data could be unsecured. A simple thing, what we do in Lake County, I know other agencies have done, and Ohio is not the first state to do this. Other responders have had these bills proposed and have presented and educated. We have a platform that's on a U.S.-based server called DroneSense, and there's others as well. And what that essentially means is when we fly that aircraft, we do not use the software that they provide for the flight. It's the DroneSense software that handles all of the flight stuff. It's tied to data. The data is secured, obviously, with U.S.-based servers. So that's generally how we mitigate it. The other thing, just so you know with all these aircraft, in this particular case, in DJI's case, because that's essentially who we're talking about here, they make up about 96% of all the aircraft. You do have the ability to shut data off. There are ways to do that. At the end of the day, a chip can't talk to anything if there not data and I can control whether or not it connected to the internet or not When we update the aircraft we have a laptop that not part of our network This is our IT people This is what I trying to tell you Go to any city that has an aggressive IT department they going to be like nope, you can't do that. You can't put that flash drive in. We have a separate laptop that's downloaded, that's loaded up, that keeps it off the network and doesn't touch it. So those are the type of data controls. The operational side, using software that is on US-based servers, and conversely on the IT side, locking down.

I'll keep it short. I understand.

Thank you, Chair. Actually, my question was addressed in Rep Hall, so thank you for that. Yeah, perfect.

Representative Matthews. Thank you, Chair. I'll be really quick because I've got another testimony I've got to get to. I just want to address some things that I've heard that I want to really focus in on what this, bill seeks to address. And I would ask every one of the agencies here, when is the last time you purchased a foreign-made drone? Because this wasn't just a 2025 issue. Back in 2017, the Department of Defense started raising these concerns with other court cases happening in the meantime. I've spoke with the lobbyists at DJI, and the security concerns are not software concerns. The FCC ruling, it's not about software concerns. It's all about hardware concerns. So when you look at what the FCC said, they're also looking at putting limitations on all Chinese-made telecommunication devices that are hardware-driven. Because if you don't know what they're making in the factory, you don't know what the security risk is. I would point to this past trip that our president took to China. before they got on Air Force One, there was a huge trash can that they dropped everything into. They weren't worried about the software. They were worried about the hardware. I do have the same concerns, though, about the timeline. We don't want to put anyone into public safety at risk for this. However, looking at what the federal government is doing, I believe that it would behoove us to start this process. But also, when we talk about potential programs, it's not the type of money that we are talking about here by any means, but in the past budget, we started the Drones for First Responders program to start that off-ramp of foreign-made drones to U.S.-made drones. But that being said, I think the security concerns that I have are not attached necessarily to the software. It is the hardware of these drones, but also the supply chain. And I'll be the first one to tell you, when you pull in, you know, I've got to watch how I say this, I guess. But when we, in other agencies, when you receive foreign-made goods that have telecom devices similar to a drone, we don't go up there and just put them straight up. You gut the insides of those. You gut the hardware out, and then you field that. That goes from TVs, cell phones, or whatever it may be. So that is where my concern lies. I think there's a lot of legitimate concerns that are brought up that we should talk about. But just to remind everyone, this crux of this amendment and this bill has been amended into House Bill 251, just so we're all on the same common operating picture on where this may go. Thank you, Chair.

I believe I did. All right. That's fair.

Thanks Mr Chair thanks Chief for driving down I know it not a long it not a short drive from Lake County but quick question like I know you probably have a bunch of different aircraft in your fleet, but just in your situation, what would you say like the average life cycle is like in years for most of these aircraft? And like, or like when are you guys underwriting to renew or replace the current fleet? I think it would be helpful for us to understand that.

Right. Okay.

I appreciate your time. Thank you, sir. Appreciate that very much.

Thank you, Chair, and the rest of the committee here. on House Bill 317. I appreciate the opportunity to come in and give testimony to this, and I will respectfully keep this very brief because I believe a lot of the testimony has already been supplied. So with the data security that you guys were just talking about, I worked for a law enforcement agency for over 30 years. I still manage and run the public safety drone unit for the city of Willard. I also run the state chapter for the Ohio Law Enforcement Drone Association, And like Scott briefly talked about, we talk about training programs. And I believe we are the responsible stewards of government and our communities. We are the responsible ones doing the right thing, if you will. With that, with the first point, with data security, yes, there are air gap systems. There are systems in place. And relating to Mr. Matthews, Representative Matthews, hardware issue, none of the data that I take or retrieve or compile is all public transparent. We can provide those flight logs, provide any data or pictures or photos at a public records request. There's no data that, if we're leaked, would I have any concerns about, nor do I believe our foreign adversaries would be interested in finding missing persons or fires or et cetera. So with that, hopefully that addresses the data security issue. Again, operational financial impact. I come from a small rural county and community. We put a lot of hard work and effort into grants to start these programs. These programs are very important to us. We use them on a regular basis, and the financial impact with this would be devastational. We don't have funds in our city budgets or county budgets to go out and rip and replace all of these drones, even in a two-year time frame. These drones that we're using still have a lot of life in them, and they are legal and compliant drones, as we speak today, based on the FCC, and there's no real operational need to just ground these fleets of drones that we have. The taxpayers have already made an investment into these drones, as again, as our cities and counties have also invested into that. We have lots of usable life, and I believe that was a earlier in Scott's testimony as well to answer his question the last drone that we purchased in our area was in 2025. Also with the federal there's no federal funding or state grants available for this we're not against using NDAA compliant drones we just need that path to get there if you can replace what we have on a one-to-one basis or some other type of grant mechanism. The DFR grant that was proposed by the state was very limited. We did apply for that. However, there was only, I believe, eight entities in Ohio that were awarded that contract. So that's very limiting when we have large amounts of drilling programs in the state. The state program that was presented was very restrictive on who could get those awards. Again, the recommendation, and I'll kind of conclude here, is that give us some time to use our drones that we already procured that are already legal and compliant. Let us use those to the end of their life and we'll move forward on this path to NDAA compliant drones. We just need some funding and help getting there. Put that out to the chair.

We appreciate it. My question is related to the demand and the supply that was in the market when these decisions were made. So if there was an option between a USA-made drone or a China-made drone, I just want to better understand how those decisions are made. Is it a matter of pricing or is it a matter of supply?

Okay, Representative Muhammad, the last question.

And as far as the materials that you're trying to change, do we not have the raw materials to upgrade that? Or do we have to get rid of the entire drone and buy sort of a U.S.-made drone? So what are some of the things that are needed to upgrade the current drones to a U.S.-made drone? Sure. Do the chair. Thank you, Representative. To answer your question, these drones should be used to the end of their life. We've already purchased and procured them, so they cannot be upgraded. They would basically be thrown away or done with or end of life as far as their use. The new, I think the key here is procurement. the FCC has already kind of dictated this what is allowed in this country what is not allowed as far as foreign entities providing these drones they already set that standard if you will and that a standard that we would be obligated to fulfill as well So if moving forward, we would have to purchase drones that are NDA compliant, and it would not be something that we would interchange or be able to use or upgrade on our previous platforms. These would just exhaust themselves, and we would look forward to moving forward and procuring NDA-compliant drones in the future. So I think that would be the factor, if you will.

Thank you, Chair.

Please proceed. Good morning, Chairman Cloggett and members of the House Technology and Innovation Committee. Thank you for having me here today. My name is McKenna Plowman, and I serve on the state government affairs team at Coinbase. Coinbase is the largest cryptocurrency platform in the United States and has been publicly traded since April 2021. Our mission is to increase economic freedom globally, and we believe that blockchain technology is a key driver in achieving that in the future. We provide a secure marketplace where customers can buy, sell, and custody over 300 different types of digital assets. Coinbase aims to be the most trusted cryptocurrency platform in the world by prioritizing consumer protection, security, and compliance. We are proud to hold a money transmitter license with the Ohio Division of Financial Institutions and are also regulated as a money services business under FinCEN within the United States Treasury, which requires know-your-customer compliance. Ohio is a very important state for Coinbase and to the broader digital asset ecosystem. Over 52 million Americans own cryptocurrency, including 1.4 million Ohioans. The state has consistently demonstrated leadership through thoughtful and pragmatic policymaking and has been on the forefront of innovation and financial technology. The legislation before you continues that tradition. It modernizes Ohio's unclaimed funds framework by creating parity between digital assets and traditional financial assets. This bill provides clarity on how digital assets should be handled once they are deemed abandoned and a company is unable to reestablish contact with the owner. Specifically, it allows unclaimed digital assets to be transferred to the state in their original digital asset form, similar to how brokerages, transfer agents, and mutual funds are currently delivered unclaimed securities to the Division of Unclaimed Funds within the Department of Commerce. This approach benefits all parties by providing clear operational guidance for companies, reducing administrative complexity and potential liability for the state, as well as better protecting Ohio residents. We have seen exponential growth in the digital asset ecosystem and adoption over the last two decades and expect this trend to continue. Establishing this infrastructure now positions Ohio to lead on modernized unclaimed funds practices and stay ahead of increasing adoption. Accepting assets in kind also creates a clear audit trail by preserving precise records of assets and quantities transferred. In addition, receiving assets in kind provides the Department of Commerce with greater flexibility. If no owner makes the claim within two years the Director of Commerce may arrange the sale and all proceeds from that sale will be deposited into the Unclaimed Funds trust fund Ohio has been on the forefront of digital asset adoption and policymaking Passage of this legislation would further reinforce the state's leadership position, particularly given the handful of states that have implemented similar policies. Coinbase thanks to Representatives Demetrio and Williams for their work on this important matter. We proudly support House Bill 426 and are eager to see the state continue to embrace this transformational technology. Thank you again for the opportunity to testify and I'm happy to answer any questions.

or make my comment better. I'm happy for her to do that.

Okay. Do you want to comment any further on that?

Yeah, fair enough. Okay, last call of questions. All right, you have one. Okay, sorry. Okay. Yeah, not a question, but more of a comment. Thank you for your testimony.

Okay, that's fair. All right. Okay, very good. Thank you very much for being with us today. I appreciate your help on that. All right, this concludes the third hearing for House Bill 426.

Thank you, Chair Claggett, Vice Chair Workman, Ranking Member, Mohamed, members of the House Technology and Innovation Committee. Thank you very much for the opportunity to provide testimony on House Bill 301, the Digital Fair Repair Act. My name is Matt Coppich. I'm a partner at the law firm Ricker, Graydon, Wyatt, representing the Ohio Manufacturers Association today. The OMA created in 1910 to advocate for Ohio's manufacturers has approximately 1,300 members statewide, and its mission is to protect and grow Ohio manufacturing. As you may know, manufacturing is the largest of the state's 20 major industry sectors, and in 2025, manufacturing contributed more than $135 billion annually to Ohio's economy, accounting for nearly one-fifth of Ohio's private industry GDP. I'll just give you a little brief history with this particular topic. In 2023, OMA opposed the predecessor to this bill, Senate Bill 73, due to its scope and exposure of proprietary technology and information and risks for litigation. On October 21st, 2025, OMA renewed those concerns in testifying against House Bill 301. The OMA does appreciate the sponsor's attempt to narrow the overall scope of the legislation with the recently adopted amendment in this committee. However, OMA remains opposed to the underlying legislation. While the number of exclusions increased, manufacturers subject to this bill's requirements still face unacceptable risks to their intellectual property and risks of litigation. For example, House Bill 301 requires original equipment manufacturers, OEMs, to provide tools at no charge except physical costs without requiring authorization or Internet access for the tool operation. Many OEM diagnostic or calibration tools are cloud authenticated or monitored, which creates conflicts with common cybersecurity controls, secure portals, access logs, role-based access. So for connected equipment, removing those controls can expand the attack surface, and even though the bill still allows secure systems for security lock materials and doesn't require bypassing owner-activated protections. So forcing an OEM to provide offline or unrestricted tooling creates cybersecurity risks, putting both the consumer and the OEM at risk of loss of intellectual property or data. The legislation also continues to undermine authorized repair provider networks. An authorized repair provider network gives consumers confidence that a repair is done correctly and safely without jeopardizing a manufacturer's warranty, requiring that OEMs provide parts at the most favorable terms offered to authorized repair providers disincentivizes repair providers from joining that authorized network. House Bill 301 requires OEMs documentation, which includes manuals, diagrams, security codes, and passwords. And even with an exception for trade secrets, OMA remains very wary that this mandate presents an additional risk to their intellectual property. The line between repair, critical information, and proprietary algorithms, calibration tables, and security keys is thin. Disclosure risks reverse engineering safety systems and exposing cryptographic material, despite the bill's trade secret language. Even with the expanded exceptions for covered products, House Bill 301's low-value threshold and the functional test could capture some industrial controls, sensors, and enterprise devices not covered by the exclusions. Misrepair of such systems could pose safety, environmental, and operational risks, underscoring the need for tighter safeguards for calibration-critical equipment. House Bill 301 bans parts pairing, but that could unintentionally sweep up some legitimate safety and quality controls. Many manufacturers use serialization and software pairing to make sure replacement parts are calibrated correctly and meet safety or emission standards. Those checks help keep things like batteries, sensors, and wireless systems operating safely and securely. A broadband might make it harder to maintain those safeguards. House Bill 301 also links violations to the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act, creating a private cause of action with the remedies in revised code section 1345.09 and attorney general enforcement. That enforcement model allows, in certain cases, class litigation and enhanced, including trouble damages, raising compliance and litigation risk without a clear showing of proportional consumer benefit. And I just want to touch more so and amend a little bit my written testimony here. Creating that private cause of action, I have in here that would make Ohio the only state if we were to enact this with a private cause of action for right to repair law. I did in my research late last night discover Massachusetts does allow private cause of action but their law is limited only to automobiles. So for these types of products it's covered under this law Ohio would still be the only one with that private cause of action. Ohio manufacturers already operate authorized repair and training programs tailored to their products. So one-size-fits-all repair mandate can unintentionally weaken safety and quality controls increase the risk of counterfeit or poorly calibrated parts and widen the cyber security attack surface for connected devices even with the bill current carve from the most recent amendment So for these reasons OMA respectfully asks this committee to reject House Bill 301 I'm happy to answer any questions.

Thank you, Chair. Thank you for your testimony today. Much appreciated. So because we have such a demand from our constituents to have this right to repair legislation, My question to you, and I know that there are other alternatives, is related to the certification process. So there are pathways that our manufacturers provide for folks to better understand how to repair on their own and be certified to do so with the appropriate approvals to use that intellectual property access. Can you speak a little bit more about that and how that affects the right to repair legislation?

So if I understand your testimony, you're representing the industry as being diametrically opposed to this.

You know this you know there not a I understand you may be hearing a lot from constituents that want to undertake these repairs There not a groundswell of these being enacted By my count there only seven states total that have enacted a bill similar to this This would be far more expansive than all of those other ones, even in California. Well, I just find it fascinating when someone comes in, when there is significant pressure from the community on a relatively expensive equipment, and you come in and you're opposed to that, and I'm far more interested in people that come in and are trying to help us get better legislation, but I think I'm reading yours as being opposed, significantly opposed. That doesn't particularly sit well, and so I'm trying to figure out if you're going to be helpful or if you're just simply going to say no way, no how.

Fundamentally, who do you think the law should favor, consumer or manufacturer?

And so where's the balance in here?

Fair enough. I think we're trying to exert some pressure. So hooray to John Deere. Yeah.

I appreciate that. But I'm sending you back home with a message that says we want some help.

Representative, you have one more question? This will be the last one. We are just about out of time. All right.

Chairman to the ranking member, thank you very much for the question. Yeah, I think my view on that, and I have to go get a more technical answer from, again, some of my colleagues back at the firm that practices in this area every day. I think one of our concerns is what is truly a trade secret might be in the eye of the beholder, and that's part of the litigation risk that we're concerned about here. is something that the company, that the manufacturer determines to say, hey, that's critical to maintaining our firewalls between our cloud-based services that monitor calibration tools, for example. You're putting that at risk. You know, every person that wants to undergo their self-repair is not a bad actor, but the truth is there are going to be bad actors there that are going to use this to try and reverse engineer and trade on those trade secrets or do some sort of, you know, do some harm to the consumer or the manufacturer. So I think it creates kind of a gray area that we are not comfortable with, and so I think that's our issue. I think we'd be, again, in the spirit of the dialogue I just had with the chair, we are more than happy to continue engaging, looking at other states. Again, this bill is more expansive than California, New York, Oregon, Washington, states that the Ohio General Assembly doesn't normally look to follow, let it go further then.

Thank you.